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ABSTRACT 
This thesis sets out to examine Kant's criticism of the 
cosmological argument. Kant's general philosophical views 
are expounded and his reasons for the rejection of 
metaphysics are explained. 
In the course of the argument Kant's own analysis of the 
cosmological proof is discussed. He laid great stress on the 
fact that there are two stages involved in the cosmological 
proof. His principal criticism concerns its second stage. 
There the proponent of the proof seeks to move from the 
necessary being, whose existence is said to have been 
established in the first stage of the argument, to God. 
Kant's claim that the second stage of the proof involves the 
principle of the ontological argument is discussed as is his 
criticism of the ontological argument itself. 
There are two principal forms of the cosmological 
argument. These are the argument from contingency and the 
first cause argument. Kant discusses both in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, the one in his critique of rational theology, 
the other in his chapter on the Antinomies. The thesis 
discusses the Kantian criticisms of both forms of the 
argument and considers how these criticisms may be answered. 
Kant's criticism of the second stage of the cosmological 
proof is also discussed and it is argued that his principle 
that this must be a pure a priori argument is unduly 
restrictive. 
Finally the possibility of founding a criticism of the 
cosmological argument on the central doctrines of the 
Critique of Pure Reason is discussed. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter I Kant's theory of knowledge is here discussed. 
Metaphysics claims to provide synthetic a priori 
truths. These claims are unfounded but 
metaphysics is nevertheless the natural issue of 
reason. Rational theology is founded on the 
Ideal of Pure Reason which is produced by reason 
when it considers the conditions necessary for 
the 'complete determination' of things. The 
argument by which this is established has 
affinities with the Beweisgrund proof. 
Chapter 2 Kant's account of the cosmological proof is 
analysed. He insists that there are two stages 
involved in the proof and that the second 
presupposes the ontological proof.. His argument 
here is open to question. Since he has rejected 
the ontological proof the cosmological proof is 
regarded as not merely superfluous but invalid. 
Chapter 3 Ln his analysis of the cosmological proof Kant 
seeks to set ii t out in its correc-f- log -i St 
ic 
f orm. Far from clarifying the issues involved 
this analysis has led to complications and 
misunderstandings. Kant's contention that the 
second stage of the proof depends on the 
ontological proof is undermined by his own 
Beweisgrund proof which provides another way of 
I establishing a connection between necessary being 
and the ens realissimum. Even if the second 
stage were dependent on the ontological proof it 
would not follow that the cosmological argument 
was superfluous as it might still be appealed to 
in order to show the world's dependence on God. 
To bring down the cosmological proof by showing 
it to be dependent on the ontological we need to 
prove the ontological proof to be invalid. 
Chapter 4 The Kantian criticisms of the ontologial proof 
are discussed. His claim that we cannot think 
the concept of necessary being because there is 
no being that cannot be thought away regardless 
of its predicatesis considered. His view that 
existence is, in any case, not a predicate is 
criticised. Kant' s arguments against the 
ontological proof are inconclusive. The 
proponent of the proof is, however, left with the 
problem of defending the notion of necessary 
being. 
Chapter 5 The notion of necessary being is analysed. Some 
SUggeSt that the concept Of factually necessary 
being is all that the cosmological proof 
requires. This is, in fact, inconsistent with 
the presuppositions of the proof. We can avoid 
the difficulties associated with the notion of 
logically necessary being without being forced 
to accept factually necessary being., The notion 
of real necessity is put forward and defended. 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 7 
The argument from contingency is defended against 
the charge that it is question begging. Kant 
rejects the principle of sufficient reason. His 
own principle that the possible presupposes the 
actual may, however, be substituted for that of 
sufficient reason by the proponent of the proof. 
It can also be argued that if the proof is 
question begging then an empty world could only 
exist necessarily. From this we can derive an 
indirect form of the proof. 
The tirst cause argument is considered. The 
argument derives from Aristotle and was discussed 
by Aquinas. Kant deals with it in the dynamical 
antinomies. His argument here is that the 
conditioned presupposes the unconditioned. The 
argument is rejected but it is argued that its 
defects spring not from invalidity in its 
reasoning but from the falsity of its premisses. 
Chapter 8 The first antinomy deals with another version of 
the tirst cause argument. According to this 
argument there must have been a first cause of 
the world series of events because there cannot 
be an infinite series of past events. Kant's 
argument in the thesis of the antinomy is 
defended while that of the antithesis is 
rejected. The difficulty for the proponent of 
the proof concerns the use to be made of the 
notion of an absolutely first event. To make use 
of it he has to show that there cannot have been 
an uncaused physical event. 
Chapter 9 The versions of the proof that have so far been 
discussed complete only the first stage of the 
proof. We must now consider how the necessary 
being or f irst cause whose existence is said to 
have been demonstrated by the f irst stage of the 
proof is to be identif ied with God. Kant holds 
that the only way that the second stage of the 
proof can be completed is by appealing to the 
principle of the ontological argument. Leibniz's 
version of the proof contains a second stage but 
this is based on the principle ot sufficient 
reason. This principle is discussed. other ways 
in which the second stage could be completed are 
reviewed and it is argued that the second stage 
need not be purely a priori. 
Chapter 10 Even if we reject Kant's criticisms of the proof 
we have to consider the objections that could be 
founded on his epistemology. These objections 
concern the restriction of the concept's of 
causality and modality to the world of sense 
experjence. They also concern the ideality of 
space and time. These arguments have been 
rejected. Their rejection, however, may raise 
further difficulties for the proponent of the 
proof. _ ,ý 
1 
Chapter 1 
In the Critiq ue of Pure Reason Kant sets out to 
establish the limits of human knowledge. Problems had been 
raised for the whole of metaphysics by Hume's analysis of 
causationt but this should not induce us to embrace a 
dogmatic empiricism. We must suspend judgement on 
metaphysics until we have engaged in a 'critique' or critical 
examination of our cognitive faculty. Thus Kant poses the 
general question: 'what and how much can the understanding 
know apart from all experienceP 
According to Kant, Hume proved irrefutably that it is 
quite impossible for reason to think the conjunction of cause 
and ef f ect a 2riori and out of concepts. For this 
conjunction contains necessity, 'but is quite imPossible to 
see how, because something is, something else must 
necessarily be, and how, therefore the concept of such an a 
priori. connection can be introduced' (Prolegomena p. 6. Trans. 
P. G. Lucas). Hume drew the conclusion that 'reason has no 
power to think such connections, not even only to think them 
universally, because its concepts would then be mere 
fictions, and all its ostensibly a priori knowledge is 
nothing but falsely stamped ordinary experiences; which is as 
much as to say that there is no metaphysics at all, and 
cannot be any' (ibid). 
While it was Hume's analysis of causation that awakened 
Kant from his 'dogmatic slumber' Kant was 'very far from 
listening to him in respect of his conclusions' (op. cit. 
P. 9). Hume had not represented his problem to himself as a 
whole; had he done so he would have found 'that the concept 
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of cause and effect is by no means the only one by which 
connections between things are thought a priori by the 
understanding' ( ibid). In developing this theme Kant 
proceeds to distinguish 'analytic' trom 'synthetic' 
Judgements. The denial of an analytic judgement or 
proposition involves a contradiction since 'analytic 
judgements say nothing in the predicate that was not already 
thought in the concept of the subject' (op. cit. p. 16); but 
this is not the case with synthetic propositions, which are 
ampliative. 
Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic 
judgements is parallel to Leibniz's distinction between 
'truths of reason' and 'truths of fact, truths of reason 
being such as are guaranteed by the principle of 
contradiction alone. Kant, however, goes on to break new 
ground by claiming that 'there are ... synthetic judgements 
which have a priori certainty and have their origin in pure 
understanding and reason' (op. ci t. p. 17). While there 'are 
derivative analytic judgements dealing with the analysis of 
metaphysical concepts, the fundamental judgements of 
metaphysics are one and all synthetic. We cannot, however, 
dismiss metaphysics on this ground alone. For synthetic a 
riorl judgements are not peculiar to metaphysics. 
'Mathematical judgements are all without exception synthetic. 
This proposition, though incontestably certain and in its 
consequences very important, seems to have wholly escaped 
hitherto the notice of the analysers of human reason' 
(op. cit. P. 18). Previous thinkers held that mathematical 
truths rested on the principle of contradiction; that, in 
Kantian terms, they were analytic. This view, Kant holds, 
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rests on an inadequate account of the nature of mathematics. 
If we reflect on the proposition 7+5= 12 we find, 
according to Kant,, that it is synthetic; for 'the concept of 
the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing further than the 
unification of two numbers into a single number, and in this 
we do not in the least think what this single number may be 
which combines the two. The concept of twelve is in no way 
already thought by merely thinking this unification of seven 
and five, and though I analyse my concept of such a possible 
sum as long as I please, I shall never find the twelve in it' 
(op. c it. P. 19). Geometry is also synthetic. If we consider, 
for example, the proposition that the straight line between 
two points is the shortest we find that our concept of 
'straight' 'contains nothing of quantity but only a quality. 
The concept of the shortest is therefore wholly an addition, 
and cannot be drawn by any analysis from the concept of the 
straight line' (op. cit. p. 20). 
In seeking the answer to our original question 'what and 
how much can the understanding know apart from all 
experience? ' we must f irst account for pure mathematics. 
How, asks Kant, is pure mathematics possible if it is not 
merely a body of analytic truths? His answer is in terms of 
his doctrine of pure intuition. Any empirical concept can be 
'amplified synthetically in experience by new predicates 
which intuition itself offers' (op-cit. p. 37). In pure 
mathematics we 'construct the concept', e. g. of a triangle, 
in non-empirical intuition. once the mathematical concept 
has been constructed, that is, 'once the intuition which 
corresponds to the concept has been exhibited a pLýlori, it 
likewise can be amplified synthetically. 
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But how is it possible to intuit anything ý priori? 
'Intuition is a representation such as would depend directly 
on the presence of the object. Hence it seems impossible to 
intuit anything a priori originally, because the intuitions 
would then have to take place without any object being 
presentf either previously or now' (op. cit. p. 37). Kant's 
answer is that space and time are forms of sensibility, and 
the objects of the senses can be intuited only in accordance 
with these forms of sensibility. With space and time we can 
know 'prior to all acquaintance with things ... what their 
intuition must be like' (op. cit. p. 40). 
Pure mathematics, then, as synthetic a pr'iori knowledge 
is possible only 'because it bears on none other than mere 
objects of the senses the empirical intuition of which is 
grounded a priori in a pure intuition (of space and time), 
and can be so grounded because the pure intuition is nothing 
but the mere form of sensibility which precedes the real 
appearance of objects, in that only through it are they in 
fact made possible' (op. cit. p. 39f). So, according to Kant, 
'Geometry is grounded on the pure intuition of space. 
Arithmetic forms its own concepts of numbers by successive 
addition of units in time; and pure mechanics especially can 
only form its concepts of motion by means of the 
representation of time' (op. cit. p. 39). 
Kant held that if mathematics concerned things in 
themselves mathematical propositions would have only 
empirical and not apodictic certainty, but in accounting for 
that apodictic certainty he believes he has rendered things 
as they are in themselves unknowable. In denying that his 
doctrine of the ideality of space and time leads to 
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Berkeleian idealism he writes 'I do indeed admit that there 
are bodies outside us, i. e. things which, although wholly 
unknown to us as to what they may be in themselves, we know 
through the representations which their influence on our 
sensibility provides for us, and to which we give the name of 
bodies' (op. cit. p. 45). For Leibniz, the doctrine of the 
ideality of space and time was part of a metaphysical system 
in which the nature of reality was established by the 
application of a priori principles. Kant, however, as he 
develops his argument, seeks to show that all such attempts 
to investigate the nature of things in themselves are 
entirely vain. 
Kant believes that 'pure natural science' (physics) also 
has synthetic a priori judgements and that these have the 
status of fundamental principles. He cites as examples 'in 
all changes of the material world the quantity of matter 
remains unchanged; and ... in all communication of motion 
actionand reaction musta1waysbeequa11 
(Critique of Pure Reason B17). He proceeds, in the Analytic, 
to account for this class of synthetic a prio_rl propositions. 
The synthetic a priori propositions of mathematics Kant has 
associated with sensibility; the synthetic a priori 
propositions of pure natural science he no. w associates with 
the understanding, which he defines as 'a faculty of 
judgement'. 
Kant's thought in the Analytic is complex. He holds 
that there are only two ways in which ideas can be related to 
their objects. Either the object makes the idea possible or 
the idea makes the object possible. The first possibility 
cannot account for our a priori knowledge of objects. Thus 
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Kant proposes his 'Copernican solution' and embraces the 
second possibility: it is 'the idea which makes the object 
possible'. This does not mean the idea or representation 
produces its object 'in so far as existence is concerned'. 
'None the less the representation is a priori determinant of 
the object, if it be the case that only through the 
representation is it possible to know anything as an object' 
(A92/B125). 
All experience contains, in addition to the intuition of 
the senses through which something is given, 'a concept of an 
object as being thereby given'. Thus concepts of objects in 
general 'underlie all empirical knowledge as its a priori 
conditions' (A93/B126). So the concept of an object in 
general is necessary to our experience. But the concept of 
an object in general differentiates itself into concepts of 
objects in general; and these concepts of objects in general 
are the categories or a 2riori concepts of the understanding. 
It is possible to have a 2riori knowledge of objects 
through the categories because through them alone does 
experience become possible. But objects are thereby known as 
they must appear to us, and not as they are in themselves. 
So while the categories of substance and of cause and effect 
are necessary in that they are presupposed in our experience 
of objects this must not be accorded metaphysical 
significance. 
As we have seen, Kant defines the understanding as a 
'faculty of judgement'. He holds that Aristotelian logic is 
complete, remarking that 'to the present day this logic has 
not been able to advance a single step, and is thus to all 
appearances a closed and completed body of doctrine' (BVIII). 
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Since understanding is a faculty of judgement, and formal 
logic gives an exhaustive classification of judgements, we 
have a complete inventory of its powers. By basing his table 
of categories on this exhaustive classification Kant believes 
that he can achieve a similar completeness. 
Kant's argument is that to the logical function embodied 
in each class of judgements there corresponds a category or 
pure concept of the understanding. The function, for 
example, of relating subject to predicate in a categorical 
judgement yields the relational categories of substance and 
accident; and the function of relating antecedent to 
consequent in a hypothetical judgement yields the relational 
categories of cause and effect. 
There seems little room for rationalist metaphysics in 
Kant's scheme. Things cannot be known as they are in 
themselves since the understanding can never transcend the 
limits of sensibility. Rational ontology, which 
'presumptuously claims to supply, in systematic doctrinal 
form, synthetic a priori knowledge of things in general 
must ... give place to the modest title of a mere Analytic of 
pure understanding' (A247/B303). In Kant's discussion of 
modality, 'The old metaphysical concept of necessity has all 
but disappeared' (W. H. Walsh Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, 
p. 153). For Kant 'the criterion of necessity lies solely in 
the law of possible experience, the law that everything which 
happens is determined a priori through its cause in the field 
of experience' (A227/B280). 
Kant does not rest content with undermining the 
foundations of rationalist metaphysics, since he wishes to 
show that metaphysics is the natural issue of human reason. 
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He proposes to give a complete account of the a priori 
concepts of metaphysics as he believes he has done for 
mathematics and pure natural science, so that he will 'enjoy 
the inestimable advantage, never previously anticipated, of 
knowing completeness in the enumerating, classifying and 
specifying of the concepts a priori, and of knowing it 
according to principles' (Prole2omena P. 93). So, whi le 
metaphysics must be abandoned as a hopeless enterprise, it is 
not mere arbitrary speculation. It, too, according to Kant, 
has a structure which he proposes to trace to its source in 
human reason. This task he essays in the Dialectic. 
Kant holds that I reason' , which he def ines as the power 
of mediate inference, is the source of metaphysics. Reason 
is the highest faculty of our knowledge, to which it seeks to 
give systematic unity. 'Just as the understanding unifies 
the manifold in the object by means of concepts, so reason 
unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, positing 
a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of 
the understanding which otherwise are concerned with 
distributive unitY' (A644/B672). Just as he deduced the 
categories from the forms of judgement in the Analytic Kant 
now seeks to deduce the fundamental concepts of reason, the 
'Ideas of Reason', from the forms of mediate inference, or 
the syllogism. "Ideas lie in the nature of reason as 
categories in the nature of the understanding. " (Prolegomena 
P. 9 1). For Kant, an 'ideal is an a priorl concept that 
'transcends the possibility of experience'. 
Since there are three forms of syllogism Kant concludes 
there are three Ideas of Reason. Corresponding to the 
categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms we have 
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the 'idea of the complete subjectIr 'the idea of the complete 
series of conditions' and 'the determination of all concepts 
in the idea of a complete totality of the possible'. Each of 
the ideas is associated with a branch of metaphysics, the 
first with psychology, the second with cosmology and the 
third with theology. 
Kant holds that metaphysics arises when we wrongly treat 
the regulative ideas of reason, whereby our knowledge is 
given a systematic unity, as constitutive. For example, the 
idea of God 'seeks only to formulate the command of reason, 
that all connection in the world be viewed in accordance with 
the principles of a systematic unity, as if all such 
connection had its source in one single all-embracing being, 
as the supreme and all sufficient cause' (A686/B714). 
In terms of Kant's epistemology, metaphysics, or the 
I 
attempt to acquire knowledge of things as they are in 
themselves, is bound to fail. How, he asks, could such 
knowledge be possible 'when time, space and all the concepts 
of the understanding, and even more so the concepts drawn 
from empirical intuition or perception in the world of the 
senses, have and can have no other use than merely to make 
experience possible? ' (Prolegomena p. 117). We can, however, 
survey the whole of this pretended a priori science and trace 
it to its origin in human reason since, as we have seen, Kant 
claims to have enumerated all a priori concepts encountered 
in human knowledge 'without which everything in metaphysics 
is nothing but rhapsody, in which one never knows whether one 
has enough of what one possesses, or whether, and where, 
something may still be missing' (Prolegomena p. 93). 
Kant's deduction of the ideas of reason has won little 
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sympathy and is generally condemned for its artificiality. 
His attempt to give a complete systematic exposition of 
metaphysics is referred to by Bennett as "Kant's undignified 
attempt to derive his choice of topics from the structure of 
human reason rather than the philosophical preoccupations 
then current in the German Universities' (Kant's Dialectic 
p. 3). Kant seems to have assumed that contemporary 
metaphysics, like contemporary logic, was final and complete. 
It is noteworthy that cosmology, which he dignifies with its 
own individual 'idea of reason',, was first treated as an 
independent branch of Metaphysics by Wolff in his 
Discourse on Philosophy in General of 1728. 
No matter how sceptical we may be of the derivation of 
the problems of metaphysics from the nature of human reason, 
there is no doubt that Kant's discussion of the problems 
themselves has been very influential. He endeavours to 
demonstrate, in the Dialectic, that the proofs on which the 
fundamental propositions of rational psychology, cosmology 
and theology rest are fallacious whether or not we accept the 
doctrines of the Aesthetic and the Analytic. Indeed, the 
contradictions Kant discovers in rational cosmology in the 
'Antinomy of Pure Reason' yield the so-called 'indirect 
proof' of the ideality of space and time. Thus the doctrines 
of the Aesthetic rest in part on the Antinomy, which must be 
independent of the theory it is called upon to support. How 
far Kant is able to maintain the independence of his specific 
criticisms of metaphysics from his epistemology is another 
question and one that we shall consider in due course. 
The illusions of metaphysics Kant holds to be natural 
and inevitable. 'There -exists ... a natural and unavoidable 
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dialectic of pure reason, not one in which a bungler might 
entangle himself through lack of knowledge ... but one 
inseparable from human reason, and which, even after its 
deceptiveness has been exposed, will not cease to play tricks 
with reason and continually entrap it into momentary 
aberrations ever and again calling for correction' (A298). 
At the root, then, of rational psychology, cosmology and 
theology there lies an 'idea of reason'. Kant associates the 
'psychological idea' with pure reason's demand that 'for 
every predicate of a thing we should look for its appropriate 
subject, and for this, which is necessarily in its turn only 
a predicate, its subject and so on to infinity' (Prolegomena 
p. 97). This 'regulative principle' is misused when we infer 
the substantiality of the thinking subject from the fact that 
all pred icates of inner sense re f er to the 'I as subj ec t' , 
for the I is not a concept but merely 'the reference of inner 
appearances to the unknown subject of them'. The 
. cosmological ideas owe their origin to reason's demand that 
'if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, 
and consequently the absolutely unconditioned is also given'. 
The contradictions of rational cosmology arise because 'this 
conditioned may be conceived in either of two ways. It may 
be viewed as consisting of the entire series in which all the 
members without exception are conditioned and only the 
totality of them is absolutely unconditioned. This regress 
is to be entitled infinite. Or alternatively, the absolutely 
unconditioned is only a part of the series -a part to which 
the other members are subordinated, and which does not itself 
stand under any other conditions' (A417/B445). On the first 
view the series is without limits, on the second view the 
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series is limited and finite. 
Kant turns finally to consider rational theology. At 
the root of rational theology there lies, not merely an idea 
but an 'ideal' of pure reason. By 'ideal' Kant says he 
understands 'the idea, not merely in concreto, but in 
individuo, that is, as an individual thing, determinable or 
even determined by the idea alone' (A568/B596). 
The ideal of Pure reason arises when we consider what 
conditions are necessary for the 'complete determination' of 
things. According to Kant 'everything, as regards its 
possibility, is ... subject to the principle of complete 





things be taken together wi th their 
contradictory opposites, then one of each pair of 
contradictory opposites must belong to it' (A571f/B599f). 
Everything that exists is completely determined, and thus 'to 
know a thing completely we must know every possible 
predicate, and must determine it thereby either affirmatively 
or negatively' (A573/B601). We can never acquire such 
complete knowledge of an individualf for this is beyond our 
human faculties, but every thing must nevertheless be 
'completely determined' in respect of all possible 
predicates. 
As A. W. Wood points out in Kant's Rational Theology, 
Kant is here influenced by the Leibnizian conception of the 
'complete notion' 0fevery individual. Inthe 
Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz says that 'the notion of an 
individual substance contains once and for all everything 
that can ever happen to it, and ... on considering this 
notion all that could be truly propounded of it is to be seen 
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in it' (Lucas and Grint translation, p. 19). In his 
correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz writes 'what determines 
a certain Adam must absolutely contain all his predicates, 
and it is this complete concept that determines generality in 
suchawaythattheindividua1 is reached'. 
(The Leibniz/Arnauld Correspondence, translated H. T. Mason, 
p. 6 1). on the other hand, the concept of something abstract, 
such as the sphere, is 'incomplete and does not contain all 
the circumstances necessary in practice for arriving at one 
particular sphere' (op. cit. pp. 58 f ). For Leibniz, there 
cannot be two individuals which differ solo numero, for this 
would violate the principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles. 
To be an individual thing, then, is to be completely 
determined. The principle of complete determination 
considers each individual thing, as regards its possibility 
'in its relation to the sum total ot all possibilities, that 
isF to the sum-total of all predicates of things. 
Presupposing this sum as being an a priori condition, it 
proceeds to represent everything as deriving its own 
possibility from the share which it possesses in this sum of 
all possibilities, (A572/B600). The transcendental substrate 
which reason employs in the complete determination of things 
is the idea of an omnitudo realitatis. According to Kant all 
'real' as opposed to merely 'logical' negations are but 
limitations of the omnitudo realitatis. 
Kant then moves from the omnitudo realitatis to the ens 
realissimum, for, he says, 'the concept of what possesses all 
reality is just the concept of a thing in itself as 
completely determined; and since in all possible pýdrs of 
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contradictory predicates, one, namely that which belongs to 
being absolutely, is to be found in its determination, the 
concept of an ens realissimum is the concept of an individual 
being' (A576/B604). It thus appears that 'all manifoldness 
of things is only a ... varied mode of limiting the concept 
of the highest reality which forms their common substratum, 
just as all f igures are only possible as so many dif f erent 
modes of limiting infinite space' (A578/B606). 
It is t is transcendental ideal, then, that lies at the 
root of rational theology. Kant connects it with the 
disjunctive syllogism by arguing that 'the logical 
determination of a concept by reason is based upon a 
disjunctive syllogism, in which the major premiss contains a 
logical division (the division of the sphere of a universal 
concept), the minor premiss limiting this sphere to a certain 
part, and the conclusion determining the concept by means of 
this part' (A577/B605). The 'universal concept' used in the 
complete determination of an individual thing is the 
'universal concept of reality in general'. 
The derivation of the concept of an ens realissimum set 
out in the 'Ideal of Pure Reason' is not meant to be a 
rationalistic proof that such a being exists. Kant says 'It 
is obvious that reason in ... representing the necessary 
complete determination of things, does not presuppose the 
existence of a being that corresponds to this ideal, but only 
the idea of such a being' (A577f/B606f). Nevertheless, his 
argument here has af f inities with the a priori proof of the 
existence of God that he himself advanced in the Beweisgrund 
essay, where he argues that possibility in general 
presupposes, not merely actuality, but, as Walsh expresses 
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itr 'what may be called a primary actualisation of basic 
possibilities in a single supremely real being'. 
(Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics p. 218). 
The connection between the Beweisgrund proof and the 
derivation of the ideal of pure reason in the Critique 
prompts us to ask what Kant's attitude was to this proof in 
his critical period. Walsh considers that the derivation of 
the ideal recalls 'a kind of thinking which Kant had by this 
time come to think radically misguided, but which all the 
same had at one time seemed to him correct, even compulsive. 
What we see here, in effect, is Kant trying to come to terms 
with his own metaphysical past, without being altogether open 
about what he is doing' (op. c it. pp. 218/219). It certainly 
appears from the Critique, as we have seen, that Kant rejects 
the proof, but he clearly thinks that it has a natural appeal 
to human reason. 
Whatever the evidence in the Critique there are grounds 
for supposing that Kant was far from thinking the Beweisgrund 
proof 'radically misguided' in his critical period. Wood has 
drawn attention to the Lectures on Philosophical Theology, 
where Kant maintains that the proof 'can in no way be 
refuted, because it has its ground in the nature of reason'. 
This does not mean that the proof succeeds in establishing 
the existence of an ens realissimum. The proof is held to be 
'subjectively' valid,, since the ens realissimum is 
presupposed by reason in its attempt to conceive the ground 
of the possibility of things in general. Kant denies 
objective validity to the proof, 'apparently because he 
regards it as failing to show that the possibility of things 
really has to be grounded in just this way. ' KantIs 
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Rational Theology p. 76). In the Critique, the proof is 
rejected as misusing an a priori principle valid only of 
appearances,, i. e. the principle that all possibility 
presupposes a material substratum, given in one whole. 
Nevertheless the proof is 'the one of all possible proofs 
which affords the most satisfaction' (Lectures on 
Philosophical Theology p. 66). 
In view of Kant's apparent sympathy with the proof it is 
strange that he does not consider it in his criticism of 
rational theology. 'There are' he claims 'only three 
possible ways of proving the existence of God by means of 
speculative reason' (A590/B618). These are the physico- 
theological, the cosmological and the ontological proofs. 
Kant is quite definite about this: 'There are, and there can 
be, no others. ' In the Beweisgrund essay the a priori proof 
from possibility is referred to as the 'ontological proof', 
the ontological argument dealt with in the Critique being 
referred to there as the 'Cartesian' argument. It is indeed, 
as Walsh says, 'remarkable that the (Beweisgrund] argument 
is not so much as mentioned in the Critique' (op, cit. p. 218). 
In any case it is certain that the possibility proof cannot 
be left out of account in any treatment of the Kantian 
criticisms of the theistic proofs. 
Kant's avowed intention in discussing the theistic 
proofs is to show that they must be rejected. He does not 
intend that we should, in consequence, abandon belief in God. 
Although we cannot demonstrate the existence of God, that is, 
of a 'supreme and all-suff icient being' yet 'the same grounds 
which have enabled us to demonstrate the inability of human 
reason to maintain the existence of such a being must also 
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suffice to prove the invalidity of all counter assertions' 
(A640f/B668f). So speculative reason cannot assist those who 
embrace either one side of the question or the other. 
Nevertheless, we can have rational belief in the existence of 
God; but this belief will be grounded on moral theology, not 
on speculative metaphysics. Kant saysr 'the only theology Of 
reason which is possible is that which is based upon moral 
laws or seeks guidance from them' (A636/B664). 
We can, then, be certain of the existence of God. But 
our conviction is a moral, not a logical certainty. As moral 
agents we are called upon to aim at certain ends, in 
particular we are called upon to promote a state of af fairs 
in which happiness is proportioned to virtue. The only 
condition under which pursuit of this end can have 'practical 
validity' is that there be a God and a future life, 'for a 
final end within, that is set before (us) as a duty and a 
nature without, that has no final end, though in it the 
former end is to be actualised, are in open contradiction' 
(Critique of Judgement p. 129). Since we cannot achieve the 
morally ideal state which is our goal as moral agents, we 
f ind ourselves impelled to believe in the co-operation of a 
moral Ruler of the world that will enable us to reach this 
goal. It is only on the condition of a Supreme Cause ruling 
the world according to moral laws that we can conceive it 
possible for nature to harmonise with the moral law dwelling 
with us. 
This 'moral proof' is unlike the metaphysical proofs 
that Kant has rejected. These are claimed to be valid 
arguments that require only to be understood to win 
acceptance. The moral proof, however, does not lead to 
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objective knowledge, but to a species of personal conviction. 
Thus Kant writes: 'I must not ... say, "It is morally certain 
that there is a God, etc. ", but "I am morally certain" etc 
(A829/B857). 
Kant claims for this 'moral theology' 'the peculiar 
advantage over speculative theology that it inevitably leads 
to the concept of a sole, all-perfect and rational primordial 
being, to which speculative theology does not, on objective 
grounds, even so much as point the way' (A814/B842). The 
Divine Being of the moral proof 'must be omnipotent, in order 
that the whole of nature and its relation to morality in the 
world may be subject to his will; omniscient, that he may 
know our innermost sentiments and their moral worth; 
omnipresent, that he may be immediately at hand for the 
satisfying of every need which the highest good demands; 
eternal, that this harmony of nature and freedom may never 
fail, etc. ' (A815/B843). 
We may then, be certain of the existence of God; but 
Kant holds that all metaphysical proofs of the existence of 
God must be rejected. It remains to see how damaging Kant's 
criticisms are in respect of these metaphysical arguments, in 
particular that of which he says 'speculative reason seems 
... to have brought to bear all the resources of its 
dia. lectical skill to produce the greatest possible 
transcendental illusion' (A606/B634). This argument Kant 
entitles 'the cosmological proot'. 
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Chapter 2 
In the Critique, Kant maintains that there are only 
three ways of proving the existence of God open to 
'speculative reason'. These he proceeds to enumerate. We 
must, he says, 'begin either from determinate experience and 
the specific constitution of the world of sense as thereby 
known,, and ascend from it, in accordance with laws of 
causality, to the supreme cause outside the world; or 
start from experience which is purely indeterminate, that 
is, from experience of existence in general; or f inally ... 
abstract from all experience, and argue completely a priori, 
from mere concepts, to the existence of a supreme cause. The 
first proof is the physico-theological, the second the 
cosmological, the third the ontological. There are, and 
there can be no others' (A590/B618f). 
In fact, however, rational theology is even more 
circumscribed than this suggests f for, in this f ield 'there 
is not indeed ... much room for choice, since all merely 
speculative proofs in the end bring us always back to one and 
the same proof,, namely the ontological' (A638/B666). In 
considering, therefore, the theistic proofs open to rational 
theology Kant is conf ident that he has I no need to fear the 
fertile ingenuity of the dogmatic champions of supersensible 
reasons' 
Kant deals first with the ontological argument, which he 
rejects as invalid. He then attempts to demonstrate that it 
is in some sense presupposed by the other proofs. This gives 
the impression that his principal objection to the other 
proofs is that they stand or fall with the ontological proof, 
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which he believes he has shown to be unsound. A disadvantage 
of this strategy, as Wood points out, is that it makes 
Kant's criticism of the other proofs dependent on his 
criticism of the ontological argument. Thus Wood argues that 
if Kant's criticism of the ontological argument should prove 
less than conclusive 'then Kant really provides no effective 
criticism at all of the other two proof s' (Kant's Rational 
Theology, p. 99). 
Wood's point requires to be qualified. If Kant has 
failed to demonstrate that the cosmological proof is 
dependent on the ontological then the question of the 
effectiveness of his criticism of the latter is irrelevant to 
the question of the validity of the former. If. on the other 
hand, he has succeeded in demonstrating that the cosmological 
proof is dependent on the ontological, it would be open to 
him to argue that this in itself should lead to a rejection 
of the cosmological proof as a redundant and circuitous 
version of the pure a priori proof, as 'an old argument 
disguised as a new one' (A606/B634). 
Kant does suggest criticisms of the cosmological proof 
other than its supposed dependence on the ontological 
argument but -these are not fully worked out. He insists that 
there are two stages to the proof, the . 1first 
being designed 
to prove the existence of a necessary being, the second that 
this necessary being is the ens realissimum. With regard to 
the f irst stage Kant lists what he takes to be the 'deceptive 
principles' involving leaving it to the reader to retute 
them. These are '(1) The transcendental prlnciple whereby 
from the contingent. we infer the cause ... (2) The inference 
to a first cause, from the impossibility of an infinite 
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series of causes, given one after the other, in the sensible 
world ... (3) The removal of all the conditions without which 
no concept of necessity is possible [being] taken by reason 
to be a completion of the concept of the series, on the 
ground that we can then conceive nothing further' 
(A610/B638). It is, however, to the second stage that Kant's 
principal objection applies: that the cosmological proof is 
dependent upon the ontological argument. Before we attempt 
to assess Kant's criticisms we ought to examine his account 
of the proof itself. 
Kant's statement of, the first stage of the argument is a 
version of the argumentum a contingentia mundi. The 
proponent of the proof is said to argue: 'If anything exists 
an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now I. at 
least, exist. Therefore an absolutely necessary being 
exists' (A604/B632). Kant says in a note that this 
inference, from there being any experience at all to the 
existence of the necessary, is 'too well known to require 
detailed statement'. it depends, he says, 'on the supposedly 
transcendental law of natural causality: that everything 
contingent has a cause, which, if itself contingent, must 
likewise have a cause, till the series of subordinate causes 
ends with an absolutely necessary cause, without which it 
would have no completeness' (A605/B633n). 
According 'to Bennett, 'This supposed demand for 
"completeness" owes more to Kant's peculiar theory of reason 
than to anything in the thought of his predecessors, and 
Kant's reference to it is a lapse' (Kant's Dialectic, p. 244). 
I do not see why we need to accept Bennett's interpretation. 
The proponent of the argument would hold that the series of 
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contingent causes is 'incomplete' in the sense that it is 
dependent or not self-sufficient and that it is on these 
grounds that we infer the existence of a necessary being on 
whom the series is said to depend. Where Kant does 
misrepresent the argument is in his statement that the series 
of subordinate causes must end with an absolutely necessary 
cause. The proponent of the argument would contend that even 
if the series be infinite, it would stillf as contingentf 
require or be dependent upon necessary being. 
There is other evidence in the Critique to indicate that 
Kant assumes the first stage of the proof to lead to a 
literal first cause. Thus he says 'the contingent exists 
only under the condition of some other contingent existence 
as its cause and from this again we must infer yet another 
cause, until we are brought to a cause which is not 
contingent, and which is therefore unconditionally necessary. 
This is the argument upon which reason bases its advance to 
the primordial being' (A584/B612). If we come to the 
necessary being by regression through the series of 
contingent causes, then presumably we come to it as a literal 
first cause. Again, in enumerating the 'dialectical 
assumptions' present in the cosmological argument Kant 
includes, as we have seen, 'the inference to a first cause 
from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes, given 
one after the other, in the sensible world' (A610/B638). 
The point is clarified only when Kant comes to discuss 
the physico-theological argument. He there writes: 'Nothing 
has of itself come into the condition in which we find it to 
exist, but always points to something else as its cause, 
while this in turn commits us to a repetition of the same 
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enqu i ry. The whole universe must ... sink into the abyss of 
nothingness, unless, over and above this infinite chain of 
contingencies, we assume something to support it - something 
which is original and independently self-subsistent, and 
which as the cause of the origin of the universe serves also 
at the same time its continuance' (A622/B650). Bennett sees 
this as an altogether more satisfactory account of how actual 
proponents of the cosmological argument have argued for 
necessary being. Here, he writes, 'the cosmological arguer 
allows that the causal-explanatory regress may be infinite, 
so that each member of it can be explained by reference to 
some earlier member of it; but he contends that it would 
still not explain why the world contained that series rather 
than some other' (ibid. ). This version of the first stage of 
the proof does bring us closer to the cosmological argument 
as used by Kant's predecessors and in particular to LeibnizIs 
statement of it, in which the principle of sufficient reason 
is fundamental. 
Leibniz clearly set great store by the cosmological 
argument and it appears in various forms throughout his 
writings. It is most fully and satisfactorily argued in his 
paper 'on the Ultimate origination of Things' of 1697. What 
is in essence the same argument, though very condensed, is 
given in the Monadology (Sections 36-39). In its mature 
form, LeibnizIs cosmological proof depends on his 'great 
pr inc iple' of suf f ic ient reason I in virtue of which we hold 
that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true 
unless there be a suf f ic ient reason why it should be so and 
not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known 
by us' (Monadology 32). 
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Leibniz argues that the sufficient reason of the 
existence of the world 'cannot be found either in any 
particular thing or in the whole aggregate and series of 
things' (Latta, The Philosophical Works of Leibniz, p. 338). 
If we consider the successive states of the world we see that 
each state of the world is, in a sense, a copy of that which 
precedes it. 'Therefore, at whatever earlier stage you go 
backj, you can never find in it the complete reason of things, 
t at is to say, the reason why there exists any world and 
why this world rather than some other' (ibid. ). We may 
suppose the world to be eternal, but 'in eternal things, even 
though there be no cause, there must be a reason which, for 
permanent things, is necessity or essence' (ibid. ). Thus 
Leibniz concludes that 'even by supposing the eternity ot the 
world, we cannot escape the ultimate extramundane reason of 
things, that is to say God' (op. cit. p. 339). 
Similar arguments appear in the 'Principles of Nature 
and Grace'. There Leibniz, having affirmed the principle of 
sufficient reason, asks 'Why does something exist rather than 
nothing? For "nothing" is simpler and easier than 
"some th i ng ". Further, granting that things must exist, we 
must be able to give a reason why they should exist thus and 
not otherwise' (op. cit. p. 415). The ultimate sufficient 
reason for the existence and configuration of the universe 
'must needs be outside [the] sequence of contingent things 
and must be in a substance which is the cause of this 
sequence, or which is a necessary being, otherwise we should 
not yet have a suf f ic ient reason with which we could stop. 
And this ultimate reason of things is called God' (ibid. ). 
Such, then, is the classical formulation of the 
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cosmological proof as based on the principle of sufficient 
reason. Can we show that the first stage of the proof, in 
Kant's view, rests on this p rinciple? Whi le it is not 
mentioned by him, it appears to lie behind the passage quoted 
above from the, physico-theological proof. Its influence may 
be felt yet more strongly in Kant's statement of the proof in 
the Lectures on Philosophical Theology where he says, 'if I 
am contingent, there must be somewhere external to me a 
ground for my existence, which is the reason why I am as I am 
and not otherwise. This ground of my existence must be 
absolutely necessary. For if it too were contingent, then it 
could not be the ground of my existence, since it would once 
again have need of something else containing the ground of 
its existence. This absolutely necessary being, however, 
must contain in itself the ground of its own existence, and 
consequently the ground of the existence of the whole world. 
For the whole world is contingent, and hence it cannot 
contain it itself the reason why it is and not otherwise' 
(op. cit. p. 35). 
To throw further light on how Kant viewed the first 
stage of the proof we naturally turn to the fourth antinomy, 
the thesis of which argues for a necessary being. Indeed 
Weldon claims that Kant's version of the cosmological 
argument is 'not actually distinguishable from the argument 
contained in the thesis of the Fourth Antinomy '(Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason, p. 126). 
In the thesis of the antinomy,, Kant sets out to 
establish that 'there belongs to the world, either as its 
part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary'. 
He distinguishes the cosmological argument, which he uses 
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here, from the 'pure cosmological proof' which has to leave 
unsettled the question whether the necessary being is the 
world itself or a thing distinct from it. It appears that 
the cosmological argument of the thesis of the Fourth 
Antinomy settles this question, because we are here concerned 
with the series of alterations that constitute the sensible 
world, and the causality of the necessary being must be in 
time and therefore in the world, so that the necessary being 
itself must belong to the world. It is impossible, according 
to Kant, for the series of alterations to derive from a 
necessary cause that does not belong to the world. 'For 
since the beginning of a series in time can be determined 
only by that which precedes it in time, the highest condition 
of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the 
time when the series as yet was not' (A454/B482). 
The cosmological argument of the antinomy rests on the 
principle that the regress of conditions presupposed by every 
conditioned thing and by every alteration cannot be complete 
without an unconditioned necessary being as its source. Thus 
Kant writes: 'Now every conditioned that is given 
presupposes, in respect of its existence,, a complete series 
of conditiorrs up to the unconditioned, which alone is 
CA 
ID -0 o lutely necessary' (. 11,45-3/B11181). This argument- miust 'De 
distinguished from the cosmological argument of the theology 
chapter which requires principles 'which are no longer 
cosmological and do not continue in the series of 
appearances' (A456/B484). 
What, then, is the relationship between the two proofs? 
Weldon, as we have seen, finds them indistinguishable; and, 
for wilkersonj the cosmological argument of the Ideal of Pure 
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Reason is 'a more economical version of the argument of the 
fourth antinomy' (Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. 146). 
There is certainly a close resemblance between the inference 
to unconditioned necessary being in the antinomy and the 
argument from the existence of the contingent to the 
existence of the necessary in the cosmological argument 
proper. In the antinomy the existence of the conditioned 
presupposes the complete series of conditions; and the series 
of conditions cannot be complete unless it includes the 
absolutely necessary unconditioned. In the cosmological 
argument proper the series of contingent causes must end with 
an absolutely necessary cause, 'without which it would have 
no completeness'. 
Presumably the thought in both cases is that we cannot 
give a complete account of the existence of a conditioned or 
contingent thing by a regressive series of causal 
explanations unless the series terminates in a necessarily 
existing first cause or highest member. What, then, is the 
distinction between the two proofs? It appears that the 
argument of the antinomy leads to a necessary being that is 
'in the world' because its causality 'must be in time and 
therefore in the world'. We are bound to the sensible world 
in the antinomy by its use of the principle that 'if the 
conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and 
consequently the absolutely unconditioned ... is also given' 
(A409/B436). The necessary being must here be held to be the 
highest member of the cosmological seriest for the relation 
of the conditioned to its condition 'is sensible and falls 
within the province of the possible empirical employment of 
understanding, the highest condition or cause can bring the 
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regress to a close only in accordance with the laws of 
sensibility, and therefore only in so far as it itself 
belongs to the temporal series' (A458/B486). If this is so, 
however, why does not the necessary being of the 'pure' 
cosmological argument also belong to the sensible world since 
there too we make use of the notion of the causal regress? 
The fact that in the sensible world we are presented 
with change and alteration is indeed important to Kant's 
version of the 'pure' cosmological proof. But what we infer 
from this fact is in the first place the contingency of 
things. 'We see things alter, come into being, and pass away; 
and these, or at least their state,, must have a cause' 
(A589/B617). Elsewhere, Kant says that the cosmological 
proof , starting from the simplest possible experience, viz. 
'that I am', proceeds: 'but the changes which go on in me 
show that I am not necessary. Therefore I am contingent [so] 
there must be somewhere external to me a ground for my 
existence' (Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 35). 
It is because the 'pure' cosmological proof makes use of 
the concept of contingency that it can leave unsettled the 
question of whether or not the necessary being belongs to 
the world itself or is distinct from it. Proponents of the 
proof, since they could not f ind in the series of empirical 
conditions any f irst beginning or highest member, 'passed 
suddenly from the empirical concept of contingency, and laid 
hold upon the pure category, which then gave rise to a 
strictly intelligible series the completeness of which rested 
on the existence of an absolutely necessary cause' 
(A458/B486). Since this cause was 'intelligible' rather than 
sensible, 'it was freed from the temporal condition which 
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would require that its causality should have a beginning' 
(ibid. ). 
The first stage of the 'pure' cosmological proof would, 
then, appear to be complete when the existence of a necessary 
being has been demonstrated, whether that necessary being 
belong to the sensible world or to the intelligible realm. 
Some commentators, however, consider that the thesis argument 
of the fourth antinomy is irrelevant to the 'pure' 
cosmological proof and cannot be used by a proponent of the 
proof. Thus, according to Al Azm, 'Kant's concern in the 
fourth antinomy is with a cosmological and not a theological 
unconditioned which is definitely not a part of the 
phenomenal wor1d butis separate f rom itI 
(The origins of Kant's Ar guments in the Antinomies, p. 113). 
According to Bennett, Kant, in the interests of his 
classi fication of metaphysics, 'needs to di stinguish the 
fourth antinomy's Thesis-argument from the cosmological 
argument in the theology chapter' (op. cit. p. 243). Iff 
however, we deny the relevance of the thesis argument to the 
cosmological proof, it is dif f icult to make sense of Kant's 
remark that the 'pure' cosmological argument, I in 
demonstrating the existence of a necessary eing, has to 
leave unsettled whether this being is the world itself or a 
thing distinct from it' (A456/B484). For, if both 
alternatives are left oPen then to demonstrate either would 
appear to be sufficient for the first stage of the 
cosmological proof proper. 
Kant unfortunately goes on to confuse the point by 
suggesting that the 'pure' cosmological proof does seek to 
establish the view that the necessary being is a thing 
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distinct from the world. To establish this, is, however, 
outside 
I 
the scope of the thesis of the antinomy, since we 
should ' require principles which are no longer cosmological 
and do not continue in the series of appearances. For we 
should have to employ concepts of contingent beings in 
general (viewed as objects of the understanding alone) and a 
principle which will enable us to connect these, by means of 
mere concepts, with a necessary being' (ibid. ). 
We might interpret Kant as saying here that by such an 
argument we could establish the possibility of a necessary 
being existing apart from the world. Or we might interpret 
him as saying that the rationalist theologian,, e. g. f Leibniz, 
for whom space and time were ideal and for whom the 
distinction between appearances and things in themselves 
already existed, would have to argue in this way. Certainly 
the argumen't of the thesis of the antinomy, where the 
necessary being is said to belong to the world, has been 
interpreted as a Leibnizian attack on the Newtonian theory of 
absolute space and time. (Vide Al Azm, op. cit. ). In his 
correspondence with Clarker Leibniz argued that if space and 
time were 'absolute' or things in themselves God would be 
'part of nature'. Kant himself says that if time and space 
were absolute then 'as conditions of all existence in general 
they must also be conditions of the existence of God' (B. 71). 
Presumably, then, whether the necessary being of the 
first stage of the proof is held to be a part of the world or 
a thing distinct from the world depends not so much on the 
argument employed as on the metaphysical presuppositions 
which lie behind it. In any event Kant is clearly highly 
critical of the alleged proofs of necessary being which we 
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have outlined. He does not, however, go into detailed 
criticism here, for he believes that he can provide a 
conclusive refutation of the cosmological proof by attacking 
its second stage. 
The second stage of the cosmological proof, to which we 
now turn, argues that the necessary being, whose existence 
has been established, is the ens realissimum. Kant clearly 
thinks that this second stage is essential to the proof, but 
when we turn'to the classical statements of the proof we find 
that this requirement was not always obvious to his 
predecessors. Thus in the 'Third Way' of Aquinas we read that 
'it is necessary to assume something which is necessary of' 
itself, and has no cause of its necessity itself, but is 
rather the cause of necessity in other things, and this men 
call God'. Leibniz similarly dispenses with any 'second 
stage' in his use of the proof in his paper 'on the Ultimate 
Origination of Things' where we read that 'we cannot escape 
the ultimate extramundane reason of things, that is to say 
God' . 
Kant could, of course, argue that even if the principal 
statements of the proof do not include a 'second stage' they 
ought to do so. In this he would be supported by R. W. 
Hepburn who writes: 'the path of argument from First Cause,, 
or Necessary Being, to a Christian personal God must be a 
complex and problematic one. Proponents ot the Cosmological 
Argument have sometimes improperly shortened it' 
(Encyclopaedia of Philos , Vol. 2, p. 234). The proponent 
of the proof as outlined by Kant certainly owes some account 
of this path of argument; but there is more than one 
cosmological argument and the question arises whether other 
32 
versions of the proof are complete without this 'second 
stage' . 
According to one commentator, 'it is unfortunate that 
Kant addresses himself to a rather feeble version of the 
cosmological argument. Since he is engaged in exposing the 
illusions of rationalist metaphysics he might well have 
chosen the Cartesian version in the Third Meditation' (T. E. 
Wilkerson op. cit. p. 146). The argument Wilkerson refers to 
here is that in which Descartes applies the causal principle 
to ideas, in particular to his idea of God as 'a substance 
infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all knowing and 
all powerful'. An idea requires a cause which possesses at 
least the same degree of formal or intrinsic reality as the 
idea itself possesses 'objectively', the 'objective reality' 
of an idea being governed by the degree of reality enjoyed by 
its object. We have, then,, an idea of God, but 'of this idea 
the objective reality is not contained in us either formally 
or eminently, nor can it be contained in any other except in 
God himself. Therefore this idea of God which is in us 
demands God for its cause and consequently God exists' 
(Meditations, Everyman Edition p. 235). 
If, with Wilkerson, we class this as a version of the 
cosmological argument, then it is one which does not involve 
a second stage. From our idea of God, with the aid of 
Descartes' causal principle, we infer that he exists. It is 
not true, however, as Wilkerson implies, that Kant leaves us 
in doubt as to how he would answer Descartes here. As we 
have already seen, Kant has his own account of how we arrive 
at the a priori concepts of metaphysics; and he would also 
deny Descartes' use of the causal principle, which is 
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employed to take us beyond the phenomenal world into the 
realm of super-sensible reality, where, for Kant it has no 
application. In any event, with regard to those versions of 
the cosmological argument that issue in an affirmation of the 
existence of a necessary being or a first cause we may grant 
Kant his point that a second stage is required to establish 
that the f irst cause or necessary being is God. 
Kant's account of the second stage of the proof is as 
follows: 'The necessary being can be determined in one way 
only, that is, by one out of each possible pair of opposed 
predicates. It must therefore be comj2letely determined 
through its own concept. Now there is only one possible 
concept which determines a thing completely a priori, namely 
the concept of an ens realissimum. The concept of the ens 
realissimum is therefore the only concept through which a 
necessary being can be thought. In other words, a supreme 
being necessarily exists' (A605/B633f). This argument, from 
necessary existence to the highest reality, is obscure 
although, as Wood notes, 'the influence of Kant's possibility 
proof is quite evident' (op. cit. p. 125)o 
According to Kant the natural procedure of human reason, 
once it has persuaded itself of the existence of a necessary 
being, is to look around 'for the concept of that which is 
independent of any condition, and find it in that which is 
itself the sufficient condition of all else, that is, in that 
which contains all reality. But that which is all-containing 
and without limits is absolute unity, and involves the 
concept of a single being which is likewise the supreme 
being' (A586/B615f). Thus it appears that human reason 
naturally lapprehends necessary being as having an existence 
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which is unconditioned'. That which is conditioned is in 
some sense dependent. The concept of the ens realissimum is 
the concept of the unconditioned which contains the 
conditions of all that is possible. 
Bennett holds that the argument for the second stage 
relies on the fact that the concept of the ens realissimum is 
a saturated concept, i. e. r 'for any monadic predicate F, the 
truth-value of "An ens realissimum is F" is settled, one way 
or another, just by the definition of "ens realissimum". 
There can therefore be no contingent truths about an ens 
realissimuml (op. cit. p. 248). Bennett goes on to say that 
what Kant says about the ens realissumum is 'trivially true 
of everything'. Each individual thing is completely 
determined by a certain concept which includes everything 
which ever was, is, or will be true of it. So, with resPect 
to such a concept, every truth about its object will be 
analytic. The point is, however, that the ens realissimum is 
completely determined a priori containing in its concept a 
'therefore for every wherefore'. We do not need to go beyond 
the concept itself to learn why it is F. The concept of an 
ens realissimum is held by Kant to be the concept of an 
unconditioned single being that contains the conditions of 
all possibility. It may be true that each individual is 
'completely determined by a certain concept' but it is 
nevertheless the concept of a conditioned being and to 
account for its nature we must go beyond its 'complete 
notion' or concept to the conditions themselves. With the 
ens realissimum alone do we have 'a thing whose thorough 
determ inat ion isboundupwithits concept' 
(Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 44). 
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That the ens realissimum should be accounted the 
necessary being of the first stage of the argument then seems 
to depend on its being unconditioned and the source of all 
possibility. It contains all reality and therefore every 
condition, being itself absolutely unconditioned. If we 
grant the existence of a necessary being and then set out to 
establish what it is, then, Kant says, 'we have no choice at 
all, but find ourselves compelled to decide in favour of the 
absolute unity of complete reality as the ultimate source of 
possibility' (A587/B615). We are not, however, forced to 
make such a choice, since for all we know 'any limited beings 
whatsoever, notwithstanding their being limited, may also be 
unconditionally necessary, although we cannot infer their 
necessity from the universal concepts which we have of them' 
(A589/B616). There may then, for all the cosmological 
argument has been able to establish, be any number of 
necessary beings. 
Kant's principal objection to the cosmological argument 
and indeed to the physico-theological argument is that they 
in some sense presuppose the validity of the ontological 
proof. When he 'searches among pure concepts' to find which 
thing among all possible things contains in itself the 
conditions essential to absolute necessity, the proponent of 
the cosmological argument holds that these conditions are 
'nowhere to be found save in the concept of an ens 
realissimum, and the conclusion is therefore drawn that the 
ens realissimum is the absolutely necessary bei ng' 
(A607/B635). However, if we can deduce necessary existence 
from the concept of an ens realissimum the empirical premiss 
is otiose and we can argue directly from the concept to the 
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existence of the ens realissimum. To argue thus, that 
absolute necessity of existence can be inferred from the 
concept of the ens realissimum, is to endorse the ontological 
proof . 
According to some authorities, Kant's demonstration that 
the proponent of the cosmological argument must, in 
consistency, endorse the ontological argument is not merely 
intended to show that the cosmological argument is a 
superfluous elaboration of the ontological. He has already 
rejected the ontological proof as invalid and thus to show 
that it is presupposed by the cosmological proof is to show 
that it too is invalid. The cosmological argument, then, is 
in an even worse case than the ontological. Its attempt to 
prove the existence of a supreme being fails as the 
ontological proof has failed, but it has the additional 
defect that it involves an ignoratio elenchi. 'It professes 
to lead us by a new path, but after a short circuit brings 
us back to the very path we had deserted at its bidding' 
(A609/B637). 
The physico-theological argument is in a similar case 
since it 'can never by itself establish the existence of a 
supreme being, but must always fall back upon the ontological 
argument to make good its deficiency' (A625/B653). The most 
the physico-theological argument can prove is 'an architect 
of the world who is always very much hampered by the 
adaptability of the material in which he works, not a creator 
of the world to whose idea everything is subject' 
(A627/B655). The proponent of the physico-theological proof, 
to advance from the concept of an architect of the world to 
the ýexistence of an absolutely necessary being must rely on 
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the cosmological argument which is, Kant says, only a 
'disguised ontological proof'. So 'the physico-theological 
proof of the existence of an original or supreme being rests 
upon the cosmological proof, and the cosmological upon the 
ontological. And since, besides these three, there is no 
other path open to speculative reason, the ontological proof 
from pure concepts of reason is the only possible one, if 
indeed, any [such] proof ... is possible at all' (A630/B658). 
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Chapter 3 
Kant's principal objection to the cosmological argument 
is, as we have seen, that it is dependent on the ontological 
argument. The nature of the relationship that he believes 
to subsist between the two proofs is, unfortunately, obscure. 
To begin with he constantly emphasises the naturalness of the 
cosmological argument as opposed to the ontological proof, 
which involves 'a quite unnatural procedure and a mere 
innovation of scholastic subtlety' (A603/B631). Kant 
indicates (at A591/B619) that in the order in which reason 
develops the proofs 'in the progress of its own development' 
the cosmological naturally precedes the ontological; but we 
later read that the cosmological proof is 'an old argument 
disguised as a new one' (A606/B634). At one point Kant goes 
so far as to say that the cosmological proof is 'artfully 
designed to enable us to escape having to prove the existence 
of a necessary being a priori through mere concepts' 
(A610/B638). 
What emerges from Kant's discussion is that he holds 
that anyone who condemns the ontological argument must, in 
consistency, abandon all attempts to produce a rationalistic 
proof of the existence of God. Other proofs may indeed, as 
Kant has indicated, have other faults, but his fundamental 
criticism is that 'all merely speculative proofs in the end 
bring us always back to one and the same proof, namely the 
ontological' (A638/B666). Let us now examine this claim. 
In the f irst stage of the proof, Kant says 'experience 
may perhaps lead us to the concept of absolute necessity, but 
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it is unable to demonstrate this necessity as belonging to 
any determinate thing' (A607/B635). How, having arrived at 
the concept of 'absolute necessity' are we to proceed? Kant 
depicts the rationalist theologian reflecting upon pure 
concepts 'to discover whether any one of them contains the 
conditions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary 
being'. However,, 'if in this way we can determine the 
possibility of a necessary being, we likewise establish its 
existence' (A608/B636). 
In order to clarify this point, Kant sets out the 
argument of the second stage in 'correct syllogistic form'. 
The nervus probandi of the proof is the proposition that 
every absolutely necessary being is likewise the most real of 
all beings. If We convert this per accidens we obtain the 
proposition that some entia realissima are likewise 
absolutely necessary beings. But since one ens realissimum 
is in no respect different from another 'we can convert 
simpliciter and say that every ens realissimum is a necessary 
being. However, if 'every absolutely necessary being is 
likewise the most real of all beings' then 'the mere concept 
of the ens realissimum must carry with it the absolute 
necessity of that being'. Now 'this is precisely what the 
ontological proof has asserted and what the cosmological 
proof has refused to admit' (A608/B636). 
Kant holds, then, that to infer that the absolutely 
necessary being of the first stage of the proof is the ens 
realissimum we require the principle that only the ens 
realissimum is an absolutely necessary being. This seems to 
go beyond the principle of the ontological argument, which 
asserts that the ens realissimum is an absolutely necessary 
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be i ng. If we allow the possibility that there exists a 
plurality of absolutely necessary beings we should have to 
show how we identify the necessary being of the f irst stage 
of the proof with ens realissimum. 
While this shows that the second stage of the 
cosmological proof may be more complicated than Kant 
indicates, his fundamental point remains. If the second 
stage of the proof is to show that the necessary being of the 
first stage is the ens realissimum or God do we not require a 
proof that the ens realissimum or God is a necessary being? 
Do we not, in fact, require an a priori proof such as that 
provided by the ontological proof? Some commentators seem to 
have missed this point. Thus T. A. Johnston writes that 'when 
[Kant] goes through the process of converting the proposition 
"necessary being is infinitely perfect being" he takes it for 
granted that it is by. proposition that the existence of 
a necessary being is established, entirely neglecting the 
fact that the existence of a necessary being has already been 
established by the previous step in the argument. When we 
say "Necessary being is infinitely perfect" we are speaking 
of a being already known to exist" (Australasian Journal of 
PhilOsO2hy, 1943, p. 15). 
Johnston's criticism is entirely misdirected. Kant does 
not say that the cosmological argument establishes the 
existence of a necessary being by employing the principle of 
the ontological proof, but that given that a necessary being 
exists we can identify that being with the ens -realissimum 
only if we employ a process of reasoning that commits us to 
accepting the ontological argument as valid. To be fair to 
Johnston, it should be pointed out that there are grounds in 
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favour of his interpretation; e. g., Kant says that 'the mere 
concept of the ens realissimum must carry with it the 
absolute necessity of that being; and this is precisely what 
the cosmological proof has refused to admit, although the 
conclusions of the latter are indeed covertly based on it' 
(A608/B636f). Study of the text as a whole, however, makes 
it clear that Kant's objection here concerns the second stage 
of the proof. 
Smart also attacks Kant's argument here, though on 
different grounds. He says that 'Kant ... has made a very 
simple mistake. He has forgotten that the existence of a 
necessary being has already been proved ... in the first part 
of argument. He changes "All necessary beings are infinitely 
perfect beings" round to "Some infinitely perfect beings are 
necessary beings". If this change round is to be valid the 
existence of a necessary being is already presupposed. Kant 
has been misled by an ambiguity in "all". "All x's are y1s" 
may take it for granted that there are some x's or it may 
not' (New Essays in Philosophical Theologj, Eds. Flew and 
MacIntyre, p. 37). 
Smart's point is that the first stage of the Kantian 
version of the cosmological proof is essential for the 
validity of the second stage. Kant himself suggests that the 
first stage of the proof is otiose: 'The appeal the 
experience is quite superfluous' (A607/B635). Smart Points 
ýut that 'all necessary beings are entia realissimal cannot 
validly be converted to 'some entia realissima are necessary 
beings' unless we presuppose the existence of at least one 
necessary being. Without the first stage of the proof all we 
can legitimately say is that if there exists a necessary 
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being then it is an ens realissimum. 
This criticism of Kant's argument has not found favour 
with other commentators. Thus P. Remnant comments: 'To prove 
that a necessary being must be a perfect being amounts to 
proving that a perfect being must be a necessary being, and 
this is just what the ontological argument, and no other 
known argument, is intended to do' (Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 37, p. 154f). While this is intended as an 
answer to Smart, it concerns, not the conversion of the 
proposition 'every absolutely necessary being is likewise the 
most real of all beings' but this proposition itself. To 
prove this we require the ontological argument, since 'no 
other known argument' has been advanced for this purpose. 
W. H. Baumer takes the same view. 'To recognise the truth of 
"All absolutely necessary beings are most real", as such an 
argument requires, is to understand that there is an 
absolutely necessary being, that the most real being exists. 
Kant insists upon pointing out that recognition of the truth 
of this is a recognition which entails "any most real being 
is absolutely necessary" since that is the usual basic 
formulation of an ontological argument. After all, the 
essence of such an argument is that the understanding of what 
a thing is is eo ipso an understanding that it is' (Monist, 
Vol. 51, p. 528). 
These critics, then, support the Kantian view that the 
cosmological argument requires the principle that 'all 
absolutely necessary beings are entia realissima and, since 
'one ens realissimum is in no respect different from another, 
by the principle of the identity of indiscernibles we derive 
the proposition that the necessary being of the f irst stage 
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of the proof is the ens realissimum. But, it is maintained, 
we can claim to establish the identity of necessary being and 
ens realissimum only if we employ the principle of the 
ontological proof. This is, however, irrelevant to Smart's 
point that for the conversion of the proposition 'all 
necessary beings are entia realissima' to be valid we require 
to presuppose that its subject term is not empty. It ignores 
this issue, which really only emerges in Kant's 'formal' 
statement of the argument, and claims that the second stage 
of the proof involves the principle of the ontological 
argument. On this view, then, Kant's criticism is effective 
whether or not we presuppose the conclusion of the first 
stage of the proof. 
It is not really clear what Kant gains by his formal 
analysis of the relationship alleged to hold between the two 
proofs. If 'every ens realissimum is a necessary being', 
that is, 'is determined from its a priori concepts alone (so 
that] the mere concept of the ens realissimum must carry with 
it the absolute necessity of that being' (A608/B636), then 
surely the proposition 'every absolutely necessary being is 
likewise the most real of all beings' must be 'determined' in 
the same manner. It is Kant's own formal analysis of the 
relationship between the proofs which makes it appear that 
only if we presuppose the conclusion of the first stage of 
the proof can we demonstrate that it is dependent upon the 
ontological argument. In fact,, as Remnant and Baumer point 
out,, the dependence of the cosmological proof on the 
ontological could, on Kant's premises, be demonstrated 
directly without any need to presuppose the conclusion of the 
first stage of the proof. 
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Wood holds that Kant does indeed suppose in his 
conversion per accidens of 'all necessary beings are 
supremely real' that there does exist at least one necessary 
being. He is fully entitled to do so 'since he has granted 
for the sake of argument that the existence of such a being 
has been demonstrated by the first stage of the cosmological 
proof. Surely the proponent of the argument is in no 
position to dispute this presupposition, since it is drawn 
from his own argument' (op. cit. p. 127). This may be admittedr 
but the point remains that Kant's argument for the dependence 
of the proof on the ontological argument can be stated 
without presupposing the conclusion of the first stage of the 
proof. According to Kant both proofs make use of the 
supposed conceptual connection between absolute necessity of 
existence and the ens realissimum. Thus he could argue that 
even if the cosmological proof succeeded in establishing the 
existence of a necessary being the only way to demonstrate 
that this necessary being was the ens realissimum would be to 
employ the principle of the ontological proof. 
Is Kant correct, then, in saying that the second stage 
of the cosmological proof is dependent on the ontologicl 
argument? This seems a dubious claim in spite of the 
approval which it has won from Remnant and Baumer. Even if 
Kant is correct and the second stage of the proof requires 
the proposition that all absolutely necessary beings are 
entia realissima, it does not follow without further argument 
that necessity of existence can be inferred from the concept 
of the ens realissimum. For the second stage of the proof it 
is sufficient to show that if there exists an absolutely 
necessary being then that being is the ens realissiMum. As 
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E. J. Nelson writes, 'the second stage of the cosmological 
proof does not demand a determination of the totality of 
indispensable conditions, but only the presence of one; 
namely the property of being an ens realissimum. Thus the 
argument requires merely that the proposition Ix is an ens 
realissimum' is necessary to Ix is a necessary existent' be 
demonstrable through the analysis of the concept of a 
necessary existent. So all that reason needs to do is to 
discover a certain necessary condition of 'x is a necessary 
existent' not a sufficient one' (Philosophical Review Vol. 
44, p. 28 5). 
Another serious difficulty for Kant's argument here is 
that his own account of reason's procedure in the second 
stage of the proof makes no reference to the principle of the 
ontological argument. According to Kant, human reason 
'begins by persuading itself of the existence of some 
necessary being. This being it apprehends as having an 
existence that is unconditioned. It then looks around for 
the concept of that which is independent of any condition, 
and finds it in that which is itself the condition of all 
else, that is, in that which contains all reality. But that 
which is all containing and without limits is absolute unity, 
and involves the concept of a single being that is likewise 
the supreme being. Accordingly, we conclude that the supreme 
being, as primordial ground of all things, must exist by 
absolute necessity' (A586/B614f). 
In this account of the procedure of human reason we see 
the influence of Kant's Beweisgrund proof. It would appear 
that Kant has here undermined his own contention that the 
ontological proof is the only argument open to reason to 
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establish a conceptual connection between necessary being and 
ens realissimum. 
Kant's claim, then, that the cosmological proof in its 
second stage is dependent on the ontological argument is open 
to question. Nevertheless, as Nelson acknowledges, Kant has 
shown 'that the empirical premise, even if it justify belief 
in a supreme existent, does not suffice to justify belief in 
a supreme being, without some proposition about the analysis 
of, and the connection between, the relevant concepts. In 
short, he teaches that in order to pass from contingent 
existent to necessary existent and from necessary existent to 
god, a 2riori elements are needed' (op. cit. p. 287). 
If we accept Kant's account of the second stage of the 
proof, what follows? It would appear that, since Kant has 
already condemned the ontological argument as fallacious, 
then its collapse must bring down the cosmological proof. 
This is certainly Wood's interpretation for he writes that 
'Kant's criticism of the cosmological proof is ... that if we 
assume the cosmological proof works, then we are committed to 
holding that the ontological argument works as well. The 
idea is that since the ontological proof has already shown 
itself to be unsound any proof which is found to be committed 
to it must be equally unsound. If Kant's claim can be made 
out, this would certainly be an effective attack on the 
cosmological proof, assuming ... that his earlier criticism 
of the ontological proof was successful' (op. cit. p. 124). 
It is true that if Kant's attack on the ontological 
argument is sound, and if his analysis of the second stage of 
the cosmological proof is correct, then an effective attack 
on the cosmological proof could be given on the lines 
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suggested by Wood. If, however, we turn to Kant's analysis 
of the cosmological proof, we do not find this possibility 
pursued. What Kant appears to hold is that the cosmological 
proof is a spurious addition to rational theology; that it is 
redundant. In the cosmological proof an old argument is 
disguised as a new one, [in) which appeal is made to the 
agreement of two witnesses, the one with credentials of pure 
reason and theother with those of experience. In reality 
the only witness is that which speaks in the name of pure 
reason; in the endeavour to pass as a second witness it 
merelY changes its dress and voice' (A606/B634). A little 
later we read that the 'so-called' cosmological proof 'really 
owes any cogency which it may have to the ontological proof 
from mere concepts. The appeal to experience is quite 
superfluous' (A607/B635). 
Bennett, following Remnant, considers that the section 
on the cosmological argument may have been written before the 
section on the ontological proof. That is, it was, he feels, 
written before Kant has developed his criticisms of the 
ontological proof. This,. he says, would explain inter alia 
why 'the discussion of the cosmological argument gives no 
hint as to what is wrong with the ontological argument, and 
indeed hardly suggests that anything is wrong with it' 
(op. cit. p. 2 54). writing of Kant's treatment of the 
cosmologi cal argument herer Bennett says 'Thi s whole 
discussion seems to be addressed to an audience who are cool 
towards the ontological argument without having any firm 
doctrine about why it is unacceptable' (op. cit. pp. 254f). 
Bennett's point is interesting, but it must be remembered 
that Kant had developed his criticism of the ontological 
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proof by 1763 when he wrote the Beweisgrund essay and it 
seems unlikely that the criticism of the incorporated proof 
in the Critique was written before then. 
Can we show that to dispose of the cosmological argument 
it would be sufficient to show that it is dependent on the 
ontological proof? This may well have been Kant's view. The 
appeal to experience is superfluous and the cosmological 
argument redundant. If we require the principle of the 
ontological proof for the second stage of the cosmological 
proof then we can use it to demonstrate the existence of the 
ens realissimum directly; for we will have already endorsed 
it as valid. Baumer takes this view and generalises the 
objection so that it applies to 'non-classical' cosmological 
arguments, i. e. those intended to establish that something 
other than God is the source of all that exists, whether that 
source be I some sort of deity [or] some sort of 
'naturalistic' thing, perhaps hydrogen from nowhere, perhaps 
a big bang, perhaps some sort of life force' (OP. Cit. pp. 531). 
No matter, then, what is taken to be the source of all 
that is, to speak of such a source here is to 'speak of 
something such that understanding what it is is eo ipso 
understanding that it is. This being so, any non-classical 
cosmological argument, just as any classical one, includes as 
an essential element an ontological argument. Thus the 
appeal to experience remains otiose, and unless ontological 
arguments are acceptable, cosmological ones are not' 
(op. cit. p. 532). once again the point is that if we are 
prepared to specify what is the source of all that exists, as 
is required by the second stage of the cosmological proof, 
then we must do so on the grounds that it exists necessarily; 
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and to maintain that it exists necessarily is to maintain 
that this necessity of existence can be inferred from our 
knowledge of what it is; for 'understanding what it is is eo 
ipso understanding that it is'. That being so we can argue 
directly from concept to necessary existence without f irst 
proving that there must be a necessary being as a If irst 
stage' in the proof. 
Those who take this view would maintain that their 
objection stands whether or not the ontological argument is 
valid since their contention is simply that the cosmological 
argument fails to make good its claim to be an independent 
proof. It is very doubtful, however, whether this objection 
can be sustained. 
To clarify this point let us consider the Cartesian 
version of the ontological proof which infers the necessary 
existence of God from the concept that we have of a supremely 
perfect being. For Descartes, since God is perfect and 
existence is a perfection it follows necessarily that God 
exists. A supremely perfect being who lacks existence would 
be, he argues, as much of a contradiction as a triangle that 
lacks three sides. 
Let us assumel for the sake of argument, that the 
Cartesian ontological proof is sound and that Kant is correct 
in maintaining that the second stage of the cosmological 
proof rests on it. Does it follow that the cosmological 
proof is redundant? I believe it does not. The cosmological 
proof seeks to prove the existence of God no less than does 
the ontological proof. But it seeks to prove the existence 
Of God from the contingency of the world* from the necessity 
first cause of the world or from some general fact about 
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the world. The essential point here is that God is the 
creator or sustainer of the world. This is entirely outside 
the scope of the Cartesian ontological proof. All the 
ontological proof claims to prove is that God exists 
necessarily. It does not prove the world to be dependent on 
God although this could perhaps be proved by other a priori 
principles. 
The cosmological proof seeks to establish first that the 
world is dependent on necessary being and second that this 
necessary being is God. There seems no reason why the 
proponent of the proof should not make use of the principle 
of the ontological argument in the second stage unless he 
rejects the ontological argument as invalid. Kant suggests 
that the proponent of the cosmological proof would reject the 
ontological, but there seems no reason why this should be so. 
Certainly Leibniz endorsed both proofs. At any event if 
Kant's claim were that the cosmological proof is redundant 
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since its first stage is otiose and without its f irst stage 
the cosmological proof reduces to the ontological, he is 
mistaken as we have seen: for without the first stage of the 
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proof we should be unable to establish the dependence of the 
world on God. 
A parallel defence can be offered in respect of physico- 
theological proof, which, according to Kant, 'rests upon the 
cosmological, and the cosmological upon the ontological' 
(A630/B658). This may be intended to imply the redundance ot 
the physico-theological proof but, if so, it is inconclusive. 
It may be that the physico-theological proof rests on the 
cosmological, since it is 'unable to give any determinate 
concept of the supreme cause of the world and therefore has 
51 
to fall back on the contingency which, in the first steps of 
the argument we had inferred from the order and purposiveness 
of the world'. All that follows if this is so is that some 
of the proofs are more fundamental than others. Kant says 
that 'the utmost ... that the argument can prove is an 
architect of the world ... not a creator of the world to 
whose idea everything is subject' (A627/B655). Kant does not 
consider the possibility that the deficiencies which he notes 
in the argument could be made good out of the proofs on which 
be believes it rests. 
We can,, then, defend the cosmological proof against the 
charge that it is redundant, that is, that the appeal to 
experience that it involves is superfluous. There arer 
however, limits to this defence. If, to use Baumer's 
example, the proponent of a 'non-classical' cosmological 
argument inferred that the necessary being of the first stage 
of the proof is matter, grounding this inference to necessary 
being on an ý priori analysis of the concept of matter, then 
we should have to admit the f irst stage of the proof to be 
superfluous. For, in that case, to establish the nature of 
the necessary being is ipso facto to account for the 
existence of the world if not its form. There may be a 
parallel here with Kant's own version of the cosmological 
proof, which argues for the ens realissimum, since the ens 
realissimum is held to be not only a necessary being, but 
also, on the argument of the Beweisgrund proof, the source of 
all possibility. 
It may be, then, that Kant would argue that the 
cosmological argument is redundant since, if its second stage 
is valid, then the concept of the ens realissimum is 
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sufficient for the necessary existence of such a being; and, 
since the ens realissimum is at the same time the ens 
originarium, 'containing in itself the ground of all possible 
things' , we may hold that 'the matter of things [derives] 
from the divine essence, since this matter consists in 
realities' (Lectures in Phil. Theology, p. 67). Thus the 
rational theologian may be represented as deducing necessary 
existence from the concept of the ens realissimum which he 
also regards as the source of the world. 
The difficulty for this interpretation is that in order 
to reduce the cosmological to the ontological proof Kant has 
to show that both employ the notion of a logically necessary 
be i ng. Reason, he says, Irecognises that only as absolutely 
necessary which follows of necessity from its concept' 
(A612/B640). To emphasise that the ens realissimum is the 
source of all possibility or the ground of all possible 
things is to invite the rejoinder that Kant himself, in the 
Beweisgrund essay, 'claimed to have formulated a concept of 
necessary existence which differs from the concept of 
logically necessary existence used in the ontological proof' 
(Wood, op. cit. p. 129). 
Although we reject Kant's claim to have reduced the 
cosmological to the ontological proof on these grounds there 
is still an answer available to him. The first stage of the 
cosmological proof might still be regarded as superfluous if 
we can infer the necessary existence of the original being on 
grounds other than those provided by the first stage of the 
proof. Thus, if we rely on the Beweisgrund proof in the 
second stage, that in itself gives us a necessary being 
without any need of the first stage as a preliminary step in 
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the argument. Here, however, we can make Nelson's point, 
that in the second stage of the proof we are concerned to 
find a necessary condition and not a sufficient condition of 
absolutely necessary existence. Thus we may multiply the 
necessary conditions for the existence of a necessary being, 
conditions which will enable us to essay the second stage of 
the cosmological proof; but this in itself does not enable us 
to show that such a being exists. 
believe, then, that we must reject the claim that the 
first stage of the proof is superfluous and that, having 
dispensed with the first stage, the truncated argument with 
which we are left proves to be the ontological proof. The 
ontological proof would not,, even if valid, do all that the 
rational theologian requires of the other proofs; and Kant 
himself provided other proofs, e. g. the Beweisgrund proof 
from possibility, that the ens realissimum is a necessary 
being. If, however, we grant Kant his point that the 
ontological proof is essential to the cosmological proof, 
then, since he believes that he has shown the former to be 
invalid,, he could argue that this invalidity must infect the 
latter. Some authorities, as we have seen, have assumed this 
to be Kant's main point against the cosmological proof. 
There are, however,, different interpretations of the nature 
of the relationship Kant believed to subsist between the 
proofs. 
According to Wood, 'Kant's criticism of the cosmological 
proof is not that the ontological serves it as a tacit 
premise, but rather that if we assume that the cosmological 
proof works,, then we are committed to holding that the 
ontological argument works as well' (op-cit. p. 125). Wood's 
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interpretation seems to depend on emphasising Kant's 
unfortunate reduction of the proof to its 'correct 
syllogistic form. There Kant seeks to prove that the 
proposition required by the second stage of the proof,, i. e., 
'ev ery absolutely necessary being is likewise the most real 
of all beings' implies the ontological proof, that the mere 
concept of the ens realissimum must carry with it the 
absolute necessity of that being. 
It may be, however, that Kant saw a more direct 
connection between the proofs. Thus he says, 'if I say the 
concept of the ens realissumum is a concept, and indeed the 
only concept, which is appropriate and adequate to necessary 
existence, I must also admit that necessary existence can be 
inferred from this concept' (A607/B635). This suggests that,, 
having proved something to exist necessarily we ask what this 
necessary being can be; and since the concept of the ens 
realissimum involves necessary existence we take this to be 
the necessary being. But to hold that the concept of the ens 
realissimum involves necessary existence is already, 
according to Kant,, to accept the ontological proof. 
Immediately we endeavour to demonstrate that absolute 
necessity belýongs to any determinate thing 'we must abandon 
all experience and search among pure concepts Lo discover 
whether any one of them contains the conditions of the 
possibility of an absolutely necessary. being. If in this way 
we can determine the possibility of an absolutely necessary 
being we likewise establish its existence' (A607/B635f). 
Whether Kant regards the second stage of the proof as 
appealing directly to the principle 
I 
of the ontological proof, 
or whether he regards the connection between the proofs to be 
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a hidden one to be made explicit by logical analysis, his 
rejection of the ontological proof as invalid is, at least by 
implication, a rejection of the cosmological proof on the 
same grounds. 
The claim that Kant's criticism of the ontological 
argument is sufficient to bring down the cosmological 
argument cannotr of course, be sustained unless that 
criticism can be shown to be conclusive. There is no doubt 
that the second stage of the cosmological proof is beset with 
problems. To accept the ontological argument as valid would 
solve some of the problems for a proponent of the proof; and 
we have seen that to accept the pure a priori proof as valid 
may not, as Kant seems to have thought, render the 'appeal to 
experience' superfluous. 
Difficulties would remain, however. For example, how 
are we to identify the necessary being of the first stage of 
the proof with the ens realissimum? As Nelson remarks, 'Kant 
imports into the argument the notion that there can be only 
one necessary existent thus getting us into a receptive mood 
for the later assertion that the notion of a necessary 
existent and the notion of an ens realissumum are equivalent' 
(op. cit. p. 28 5). For Nelson the cosmological argument 'is not 
essentially a monotheistic proof. Properly stated, it 
concludes to the existence of a god' (op. cit. p. 286). 
The main question at this stage, however, is whether 
Kant has succeeded in demonstrating the invalidity of the 
ontological argument on which the cosmological proof is said 
to depend. If he has succeeded then the proponent of the 
proof will have to look elsewhere for the materials to 
construct the 'second stage' of his argument. Consideration 
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of Kant's criticism of the ontological proof will also shed 
light on his views concerning necessary being in general . 
57 
Chapter 4 
Kant gives no detailed account of the ontological 
argument before proceeding to criticism. He makes three 
principal criticisms that are progressively narrower in 
scope. The first, which concerns the possibility of an 
absolutely necessary being, is relevant to the cosmological 
argument no less than to the ontological argument. Previous 
thinkers had sought to prove the existence of such an 
absolutely necessary being without first considering 'whether 
and how a thing of this kind allows even of being thought' 
(A592/B620). Kant's second objection is directed against the 
procedure whereby the proponent of the ontological proof 
seeks to establish the existence of the ens realissimum, 
i. e., by inferring necessity of existence from the concept we 
have of such a being. His objection here would apply to what 
Baumer refers to as 'non-classical' ontological arguments as 
well as to the classical Anselmian and Cartesian versions of 
the proof. There is no being which cannot be thought away 
regardless of its predicates. In the third objection Kant is 
specifically concerned with the Cartesian version of the 
proof in which the existence of God as the ens perfectissimum 
is inferred from the fact that existence is a perfection and 
must therefore be included in our concept the ens 
perf ectissimum. Kant's reply to Descartes is that existence 
is not a predicate. We shall now examine these objections in 
turn. 
(1. ) According to Kant human reason arrives at the notion of 
absolutely necessary being by two distinct routes, both of 
which lead to the ens realissimum. Reason requires the 
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concept of the ens realissimum as the source of the complete 
determination of its concepts. But it also requires to 
affirm the existence of an absolutely necessary being since 
it cannot tolerate the notion of the regress of the 
conditioned without ultimate support from the unconditioned. 
The unconditioned reason equates with the ens realissimum, 
since the concept of the ens realissimum is the concept which 
best 'squares with so supreme a mode of existence' 
(A 58 5/B 613). Thus it appears that we can certainly 'think' 
the concept of an absolutely necessary being, and indeed by 
the demands of reason we are constrained to do so. But 
Kant's real challenge to the proponent of the proof is that 
he should give an account of the conditions which make the 
non-existence of the ens realissimum unthinkable. 
In spite of the claims of reason the ens realissimum 
fails to give us the concept of an absolutely necessary 
being. Kant dismisses the argument that the ens realissimum 
is essential for the determination of our concepts. 'Such a 
thing is a mere f iction in which we combine and realise the 
manifold of our idea [of the sum total of all possibilitYl in 
an ideal as an individual being' (A580/B608). 
Kant's exposition of the argument that he is here 
attacking is obscure. He holds that what he calls "the 
principle of complete determination" leads us to the ens 
realissimum. We "determine" a concept when we affirm or deny 
that a given predicate applies to it. Leibniz and Wolff had 
held that every particular thing must be completely 
determined with respect to all possible predicates; indeed to 
be a particular thing is to be completely determined. In 
Kant's argument 'every thing, as regards its possibility, is 
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subject to the principle of complete determination, according 
to which if all the possible predicates of things be taken, 
together with their contradictory opposites, then one of each 
pair of contradictory opposites must belong to it' 
(A571f/B600f). The principle of complete determination then, 
since 'all concepts of negations are derivative' leads us to 
the notion of a total of all the predicates of the real each 
of which can be affirmed or denied of any real thing. This 
total proves in fact to be the concept of an individual thing 
determined positively with respect to all predicates 
expressing reality. Thus the total of all non-derivative 
predicates which is presupposed by the principle of complete 
determination becomes the completely determined concept of 
all reality, the concept of the ens realissimum. 
According to Kant the ens realissimum is regarded by 
reason, not merely as the source of the complete 
determination of, our conceptsf but as the source of all 
possibility of things. 'Reason regards all possibility of 
things as derived from a single fundamental possibility, 
namely that of the highest reality, and thereupon presupposes 
this to be contained in an individual primordial being' 
(A581/B610). --It does so because nothing can be an object for 
us unless the given in the field of appearance is regarded as 
a single all-embracing whole. 'It is upon the limitation of 
this whole that all possibility of empirical objects, their 
distinction from each other and their complete determination, 
can alone be based' (A582/B610). Reason, however, misuses 
the principle that nothing is an object for usr unless it 
presupposes the sum of all empirical reali. ty as the condition 
of its possibility. 'Owing to a natural illusion, we regard 
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this principle, which applies only to those things which are 
given as objects of our senses, as being a principle which 
must be valid of things in general. Accordingly, omitting 
this limitation, we treat the empirical principle of our 
concepts of the possibility of things, viewed as appearances, 
as being a transcendental principle of the possibility of 
things in general' (ibid. ). 
If reason resorts to the concept of the unconditioned as 
the ground of the conditioned it is again led to the ens 
realissimum that is itself the sufficient condition of all 
else; but it is no nearer the concept of an absolutely 
necessary being. We can remove all the conditions which the 
understanding requires to regard something as necessary, but 
that 'is very far from sufficing to show whether I am still 
thinking anything in the concept of the unconditionally 
necessary, or perhaps rather nothing at all' (A593/B621). In 
thinking the unconditioned we are thinking away the 
conditions necessary for anything to be an object of our 
experience, for example the condition that objects of 
- experience should be in causal interaction, but we are far 
from showing that this leads us to the concept of any 
possible being. 
The concept of the ens realissimum is not, then, the 
concept of an absolutely necessary being although it is 
presupposed in our experience. Kant seems to suggest that if 
the ens realissumum were truly the source of all possibility, 
that is, if it were a condition of 'things in general' and 
not merely of objects of the senses, then it would indeed be 
an absolutely necessary being. But this is false, since it 
needs to be proved that the 'source of all possibility, could 
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not itself be contingent. The ens realissimum as the source 
of all possibility cannot give us the concept of an 
absolutely necessary being as required by the ontological 
proof. What the ontological proof requires is a concept from 
which we may infer the existence of its object. It is only 
if something exists that we can infer the existence of a 
source of 'possibility' and so we are led back to the 
cosmological argument at this point and to its appeal to this 
'simple experience'. 
Kant says that if we are obliged to agree that there is 
a necessary being, then we have no choice in coming to a 
decision as to what this necessary being may be, but find 
ourselves compelled to decide in favour of the ens 
realissimum. However, in his discussion of the cosmological 
argument, as we have seen, he holds that reason seeks to 
establish the existence of an absolutely necessary being on 
conceptual grounds in the second stage, and that this is 
simply the ontological argument from pure concepts, which 
makes the 'appeal to experience' redundant. Here, on the 
other hand, we are said to be inevitably led to the ens 
realissimum once we concede the existence of an absolutely 
necessary being, making it appear that the 'appeal to 
experience' or first stage of the cosmological proof may 
after all be an essential step in establishing the existence 
of the ens realissimum since its existence cannot be 
established on conceptual grounds alone. Kant appears to 
mean that given the concept of necessary being we are led on 
psychological grounds to equate this with the ens realissimum 
but that this would be justified only if the concept of the 
ens realissimum were such that we could infer the existence 
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of its object. 
The concept of the ens realissimum is not, according to 
Kant, the concept of an absolutely necessary being. Our 
reason may persuade itself of the existence of an absolutely 
necessary being as the source of all possibility or as the 
unconditioned ground of the conditioned; but we can go no 
further since we cannot provide an account of 'the conditions 
which make it necessary to regard the non-existence of (such] 
a thing unthinkable' (A593/B621). It is this latter 
requirement that must be fulfilled if any version of the 
ontological argument is to succeed. Kant, however, proceeds 
to develop arguments designed to show that this requirement 
cannot be f ul f illed and that no version of the ontological 
proof can be successful. 
(2. ) Kant's second objection to the ontological argument is 
related to Caterus's criticism of the Cartesian version of 
the proof. Caterus wrote: 'though it be conceded that an 
entity of the highest perfection implies its existence by its 
very name, yet it does not follow that very existence is 
anything actual in the real world, but merely that the 
concept of existence is inseparably united with the concept 
of highest being. Hence you cannot infer that the existence 
of God is anything actual, unless you assume that that 
highest being actually exists; for then it will actually 
contain all its perfections, together with this perfection of 
real existence' (The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. 
by Haldane and Ross, Volume II, p. 7). 
Caterus holds, then, that we cannot resort to conceptual 
truths, to what Kant calls 'analytic' truths, to provide us 
with knowledge of what is actual until we know that the 
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concepts concerned are instantiated. We may accept that our 
concept of God includes existence but we can no more infer 
that God therefore exists than we can infer the existence of 
an omnipotent being from the fact that omnipotence is 
included in the concept of God. Kant, in similar vein, holds 
that it is only if the subject is 'posited' that it is 
contradictory to reject the predicates which constitute our 
concept of it: 'To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its 
three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no 
contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its 
three angles. The same holds true of the concept of an 
absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we 
reject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no 
question of contradiction can then arise' (A594/B623f). 
Wood, having noted that Kant, in his early 'Nova 
dilucidatio' essay, urges objections to the ontological 
argument similar to those advanced by Caterus, goes on to 
point out that this line of criticism is implied by the 
Kantian doctrine that even analytic judgements are assumed to 
be about objects and not merely about concepts, this being an 
instance of his belief that the truth of a proposition is 
always its correspondence with an object. 'Such a view ... 
suggests that the subject term of even an analytic 
proposition must succeed in referring to an object if that 
proposition is to be counted as true' (Wood, op. cit. p. 114). 
In fact,, Wood holds that we need not hold a subject/predicate 
proposition to be false where reference fails since we could 
maintain that in such a case the proposition concerned has no 
truth value; and he regrets that Caterus gives no indication 
of his views on this point. We could hardly, however, hold 
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that a positive existential proposition such as Caterus was 
considering is neither true nor false when its subject term 
fails to refer to anything. It is then plainly false. 
By distinguishing between analyticity and truth we can 
allow that existence is included in the concept of God and 
yet deny that the proposition 'God exists' is true. In the 
Discourse on Method, Descartes had written that his idea of a 
perfect being includes the existence of such a being 'in the 
same way as the idea of a triangle includes the equality of 
its three angles to two rights angles' (Haldane and Ross, 
Vol. l. p. 1 04). Kant rejects all such examples since they 
involve only conditioned necessity: 'All such judgements are, 
without exception, taken from judgements, not from things and 
their existence. But the unconditioned necessity of 
judgements is not the same as an absolute necessity of 
things. The absolute necessity of the judgement is only a 
conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the predicate in 
the judgement. The ... proposition [that a triangle has 
three angles) does not declare that three angles are 
absolutely necessaryr. but that,, under the condition that 
there is a triangle (that is that a triangle is given), three 
angles will necessarily be found in it' (A593/B621f). 
There is no contradiction, then, for Kant, in rejecting 
the existence of an absolutely necessary being. 'There is 
nothing outside it that would then be contradicted, since the 
necessity of the thing is not supposed to be derived from 
anything external: nor is there anything internal that would 
be contradicted, since in rejecting the thing itself we have 
at the same time rejected all its internal properties' 
(A595/B623). There are difficulties here, however. A. Kenny 
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has argued that 'Descartes' argument is most intelligible if 
we regard him as admitting, with Meinong, that there is a 
status of pure objecthood, beyond being and nonbeing, but, 
unlike Meinong ... restricting it to those entities that have 
true and immutable essences, that is,, those about which 
nontrivial truths can be proved a 2riori or whose component 
properties are necesarily linked' (. Descartes, P. 168). Thus 
Kenny affirms that 'for Descartes, the subject of the 
sentence "God exists" [is] a pure object, beyond being and 
nonbeing. A pure object can have properties whether or not 
it exists' (op. cit. p. 157). 
If we allow such 'pure objects' then we can accord 
absolute necessity to essential truths concerning true and 
immutable natures without begging questions of existence. 
Kant says that 'in rejecting the thing itself we have at the 
same time rejected all its internal properties'. We cannot, 
however, reject the properties of Cartesian 'true and 
immutable essences' that are independent of thought. How 
does this affect the issue of the ontological proof? 
According to Descartes the true and immutable nature of God 
includes all perfections and existence is a perfection. We 
cannot say that if God exists he possesses all perfections. 
His true and immutable nature, which is independent of all 
conception and all thought, includes existence. 
This version of the ontological proof depends on non- 
existent entities, pure objects, having natures and 
properties. Presumably Descartes would hold that pure 
objects have the properties we clearly and distinctly 
conceive them to have. Thus the triangle as a pure object 
has three angles, that is, what has a nature has the 
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properties belonging to that nature. It follows that since 
the true and immutable nature of God includes existencer and 
since whatever possesses a nature has the properties 
belonging to that nature, there is no 'pure object' 
possessing the properties of a perfect being. Since 
existence is, on Descartes' argument, a property, and since 
it is one belonging to the nature of the ens perfectissimum 
or God,, the true and immutable essence of God can belong only 
to an existing thing. There is here no distinction between 
essence and existence. 
While Kant does not deal with the niceties of the 
Cartesian proof there is no doubt that he would reject the 
Cartesian notion of true and immutable natures. In Kant's 
theory, the objects of mathematics derive from our pure 
intuition. We know a priori truths concerning the triangle 
because they involve the nature of our sensibility, not 
because our understanding grasps an essence that is 
independent of thought. As Wood says, on Kant's view, 'the 
idea of God could represent to us something like a true and 
immutable nature only if we possessed an intuitive 
understanding, a capacity to produce contents wholly A 
without any reliance on sensibility to supply their contents' 
(op. cit. p. 123). 
Kant's second objection, thent is directed against the 
notion of logically necessary being that is at the root of 
the ontological argument. He holds that there can never be a 
contradiction in denying the existence of anything, no matter 
what its predicates may be, since in rejecting the existence 
of anything we are rejecting the whole subject/predicate 
complex. There remains the claim that when our concept of 
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anything includes existence essentially there is a 
contradiction in denying the existence of its object. It is 
to this claim that Kant now turns. 
In one sense, Kant's third objection to the ontological 
proof is more radical than the second. The second objection 
was directed against the attempt to infer necessity of 
existence from the concept of an absolutely necessary being, 
the point being that if we reject the existence of such a 
necessary being 'we reject the thing itself with all its 
predicates; and no question of contradiction can then arise' 
(A595/B623). Whereas the second objection apparently allows 
the concept of necessary being employed by the proof, the 
third rejects it as ill-formed. The concept is of a being 
that possesses all perfections, including existence, and from 
which the existence of the perfect being is inferred. To 
this Kant replies, I "Being" is obviously not a real 
predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which 
could be added to the concept of a thing' (A598/B626). If 
this is so it cannot be held that 'God exists' is analytic. 
According to Kant, existential propositions are 
synthetic: 'if ... we admit, as every reasonable person must, 
that all existential propositions are synthetic, how can we 
profess to maintain that the predicate of existence cannot be 
rejected without contradiction? This is a feature which is 
found only in analytic propositions, and is indeed precisely 
what constitutes their analytic character' (ibid. ). As 
Shaf fer has pointed out, this does not square with Kant's 
statement that 'being' is not a real predicate. For Kant, 
synthetic judgements are those that 'add to the concept of 
the subject a predicate which has not been thought in it, 
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(B. 11). Thus it appears that synthetic judgements are those. 
which add 'real' predicates to the concept of a thing. By 
insisting that existential propositions are synthetic and 
that existence is not a real predicate Kant seems committed 
to the view that there are two distinct types of synthetic 
propositions, the one existential, the other ampliative. It 
would, of course, be possible to argue that the 
analytic/synthetic dichotomy does not give an exhaustive 
classification of propositions and that existential 
propositions form a third class. Kant, however, clearly 
states that existential propositions are synthetic. 
If 'being' is not a real predicate, what is it? Frege 
and others have argued that the ontological argument is 
mistaken in treating 'exists' as a predicate instead of as a 
quantifier. The point here is that when we say 'God exists' 
we are not attributing a predicate to a subject but saying 
that a certain group of predicates is instantiated or applies 
to something. Kant sometimes follows a similar line of 
argument. Thus, in the Beweisgrund, he says: 'If I say "God 
is an existing thing", it appears that I express the relation 
of a predicate to a subject. But there is an incorrectness 
in this expr-ession. Expressed correctly it should say: 
something exisLing is God, that is, those predicates thdt we 
designate collectively by the expression "God" belong to an 
existing thing' (. Beweisgrund (11 74) ). 
Kant's treatment of this issue is less satisfactory in 
the Critique. There he says that it 'we take the subject 
[God] with all its predicates ... and say "God is" or "There 
is a God", we attach no new predicate to the conr-ept of God, 
I 
but only posit the subject itself with all its predicates, 
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and indeed posit it as being an object which stands in 
relation to my concept' (A599/B627). As Walsh says, 'It is 
not the subject which is posited, but the characteristics it 
comprehends, since to posit in this connection is to declare 
that something general has an instance' (op. cit-p-223). The 
point behind the claim that existence is a quantifier is that 
we thereby avoid the problems associated with treating 
affirmations or denials of existence as affirmations or 
denials that concern a subject. In affirming or denying the 
existence of anything we are, it is claimed, merely saying 
that a certain group of predicates either is or is not 
instantiated. 
For Kant, then, existence is not a real predicate 
although it may serve as a 'logical' predicate. A 'real' 
predicate is 'a concept of something which could be added to 
the concept of a thing' (A598/B626). It appears that a 
'real' predicate is also a 'determining' predicate, that is, 
'a predicate which is added to the concept of the subject and 
enlarges it' ( ibid. ). If this is so, however,, it is 
difficult to see how any predicate attributed to a subject in 
an analytic judgement can be a 'real' predicate; and if the 
proponent of -the ontological proof believes 'God exists' is 
analytic then he could argue that in no analytic judgement (jo 
we f ind a 'real' predicate. 
Some predicates may, of course, occur. sometimes in 
analytic and sometimes in synthetic judgements, r!. g., the 
predicate 'is Coloured' in the 'blue expanse is Coloured' and 
in 'the expanse is coloured'. It might be held that 
proposition of the form 'x exists' can never be : Iynthetic and 
I 
it is only predicates that can occur in synthetic judgements 
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that are 'real predicates'. This, however, conflicts with 
what Kant has already said viz. that existential propositions 
are always synthetic. It is worth noting that if it were held 
that in Ix exists' , 'exists' cannot be a determining 
predicate on the grounds that it can never enlarge our 
concept of anything and thus can never occur in synthetic 
judgements, it would follow that no predicate is a real or 
determining predicate unless it can occur in synthetic 
judgements. There may be difficulties here as it is 
difficult to conceive circumstances in which a proposition of 
the form 'x is temporally continuous' would be synthetic and 
yet the predicate 'is temporally continuous' would generally 
be taken to be a real predicate though not a determining one. 
It can certainly occur in analytic judgements. 
It does not appear that the distinction between analytic 
and synthetic proposition is helpful to Kant's argument at 
this point. To hold that existential propositions are 
synthetic is to invite the reply that in that case exist 
must, after all, be a 'real' predicate. To hold that such 
propositions can be analytic would be to concede too much to 
the proponent of the proof unless it can be shown that 
analyticity in existential propositions is harmless because 
trivial. In fact, J. Barnes, in The Ontolog ical Argument, 
argues that Kant's claim that 'being' is not a real predicate 
derives ultimately from Hume, who, in the Treatise, writes: 
'The idea of existence ... is the very same with the 
idea of 
what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on any thing 
simply, and to ref lect upon it as existent, are nothing 
different from each other. That idea, when conjoin'd with 
the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we 
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conceive, we conceive to be existent' (I. ii. 6). 
The issue of whether existential propositions are 
synthetic or analytic deflects Kant from his main contention, 
which is that existence is not a predicate. If it is not a 
predicate then clearly no existential proposition can be 
analytic. Kant is well aware that his denial that existence 
is a predicate will carry little weight unless he is able to 
support it by argument, since 'the illusion which is caused 
by the confusion of a logical with a real predicate (that is, 
with a predicate which determines a thing) is almost beyond 
correction, (A598/B626). His proof of his thesis involves 
an appeal to his principle that a real predicate is one that 
is added to the concept of the subject and enlarges it. 
Existence cannot be 'added' to a concept in this way, since 
'by whatever and by however many predicates we may think a 
thing - even if we completely determine it - we do not make 
the least addition to the thing when we further declare that 
this thing is. otherwise, it would not be exactly the same 
thing that exists but something more than we had thought in 
the concept; and we could not, therefore, say that the exact 
object of my concept exists' (A600/B628). 
Kant's argument here has been severely criticised. 
Shaffer considers it astonishing that it has stood up for so 
long. 'For the argument, if sound, shows that nothing can be 
a real predicate. Suppose I wish to say that something is 
red, where red is intended as a "real" predicate. In 
asserting that the thing is red, I would be adding to the 
concept of the thing, and hence would be unable to say that 
the object as originally conceived is red, that the 'exact 
object of mY concept' is red. The argument which shows that 
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lexists' is not a 'real' predicate also shows that nothing 
can be one'. ('Existence, Predication, and the ontological 
Argument' inT. Penelhum and J. J. MacIntyre (eds. ) 
The First Critique p. 126) 
According to Bennett, 'what exists is always "more than 
we had thought in the concept". Whatever one "thinks in a 
concept" must be abstract, omitting answers to at least some 
questions of detail, and so a reality corresponding to any 
such thought will always have some features with regard to 
which the thought was, as it were, silent. Kant implies that 
we might "completely determine" a thing, but that is 
impossible'. If we could, then 'perhaps that would involve 
us automatically in thinking of it as existing. In assuming 
the contrary, Kant is simply begging the question in favour 
of his view that "existent" is not a determining predicate' 
(op. cit. P. 230). 
Bennett's argument seems somewhat confused here. if 
'existent' is a determining predicate then any completely 
determined concept must be determined with respect to 
existence, so that a completely determined concept of x will 
be a concept of an existent x or a non-existent x, if 
'existent' is a determining predicate, then the question of 
whether we think the object of a completely determined 
concept as existing or not is settled by the concept itself. 
Kant's view is always that the concept of any possible being 
can be 'completely determined' without begging questions of 
existence. His view here derives from Leibniz, who held that 
God contemplated the 'complete concepts' of all possible 
beings, conferring existence to such as would produce the 
best of all possible worlds. Kant would presumably argue 
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against Shaffer that if existence were a predicate we would 
no longer have 'completely determined' concepts of possible 
beings. 
In the Critique, Kant provides a second, somewhat 
similar, argument to show that existence is not a predicate. 
'If we think in a thing every feature of reality except oner 
the missing reality is not added by my saying that this 
defective thing exists. On the contrary, it exists with the 
same defect with which I have thought it, since otherwise 
what exists would be something different from what I had 
thought' (A600/B628). Wood interprets Kant as saying that we 
may have the concept of an 'almost perfect being' that has 
every perfection but one. We do not know which perfection is 
lacking. 'Now Kant's contention is that we are led into 
absurdities if we assume that "existence" is the reality we 
are seeking. For suppose it is. In that case, if the almost 
perfect being we are thinking of existed, it would have the 
missing reality,, and therefore would not be almost perfect, 
but wholly perfect. But this contradicts the assumption that 
we are thinking of an almost perfect being, and hence is 
absurd ... Consequently if existence cannot be the missing 
reality this can only be because existence is not a reality 
at all' (Wood, op. cit. p. 108). 
Wood rejects this argument. 'We see at once that it 
cannot be correct if we run through it again, this time, 
supposing "omnipotence" (or any other undisputed real 
predicate) to be the reality missing from our almost perfect 
being. In that case too we would have to admit that if the 
almost perfect being were omnipotent, it would have the 
missing reality, and hence be wholly perfect, contrary to our 
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original suppositions. Thus if Kant's argument succeeded in 
showing that existence is not a real predicate, it would also 
succeed in showing that nothing could be one' (ibid. ). 
The issue may not be settled as simply as Wood suggests. 
If we have the concept of an 'almost perfect being' that is 
completely determined with respect to all real predicates and 
includes all realities except omnipotence, then that concept 
may be instantiated. If, on the other hand, we have the 
concept of an 'almost perfect being' that does not include 
existence we have the concept of an 'almost perfect non- 
existent being'. Clearly this concept cannot be instantiated 
sin ce if it were, 'what exists would be something different 
f rom what I had thought'. If existence is a predicate then 
our 'completely determined' concept of any being must include 
or exclude its existence. 
Kant holds that we can have 'completely determined' 
concepts of possible beings which leave open the question of , 
the existence of their objects. If existence were a 
predicate then- no concept undetermined with respect to 
existence could be realised since in coming to be its object 
would acquire a characteristic not possessed by the concept. 
Of course, if existence were a predicate then a 
completely determined concept would include or exclude it. 
Presumably Kant would say that such a concept is not the 
concept of a possible being. It would, however, be possible 
to hold that existence is included in the concept of all 
possible beings, since we conceive them as existent. But 
while this would show that 'existence' could not, after all, 
be the 'missing reality' of Kant's 'almost perfect being' 
conceived as a possible being, it is inconsistent with his 
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view that existence is not a predicate. 
There appears to lie behind Kant's argument what J. W. 
Forgie has called the 'Doctrine of Isomorphism' between 
concepts and actual beings. ('Kant and the Question "Is 
Existence a Predicate? "' Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 5 
(1975)). Thus Kant writes: 'the real contains no more than 
the merely possible. A hundred real thalers do not contain 
the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as 
the latter signify the concept, and the former the object and 
the positing of the object, should the former contain more 
than the latter, my concept would not, in that case, express 
the whole object, and would not therefore be an adequate 
concept of it' (A599/B627). Kant here appears to be begging 
the question. As Forgie says, the reductio argument will not 
show that existence is not a predicate of any real object 
'unless we make the additional assumption that existence 
cannot be included in any concept of a thing' (op. cit. p. 571). 
Although we may concede that Kant's arguments to prove 
that existence is not a predicate are unsuccessful they do 
not appear to be as simply fallacious as some commentators 
have suggested. The notion of the 'complete determination' 
of concepts lies behind much of what he says here. if 
existence were a predicate then every 'completely determined' 
concept would include or exclude it. Clearly no concept of a 
possible being could exclude existence. So the only 
alternatives appear to be that existence is not a predicate 
or it is a universal predicate of possible beings. Kant 
embraces the first possibility; but many would hold that the 
second would also be sufficient to dispose of the ontological 
argument since the concept of God is no longer unique in 
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including existence. It may be objected here that we are led 
into paradox if we suppose our concepts of physical things to 
include existence. For then it would be analytic that such 
physical things exist whereas, as Kant insists, denials of 
existence are never contradictory. Thus the denial that 
existence can ever be included in the concept of a thing is 
associated with the fear that it would then be the concept of 
a necessary existent. This fear is groundless. our concepts 
of things change with experience. our concept of the crow is 
of a black bird. If, however, we discover white crows, then 
our concept changes. In the same way our concept of the crow 
is of an existing creature. If we found that there were no 
crows and never had been it could be argued that our concept 
would change so that it excluded existence. Our concept 
would then belong to the realm of mythology and fiction. 
To argue that existence cannot be included in our 
concepts of things because our concepts cannot change in this 
way, is, as Forgie says, to beg the question. If existence 
is a predicate then our concepts must be capable of change in 
this respect as in any other. Against this it might be 
argued that, on a causal theory of concepts, such change is 
ruled out. Forr on such a theoryf if we found that there 
were one-horned horse-like animals, they would not be 
unicorns since neither they nor their ancestors gave rise to 
our concept of the unicorn, which derives from mythology. 
Arguments of this type have been used in the causal theory of 
names. Thus K. S. Donnellan has argued that if our 
descriptions of a mythological creature named X happen to fit 
an existing creature, that existing creature is not, in fact, 
X. Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds ed. S. P. Schwartz 
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p. 238 ). But even on a causal theory of concepts it does not 
follow that existence could not be a predicate. For in the 
case of the unicorn we have simply two concepts,, one, 
excluding existence, for the mythological beast and one, 
including existence, for the newly discovered species. 
Barnes, in reviewing the objections to the ontological 
argument that are associated with existence and predication, 
rejects the view that, as he expresses it, 'everything 
exists'. To support his contention that existence cannot be 
a universal predicate he adduces first the case of fictional 
entities, then the fact that in 'recent advances in modal 
logic ... the interpretation of modality relies heavily on 
the notion of identifiable non-existent individuals' 
(op. cit. p. 5 0). If, however, existence were a predicate then 
in neither case would we be dealing with possible 
individuals. Even if we assume that we can have 'completely 
determined' concepts of such things, our concepts of them qua 
fictions or qua non-existent individuals exclude existence. 
If our concept of such a thing were realised, it would 
include the property of existence and thus be 'something more 
than we had thought in the concept'. Thus we can still urge 
against Barnes that our concepts of all possible beings 
include existence. 
Our interest in the ontological proof has been whether, 
given Kant's contention that it is fundamental to the other 
theistic proofs and to the cosmological proof in particular, 
he has provided a convincing ref ution of it. KantIs 
principal objection, that existence is not a predicate, has 
been widely criticised and it must be admitted that his 
arguments here are inconclusive. While it might, as we have 
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seen,, have been more profitable for Kant on his own premises 
to have considered existence as a universal predicate of 
possible beings, he does not pursue this line of argument in 
his criticism of the proof. Perhaps Kant's most telling 
point against the ontological argument is his second 
objection, that is, that whereas we cannot 'in an identical 
proposition' reject the predicate while retaining the 
subject, we can, without contradiction, reject both. His 
criticism of the proof, although it contains many valuable 
points, is, I believe, inconclusive. This does not, of 
course, mean that the ontological argument is valid. 
We now need to return to the cosmological argument and 
to consider it in the light of Kant's criticisms of that 
argument itself and in the light of his discussion of the 
ontological proof that we have just reviewed. As we have 
seen Kant rejects the notion of necessary being, which he 
equates with logically necessary being. only if we can give 
a sense to the concept of necessary being can we go on to 
consider the first stage of the proof, which seeks to 
establish the existence of such a being. If this can be 
accomplished we are left with the problem of completing the 
second stage of the proof, that is, of identifying this 
necessary being with God.. We shall now consider these 
problems in turn. 
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Chapter 5 
The proponent of the cosmological proof seeks to 
establish, in the first stage of his argument, the existence 
of a necessary being. Since, however, the very notion of 
necessary being has been rejected as an absurdity by some 
thinkers, we must ensure that he is not embarking on a 
hopeless enterprise, a search for the impossible. Kant's own 
position on this issue is ambivalent. His objections to the 
notion of necessary being turn on the point that we cannot 
conceive absolutely necessary existence, that we cannot give 
an account of the conditions that make i t necessary. He 
appears, nevertheless, to allow that there may be an 
absolutely necessary being. In the solution of the fourth 
antinomy he writes that both sides in the apparent conflict 
may be correct in the terms of transcendental idealism, since 
all things in the world of sense may be contingent, 'yet 
there may be a non-empirical condition of the whole series; 
that is, there may exist an unconditionally necessary 
being' (A560/B588). At one point he objects to the claim 
that the cosmological argument proves the existence of a 
necessary being, which must ipso facto be divine, that 'we 
are entirely free to hold that any limited-beings whatsoever, 
notwithstanding their being limited, may also be 
unconditionally necessary' (A588/B616). 
If Kant allows that there may be a necessary being or a 
being that exists necessarily, other thinkers have rejected 
the very notion of such a being as incoherent. Indeed, J. N. 
Findlay, in an important paper, has argued that this 
incoherence can provide us with an a priori disproof of the 
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existence of God. He maintains that for a being to be a 
worthy object of our religious worship, for it to 'deserve 
the utter self-abandonment peculiar to the religious frame of 
mind', certain conditions must be fulfilled. Such a being 
'can never be a thing that merely happens to exist, or one on 
which all other objects merely happen to depend. The true 
object of religious reverence must not be one, merely, to 
which no actual independent realities stand opposed; it must 
be one to which such opposition is totally inconceivable. 
God mustn't merely cover the territory of the actual, but 
also, with equal comprehensiveness, the territory of the 
possible. And not only must the existence of other things be 
unthinkable without Him,, but His own non-existence must be 
unthinkable in any circumstances. There must, in short, be 
no conceivable alternative to any existence properly termed 
'divine': God must be wholly inescapable ... whether for 
thought or [for] reality. And so we are led on insensibly to 
the barely intelligible notion of.. a Being in Whom Essence and 
Existence lost their separateness' (Mind, Vol. 57,1948 
180). 
Findlay goes on to argue that a divine being would also 
have to possess all perfections necessarily; but for the 
moment we shall concentrate on his attack on necessary being. 
For Findlay, on the 'modern view' of the matter, 'necessity 
in propositions merely reflects our use of words, the 
arbitrary conventions of our language. on such a view the 
Divine Existence could only be a necessary matter if we had 
made up our minds to speak theistically whatever the 
empirical circumstances turn out to be' (op. cit. p. 182). In 
this case the 'modern approaches' do not allow us to remain 
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lagnostically poised' but 'force us to come down on the 
atheistic side. For if God is to satisfy religious claims 
and needs He must be a being in every way inescapable, one 
Whose existence and Whose possession of certain excellences 
we cannot possibly conceive away. And modern views make it 
self-evidently absurd (if they don't make it ungrammatical) 
to speak of such a Being and attribute existence to Him' 
( ibid. ). 
Proponents of the proof who assume that the notion of 
logically necessary being is incoherent often fall back on 
the notion of factually necessary being. Hick, for example, 
denies that God, as the adequate object of human worship, 
must be conceived in such a way that 'God exists' is a 
logically necessary truth. This is to be denied for 
precisely the reason offered by Findlay, namely, 'that the 
demand that "God exists" should be a necessary truth is, like 
the demand that a circle should be square, not a proper 
demand at all, but a misuse of language. only, 
whereas Findlay concludes that the notion of an adequate 
object of religious attitudes is an absurdity, we shall 
conclude that that of which the idea is an absurdity cannot 
be an adequate object of religious attitudes; it would on the 
contrary be an unqualified inadequate object of worship' 
('God as Necessary Being' Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 57, 
(1960) p. 728). According to Hick, 'Findlay has only 
disproved the existence of God if we mean by God a being 
I 
whose existence is a matter of logical necessity. Since, 
however, normative Christianity, both biblical and 
theological, has not meant this, Findlay's argument may 
instead be taken as emphasising that we must either abandon 
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the traditional phrase 'necessary being' or else be very 
clear that the necessary being of God is not be construed as 
logically necessary being' (op. cit. p. 731f). 
What is factual necessity? Rainer says that the factual 
necessity of God involves His complete actuality,, 
indestructibility and 
_aseitas 
or independence of limiting 
conditions ('Necessity and God' Mind 1949 Vol. 58, p. 75). 
Hick, who discusses the issue at length, traces the notion of 
factual necessity back to Anslem who, in his reply to 
Gaunilon, writes: 'All those objects and those alone can be 
conceived not to exist, which have a beginning or end or 
composition of parts: also ... whatever at any place or at 
any time does not exist as a whole. That being alone on the 
other hand cannot be conceived not to exist, in which any 
conception discovers neither beginning nor end nor 
composition of parts, and which any conception f inds always 
and everywhere as a whole' (Quoted by Hick, op. cit. p. 730). 
Hick, indeed, credits Kant with first drawing the 
distinction between logical and factual necessity. In fact,, 
the distinction is implicit in the scholastics' contrast 
between "negative" and "positive" eternal truths, the former 
being eternaEly true because they express what is eternally 
the case, the latter being eternally true because they 
express what must, of necessity, be the case. Even if we 
cannot give Kant the credit for first drawing the distinction 
it is nevertheless true that the Kantian schema of necessity 
as existence throughout all time 'suggests the theological 
notion of a temporally unlimited being, and this is an 
important aspect (although not tI he whole) of thb concept of 
God as a factually necessary being' (Hick, op. cit. p. 726). 
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According to Hick, then, factually necessary being must 
include eternity, although eternity is not by itself 
sufficient to the concept of an adequate object of man's 
worship; 'For it is possible to conceive of something 
existing eternally ... but only because, although there are 
powers capable of abolishing it, they always refrain from 
doing so' (op. cit. p. 732). We must, therefore, add that 'as 
the ultimate Lord of all, God is also incorruptible, in the 
sense of being incapable of ceasing to exist or to possess 
his divine characteristics by reason of a decay or 
discerption not due to external factors. God, then, can 
neither be destroyed from without nor suffer dissolution from 
within' (ibid. ). In fact these essential characteristics 
follow from God's aseity. 'A self-existent being must be 
eternal, i. e., without temporal limitation. For, if he had 
begun to exist, or should cease to exist, he must have been 
caused to exist, by some power other than himself; and this 
would be inconsistent with his aseity. By the same token he 
must be indestructible, for to say that he exists in total 
ontic independence is to say that there is and could be no 
reality with the capacity to constitute or destroy him; and 
likewise he must be incorruptible, for otherwise his aseity 
would be qualified as regards its duration' (op. cit. p. 733). 
Such, then, is the notion of factually necessary being. 
The question arises whether it is adequate to the 
cosmological argument. Some writers reject it altogether. 
Barnes, for example, considers that it is perverse and a 
violation of English usage to take "necessary" to mean 
"independent and eternal" I (op. cit. p. 31f). others consider 
that it cannot be used by a proponent of the proof. Hick has 
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remarked,, in The Existence of God, that the logical form of 
the cosmological argument 'is that of a dilemma: either there 
is a God or the world is ultimately unintelligible' (p. 6). 
The dilemma becomes dif f icult to discern when God is 
interpreted as a factually necessary being. If the world 
does not depend on God then it it true that we have an 
ultimate but inexplicable fact; however, if the world is so 
dependent on a factually necessary God then we are no better 
off since we still have an ultimate but inexplicable fact. 
With a 'factually necessary being' we have no sufficient 
reason for its existence; and those versions of the 
cosmological proof that rely on the principle of sufficient 
reason cannot operate with the concept of a factually 
necessary being. As one writer says, ' ... the Cosmological 
Argument merely suggests that in a persistent search for 
explanation we must eventually reach a basic, ultimate fact, 
which is in itself therefore inexplicable. And this, viewed 
properly, in all likelihood is true'. But it has not 'the 
faintest tendency to show this ultimate is the existence of 
the theist's God' (Duff-Forbes,, 'Hicki, Necessary Being and 
the Cosmological Argument', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
Vol. 1 (1972), P. 483). 
In advancing the notion of factually necessary being, 
Hick denies that we can attach any sense to the statement 
that such a being might not have existed; nor, he argues, can 
we demand any explanation for its existence. Findlay says 
that a God that merely happened to exist would not be an 
adequate object of our worship. Hick remarks that here 
'Findlay has made the very mistake for which he has 
criticised the theologians. Findlay should be the last 
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person to use [the] dichotomy [between existing necessarily 
and "merely happening to exist"] since he has himself 
rendered it inoperative by pointing out that one half of the 
dichotomy is meaningless ... Having concluded that the notion 
of necessary existence has no meaning, to continue to speak 
of things merely happening to exist, as though this stood in 
contrast to some other mode of existing, no longer has any 
validity' (op. cit. p. 731). Hick's point emerges in his 
discussion of explanation. The existence of God as a 
factually necessary being 'is the ultimate given 
circumstance, behind which it is not possible to go with 
either question or explanation. For to explain something 
means either to assign a cause to it or to show its place 
within some wider context in relation to which* it is no 
longer puzzling to us. But the idea of a self-existent 
Creator of everything other than himself is the idea of a 
reality which is beyond the scope of these explanatory 
procedures' (op. cit. p. 733f). 
The problem is, however, whether a factually necessary 
being provides an adequate foundation for the cosmological 
proof. There is no sufficient reason for the existence of 
such a being. It is one thing to say that we have reached 
the primordial being, a being that is ultimate in the sense 
that it has, within itself, the sufficient reason for its 
existence; it is quite another to say that something is, as a 
matter of fact, primordial or ultimate in the sense that it 
cannot, in principle, have been caused to exist. Hick says 
that since Findlay has robbed the phrase 'just happens to 
exist' of meaning he should not contrast something that 'just 
happens to exist' with something that has another type ot 
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existence. But whereas we may say of something that has an 
explanation that it 'does not just happen to exist' , to say 
this of something that cannotf in principle, be explained, 
seems more dubious. The one does not fail of explanation 
because it has one. The other does not fail of explanation 
because none in principle could be provided. But to argue, 
as Hick does, that the ultimate reality is factually 
necessary in this sense is to undermine the cosmological 
argument, which derives its force from the belief that there 
is an ultimate explanation of the world. If we allow that no 
such ultimate explanation can be given then there is no need 
to start on the cosmological regress. 
These difficulties in Hick's position are discussed by 
Duff-Forbes who concludes that 'if such a [factually 
necessary] God exists that he exists, although he might not 
have done so, is inexplicable; it just happens that things 
are thus, if they are, and not otherwise. And this, it is 
perhaps worth adding, is what some people might very well 
want to call a "brute fact" (op. cit. p. 480). Duff-Forbes 
objects strongly to Hick's argument, in The Existence of God 
and elsewhere, that either we accept the existence of God or 
we recognise-that the universe is 'a mere unintelligible 
brute fact'. Tihis will not do, writes Duf f -Forbes, 'tor 
belief in the existence of a factually necessary though 
logically contingent God ... is precisely belief 
in an. 
ultimate and inexplicable 'brute fact'. If a 1, Dgically 
contingent but ultimate, and hence unaccountable, state of 
af fairs is a 'brute tact' then the existence of Hick's 
factually necessary God is ... a brute fact. And if to 
t 
suppose that explanations f inally terminate in an ultimate 
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fact which cannot, being ultimate, in turn be explained is to 
render the universe unintelligible then it is unintelligible 
[if) that ultimate is the existence of God' (op. cit. p. 482). 
In fact Hick, in his reply to Duff-Forbes, concedes that 
'the universe conceived of as matter beginninglessly in 
motion in accordance with certain fundamental physical laws, 
would likewise be a necessary (i. e. eternal and independent) 
being. Its existence would constitute an ultimate fact 
concerning which the question Why does it exist? has no 
purchase; for if the universe is def ined as the totality of 
all that is, there can be nothing further in terms of which 
to explain its existence or character. Thus God and the 
universe both, and equally, satisfy the definition of a 
necessary being, the existence of which is an ultimate fact; 
and accordingly the movement of thought from the contingent 
to the necessary, or from the explicable to the ultimate, can 
equally well come to rest in the physical universe as in God, 
and hence cannot be presented as an argument for the 
existence of God' (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1 
(1972) p. 488f). 
Hick's concession here seems to render vain the hope 
that the cosmological argument can make use of the notion of 
factually necessary being. Hick, however, does not accept 
this, since he maintains that there are significant 
differences between the two possible 'stopping-points for the 
series of Why questions'. In the first place it is always 
possible to ask of the universe whether it is dependent upon 
anything else; whereas God cannot be God unless he is 
independent of all else. So, in this sense, the idea of God 
exceeds the idea of the physical universe in explanatory 
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ultimacy The physical can function as a de facto 
terminus of explanations; but God can, in addition, function 
as a de iure or logical terminus' (op. cit. p. 486). The 
problem remains, however, for any version of the cosmological 
argument that operates with the notion of factually necessary 
being, that there is no logical compulsion to go beyond the 
world to a God who may be an ultimate explanation of the 
world though inexplicable himself. 
Hick says also that the human mind tends 'to f ind an 
explanatory finality in conscious acts of will which it does 
not f ind in the states or movements of unconscious matter'. 
This may be true, but Hick's argument gives no reason why we 
should embrace the theistic view with its explanatory 
ultimacy'. He presumably sees the cosmological argument as 
having a purely persuasive force derived from psychological 
considerations, that is from our desire for ultimate 
explanations. He concedes that his version of the proof, 
operating as it does with the concept of factually necessary 
being, is not logically compulsive, and succeeds only if we 
reject the view that the world is ultimately a sheer 
inexplicable 'brute fact'. Most proponents of the proof 
would reject the view that there are any inexplicable 'brute 
facts'. The weakness of Hick's version is, as we have seen, 
that he is driven back to such an inexplicable 'brute fact', 
although he attempts to mitigate the position by arguing 
tha t,, if we reject logically necessary being, God must be 
considered as a factually necessary being whereas the world 
need not necessarily be so conceived, 
The notion of factually necessary being is not merely 
inadequate to the cosmological argument but is inconsistent 
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with it. For the cosmological argument cannot allow that 
there may exist any being that does not either contain within 
itself the sufficient reason for its own existence or depend 
upon such a being. Factually necessary being cannot, 
therefore, be used to answer the criticism that the 
cosmological proof operates with an absurd notion, that of 
necessary being. We must, therefore, look more closely at 
this criticism to see how, if at all, it can be answered, 
Many philosophers would insist that if we reject 
factually necessary being then we are driven back to the 
notion of logically necessary being. Kant's objection to the 
notion of logically necessary being is that no existential 
proposition can be analytic: 'if ... we admit, as every 
reasonable person must, that all existential propositions are 
synthetic, how can we profess to maintain that the predicate 
of existence cannot be rejected without contradiction? ' 
(A598/B626). Many arguments for the contingency of all 
existential propositions turn on the Kantian claim that if 
existence is not a property at all it cannot be a defining 
property; so assertions of existence cannot be logically 
necessary or analytic. Thus Penelhum writes that existence 
cannot be held to be a quality that a perfect being would 
have to have. It is not a quality at all. The distinctive 
character of the concept of existence 'precludes our saying 
there can be a being whose existence follows from his 
essence, (Mind, Vol. 69, p. 180). 'So there is no way in 
which the existence of any being could be held to be a fact 
explicable by reference to that being itself I( ibid. ). The 
only alternative, according to Penelhum,, is that 'God exists' 
is synthetic. However, 'to say that "God exists" is 
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synthetically necessary is to run counter to fashionable 
views about necessity in propositions ... The difficulty for 
our present purpose is the notorious one for believers in 
synthetic necessity of explaining the necessary character of 
the examples offered' (op. cit. p. 180f). 
Some say, with Aquinas, that although God exists 
necessarily we simply do not have the knowledge of the divine 
nature required to deduce God's existence from it. However, 
according to Penelhum, to argue from finite beings to a being 
whose existence does follow from his nature is to argue that 
'if we knew God's nature we could deduce his existence from 
it - and this is the mistake ... It is not our ignorance that 
is the obstacle to explaining God's existence by his nature 
but the logical character of the concept of existence' 
(op. cit. p. 18 1). R. W. Hepburn takes the same view of the 
supposed analyticity of 'God exists'. He writes: 'Those 
versions of the [Cosmological] Argument are invalid which 
entail that God logically necessarily exists: that is, that 
existence is a predicate' ('From World to God' Mind, vo 1. 
72 (1963), p. 44). 
It is significant that critics of the proof equate the 
alleged necessity of 'God exists' with analyticity and with 
the doctrine that existence is a property. J. F. Ross rejects 
altogether the view that the cosmological argument operates 
with the notion of logical necessity. He says that 'it is 
obviously unreasonable to so interpret the argument's claim 
to be one for logical necessity since such necessity is a 
formal property of propositions and not ... of things' ('God 
and Logical Necessity'r Phil. Qua f Vol. II (1961), 
p. 2 2). Some have, indeed, tried to avoid the objections to 
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necessary being by claiming that it is the proposition 'God 
exists' that is necessary thus resolving the difficulties of 
the de re in the de dicto. Thus, G. E. Hughes writes: 
'Instead of saying "God is a necessary being" we can say "The 
proposition 'God exists' is necessary or necessarily true"; 
and I readily grant this formulation has great advantages' 
(Mind, vol. 58, p. 69). Hutchings rightly objects to Hughes 
that 'what the theist wants to talk about is God, not 
propositions about God' (op. cit. p. 6). Hutchings goes on to 
argue that 'the necessity ascribed to God is not, for the 
theist, to be thought of as owing anything to the "necessity" 
of the proposition "God exists" (au contraire), so the 
objection that the usual sorts of necessary propositions are 
non-existential is, if true, not relevant' (op. cit. p. 7). The 
truth of the matter#, according to B. R. Reichenbach, is that 
the proponent of the proof does indeed hold that the 
proposition "God exists" is necessary; but this necessity is 
not to be thought of as analyticity. Reichenbach, having 
denied that all necessary propositions are analytic goes on 
to argue that 'there are propositions which derive their 
necessity, not from any analysis of the meanings of the terms 
contained within the proposition, but rather from being the 
conclusion of a valid argument. The proposition follows 
necessarily from its premisses' (Divine Necessity and the 
Cosmological Argument' 
-Monist, 
Vol. 54 (1970) r p. 409). This 
is in itself of little comfort to the proponent of the proof. 
Just as the conclusion of a valid argument may be false if 
its premises are false so it may be meaningless if it 
operates with a meaningless term. The objection that we are 
considering is that the proof does indeed operate with an 
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illegitimate notion, viz. necessary being. Thus we come back 
to our starting point. Before we can show the argument to be 
valid and the conclusion to be necessary we must defend the 
notion of necessary being itself. 
Reichenbach himself acknowledges that the cosmological 
proof needs more than the conditional necessity that 
characteri ses the conclusion of a valid argument. For the 
proponent of the proof, God's existence is a "real" 
necessity, that is, it 'follows from the very nature of the 
existent. It is of God's very essence that, if he exists, he 
cannot not exist. It is of God's very nature that he is not 
dependent on any other being, that he canot be brought into 
existence nor made to cease to exist. These characteristics 
... derive from the very nature, the very being, of the 
divine being. Therefore the necessity is more than the 
result of verbal convention. God was a necessary being prior 
to and independent of any human verbalisation of such' 
(op. cit. p. 415). The question is whether this notion of real 
necessity can be defended. 
Some defence of 'real' necessity must be offered by the 
proponent of the proof since he cannot succeed in 
demonstrating that the concept of necessary being is 
legitimate merely by demonstrating that there may be 
existential propositions that are necessary or analytic, nor 
can the proof operate with the concept of factually necessary 
being. If we are to proceed, then, we must show that the 
simple dichotomy between logical necessity as analyticity and 
a formal property of propositions on the one hand, and 
factual necessity as eternity and independence on the other, 
does not exhaust the possibilities available to the proponent 
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of the proof. 
What other interpretations of necessary being have been 
offered? Few proponents of the proof have attempted to 
elucidate this notion. Barnes approves the criticism of the 
advocates of necessary being offered by Kant, who 'complained 
that these men never gave any clear examples of what they 
meant, but contented themselves with what are plainly cases 
of "hypothetical" necessity. And of course a clear example 
would clinch the issue' (op. cit. p. 34). In considering the 
examples of necessary being that have been offered, Barnes 
rejects the claim on behalf of universals made by Searle in 
Speech Acts, on the grounds that it is a contingent fact that 
there is language and that there are language users. The 
'more promising' claimants to necessary being include 'such 
mathematical theorems as these: there exist two real 
solutions to every quadratic equation; there exists a prime 
between 12 and 15; there exists a number identical with every 
power of itself. These propositions are undeniably 
existential' (op. cit. p. 36). They are also luncontroversially 
necessary' (ibid. ). Presumably Barnes would deny that 
mathematical truths are contingent upon the existence of 
mathematicians in the way that the existence of universals is 
contingent upon there being language users. 
It is unlikely that Barnes' mathematical examples would 
win universal acceptance as examples of necessary being. 
Flew,, for example, has written that 'the so-called "existence 
theorems" of mathematics have recently been summoned [to 
revive the ontological proof]. In fact, of course, they bear 
if anywhere in the opposite direction; since as parts of pure 
mathematics they are not proofs of the actual existence of 
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anything, but only and properly of the freedom from 
contradiction of concepts' (God and Philosophy , p. 79). This 
suggests that Flew considers that 'exist' is ambiguous, 
having different senses in different contexts. Even if we 
deny this, some might still wish to make the distinction 
urged by R. M. Adams who suggests that numbers and the like 
can be said to exist in some 'purely conceptual realm' 
without reality being determined thereby. 'But something 
which (like God) is conceived of as acting causally on real 
human beings and physical objects must presumably exist as a 
real thing if it exists at all' (American Philosophical 
Quarterlyr Vol. 8 (1971), p. 290). It could then be argued 
that the proponent of the proof must show that it makes sense 
to attribute necessary being, not merely in the 'conceptual 
realm' but in reality. 
What is required of the proponent of the cosmological 
argument is that he should show that the concept of necessary 
being, existing and acting in the 'real world' , is free of 
contradiction. As we have seen, many critics of the concept 
of necessary being assume that, if we reject factually 
necessary being, we are left with logically necessary being 
or the claim that 'God exists' is analytic. It is then 
claimed that necessity is a property of propositions; and 
that 'exists' is not a predicate. The proponent of the 
cosmological argument may, however, wish to argue that God's 
existence is necessary while denying that the proposition 
'God exists' is necessary or analytic. To say that if we had 
the requisite knowledge of the divine nature we could deduce 
God's existence from it is not to say that God's essence 
includes existence. Our knowledge of the essence of a thing 
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may give rise to entailments that are not reducible to 
analytic statements about it. 
It is by no means easy to meet Barnes' request for 
'clear examples' of necessary being such as may be of 
assistance to the proponent of the cosmological proof. When 
Barnes himself reviews the 'more plausible candidates' for 
necessary being he considers examples drawn from the abstract 
sciences of mathematics and logic. It may, however, be 
possible to adduce examples which serve the proponent of the 
proof better. At this point we should note that, in Kant's 
view, if we reject transcendental idealism then we must hold 
space itself to be a necessary existent. Space, he writes, 
'since it is the primary source and condition of all shapes, 
which are only so many limitations of itself ... is taken as 
something absolutely necessary, existing in its own right, 
and as an object given a priori in itself' (A619/B647). This 
is false, however, since space is only a 'principle of 
sensibility'. 
For Kant, at the time he wrote the Critique, rejection 
of transcendental idealism must lead to the conclusion that 
space and time are absolute. In the Antinomies, he remarks 
that 'these two non-entities, empty space outside the world 
and empty time prior to it, have to be assumed if we are to 
assume a limit to the world in space and time' (A433/B461). 
In 'The First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space', 
Kant argues that the puzzle of incongruent counterparts can 
be resolved only in terms of the absolute theory of space 
(although he later concluded that it could be equally well 
resolved in terms of transcendental idealism). The 
difference between incongruent counterparts,, such as a left 
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hand and a right hand, cannot lie in the internal relations 
between the parts of each object, which will be the same in 
both cases, nor can it lie in the relations between the hands 
and external objects, because I... if we conceive the f irst 
created thing to be a human hand, it is necessarily either a 
right hand or a left, and to produce the one a different act 
of the creating cause is required from that whereby its 
counterpart can come into being' (Kant's Inau 
Dissertation and Early Writing on Space, J. Handyside, 
P. 27f). The distinction must, then, Kant argued, lie in the 
object's relation to absolute space. 
While Kant himself, of course, came to the view that 
space and time were ideal he has,. nevertheless, put forward 
arguments that lend support to the theory of absolute space 
and time. The arguments of the Aesthetic do not show sPace 
and time to be transcendentally ideal since it is there 
unresolved whether they do characterise things as they are in 
themselves. Kant's case for the transcendental idealism of 
space and time rests largely on the dubious arguments of the 
Antinomies. So there are grounds for holding, on Kant's own 
premisses, that space is an absolutely necessary being. 
This discussion of the nature of space and time would 
seem to indicate that they could be the subject of a Inon- 
classical' cosmological proof. This possibility has been 
brought closer by the assimilation, in modern physics, of 
space and time to 'space-time', and in particular by the 
General Theory of Relativity in which fields of force become 
geometrical properties of space. Thus H. G. Alexander remarks 
that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 'in the 
General Theory of Relativity, space-time is given some sort 
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of reality. For part, if not all, of what is meant by 
calling a thing real is that one can ascribe properties to 
it' (Introduction to The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 
P. IV). In some interpretations of the General Theory, the 
existence of matter itself is dependent upon the structure of 
space-time. As J. J. C. Smart says: 'relativistic cosmology 
often gives a picture of matter as consisting simply of 
regions of special curvature of space-time' (. The 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7, p. 510). 
While we may see here the materials for the construction 
of a 'non-classical' cosmological argument, this could only 
be controversial. It would involve philosophical 
difficulties, the universe being interpreted as a finite but 
necessary system; and it would be inconsistent with quantum 
mechanics which is essentially a particle physics. 
Nevertheless, it may still be possible to reject such a non- 
classical proof and simply to hold that absolute space exists 
necessarily. 
If we allow that space exists necessarily how do we 
account for that necessity? It is certainly not analytically 
true that that space exists. Presumably we could argue that 
we cannot think space away: as Kant says, 'we can never 
represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can 
quite well think i t empty of objects' (A24/B38). So in this 
case at least we can challenge Hu me's statement that, 
'whatever we conceive as existent, we can conceive as non- 
existent' (Dialogues on Natural Rel , Section IX). To 
prove that space can only be 'empty' and never 'absent' is 
not, of course, the whole of the argument designed to prove 
the reality of space; as we have seen, arguments are not 
98 
wanting that are claimed to prove space to be 'real' in the 
sense of having characteristics that condition any thing 
which may occupy it. 
Much of the resistance to the concept of necessary being 
comes from -a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
cosmological proof. The critics of the proof treat its first 
stage as asserting that the world must be grounded in 
necessary being in order to satisfy the demand for a 
sufficient reason for the existence of the world. It must be 
admitted that the proponents of the proof have frequently 
argued in this way. In fact, however, the movement of the 
argument is from sufficient reason to necessity rather than 
the reverse. The critic's view is that the proponent of the 
proof is looking for necessary being from the start, that 
only necessary being will provide an adequate ground for 
contingent things. It is here that the greatest weight of 
his criticism falls. It is objected that necessity is a 
property of propositions and that it is a category mistake to 
talk of necessary being. At this stage it may be suggested 
that necessity and contingency are polar concepts so that the 
notion of contingent being itself, the very starting point of 
the proof, becomes suspect. Considerations of this kind 
drive the proponent of the proof back to the aetiolated 
notion of factual necessity. This notion, as we have seen, 
is not adequate to the cosmological proof. These 
difficulties, howeverr can be avoided. 
As we have observed, the movement of the argument is 
from the demand for a sufficient reason for the world to 
necessary being rather than the reverse. What the proponent 
of the proof demands is a ground for the existence of the 
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world that will have a reason for its existence; and as this 
ground must be ultimate that reason must be a suf f ic ient 
reason and not one that commits us to a regress. It may be 
true that a being for the existence of which there is a 
sufficient reason will be facto a necessary being. But 
this does not mean that we are looking for a being whose 
essence includes existence. A sufficient reason or ground 
for the existence of the world will be provided by a being 
whose existence involves 'real' necessity in the sense 
outlined by Reichenbach. The critic suggests that we are 
looking for an essentially necessary being from the start. 
In fact we shall be satisfied with one from which necessity 
is inferred on other grounds, i. e., one for whose existence a 
sufficient reason may be given other than its necessity. it 
would not be an analytic truth that such a being existed. 
The critic of the proof is not likely to be satisfied 
with the bare assertion that the proof is concerned with 
'real' rather than logical necessity. He will wish to know 
how the proponent of the proof proposes to defend this 
notion. What, he will ask, is real necessity? At this point 
the proponent of the proof will return to the principle of 
sufficient reason. The necessary being of the first part of 
the proof is simply one for the existence of which a 
sufficient reason can be given. In general we understand 
well enough what is meant by giving a reason for the 
existence of something. A mountain range is formed by the 
folding of geological strata; a lake is formed when the 
natural f low of a river is impeded. These causal 
explanations, however, are not ultimate and complete in the 
sense of providing a suf f icient reason for the existence of 
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their objects. The po-int behind the cosmological proof is 
that the regress of causal explanations must come to an end 
in what Spinoza calls the causa sui. Thus causal 
explanations are of little help; and we may still be asked 
how we can justify employing the notion of a being whose 
existence would be inferred from its essence. This, it might 
be held, is no less a paradox than the notion of a being 
whose essence includes existence. 
In answer to the critic of the proof we may return to 
his challenge to provide examples of necessary being, 
although it should now be clear that we are not construing 
necessity in terms of analyticity. We have already touched 
on the questions whether absolute space could be considered a 
necessary existent and whether this would serve to answer 
the objections raised to the notion of necessary being. To 
accept that absolute space is a necessary being is not to 
hold that its existence is a matter of logical necessity,, as 
will be seen when we consider the process of argument that 
might be employed to establish its necessity. We could, in 
such an argument, start by arguing, with Kant, that it is 
inconceivable that space should not exist, that 'we can never 
represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can 
quite well think it as empty of objects' (A24/B38). In a 
world in which space did not exist, not only would all 
actual things be cancelled but all possibility would be 
cancelled also. Kant, for whom space is ideal, says merely 
that it 'necessarily underlies outer appearances' (A24/B39). 
For anyone who rejects Kantian idealism, the absence of 
space would cancel not merely possible appearances but all 
possibilityr or at least all possible extended things. What 
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reality could -there be that cancelled or diminished the 
province of the possible? It could not be that space was 
absent since the absence of space implies not merely the 
absence of objects but the cancelling of all possibility of 
ob3ects. It. might, of course, be said that on the 
relativistic view of space a world empty of extended objects 
would have no space. But Kant himself holds that if we 
reject the doctrine of the ideality of space then we must 
embrace the theory of absolute space. So long as the 
possibility of objects in general is not cancelled, then, on 
Kant's arguments,, the possibility of incongruent particulars 
can be appealed to to establish that space must be absolute. 
It thus appears that, on the Kantian view, if we reject 
transcendental idealism, we must embrace the absolute theory 
of space. The only way left for the realist to deny that 
this absolute space is a necessary being would be to accept 
that it is an entity and yet to assert that its existence is 
contingent. This Kant would deny. For Kant, as we have 
seen, it is inconceivable, on realist presuppositions, that 
space should not exist. The realist, then, has to admit 
space into his ontology as 'eternal, infinite and self- 
subsistent' (A40/B57). 
We have now outlined an argument, using Kantian 
materials,, that could be used to show space to be a necessary 
existent in the sense required by the proponent of the proof. 
The critic might object that, for the argument to be 
complete, we would have to show that the properties of space 
are themselves necessary, since a space having different 
properties would be a different entity. To counter this 
objection we could argue that the properties of absolute 
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space are in part determined by what it contains, the 
fundamental reality being in all cases the same. 
Our discussion of the ontological status of space has 
been designed to answer the critic who demands that the 
proponent of the proof should elucidate the notion of 
necessary being. It has appeared that absolute space can be 
regarded as a necessary existant without this involving us 
in the controversial notion of logically necessary being. A 
critic, however, might deny significance to this argument 
from absolute space on the grounds that we are no nearer 
understanding God's necessity. The point of the argument 
has, of course, been to justify the use of the notion of 
'real' necessity as outlined by Reichenbach. The proponent 
of the proof may point out that our argument concerning the 
necessity of absolute space is possible only given our 
experience of space. We have no experience of the divine 
properties or essence and it is thus impossible for us to 
demonstrate the 'real' necessity of God's existence. It is 
for this very reason that Aquinas maintains that we simply 
lack the knowledge to deduce God's existence from his 
essence. Without experience of space it would be be 
similarly impossible for us to demonstrate its necessity. 
We can, then, I believe,, grant to the proponent of the 
proof the point that the difficulties said to have been 
discovered in the concept of necessary being are 
inconclusive; and we may thus proceed to examine the argument 
by which the existence of such a being is said to be 
established. It must be admitted that certain accounts of 
necessity that have been offered are unsatisfactory. The 
notion of factual necessity is inadequate to the cosmological 
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proof, as is the notion of logically necessary existence 
interpreted in terms of analyticity. The proponent of the 
proof cannot allow that the ultimate reality of the world can 
be merely 'factually necessary'; and the claim that 'God 
exists' is analytic is vulnerable to the objection that 
analyticity is distinguishable from truth. As we have seen, 
however, these unsatisfactory accounts of necessity can be 
dismissed without prejudicing the cosmological proof. We now 
turn to consider the claim that there are rational grounds 
for asserting the existence of a necessary being that is the 
source of the world. 
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Chapter 6 
If we allow that the concept of necessary being is free 
from contradiction then we ought to examine the arguments 
that have been advanced to establish the existence of such a 
being. 
, 
The ontological argument, which we have already 
examined, is not directly relevant to our purpose. The type 
of argument with which we are here concerned is designed to 
complete the first stage of the cosmological proof and 
concludes simply to the existence of a necessary being or 
f irst cause, the nature of which is lef t undetermined. The 
arguments that have been employed to establish this first 
stage of the cosmological proof fall broadly into two 
categories. In the first, we have those arguments that take 
as their starting point the alleged contingency of the world 
and, in the second, those arguments that seek to establish to 
existence of a If irst cause'. Kant, in the Dialectic, treats 
the first type under rational theology as the cosmological 
argument proper and the second in the antinomies as part of 
rational cosmology. 
The argument from the contingency of the world or the 
argumentum, a contingentia mundi moves from the premiss that 
the world exists contingently, and is therefore dependent, to 
the conclusion that it derives its existence from a necessary 
be i ng. In Leibniz ls statement, it is the argument that the 
sufficient reason for the existence of the world 'must needs 
be outside [the] sequence of contingent things and must be in 
a substance which is the cause of this sequence, [a 
substance] which is a necessary being, bearing in itself the 
reason of its own existence' (Principles of Nature and Grace, 
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8). This 4rgurnent is closely related to those versions of 
the f irst cause argument that also appeal to the principle of 
sufficient reason. The distinction between the two proofs is 
sometimes dif f icult to draw, since elements of both may be 
present in a single statement of the cosmological argument, 
but it may perhaps be made by pointing out that whereas the 
argumentum a contingentia mundi argues directly from the 
contingency of the world to the necessary being in which it 
must be grounded, the causal argument starts from som, --ý 
admittedly causal explanatory relation in the world that, it 
is held, commits us to a regress of causes. It is then held 
that this regress of causes is impotent to explain that which 
it was invoked to explain and demands support f rom outside 
the series. The nature of the conclusion varies with the 
nature of the causal relation in question. 
Kant's criticism of the argument from contingency, which 
we shall now examine, is not fully developed in his 
discussion of rational theology where he is principally 
concerned with its dependence on the ontological proof. with 
regard to the inference from contingent to necessary being he 
is content to say that it involves an illegitimate appeal to 
'the transcendental principle whereby from the contingent we 
infer a cause. This principle is applicable only in the 
sensible world; outside that world it has no meaning 
whatsoever' (A609/B637 Elsewhere in the Critique, 
however, we f ind views expressed that are very damaging to 
the argument from contingency. In the first place, Kant 
rejects the principle of sufficient reason on which the 
classical version of the proof is based; and in the second 
place, he rejects the fundamental premiss of the proof, 
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i. e., that the world is or can be known to be contingent. 
According to Kant something is apprehended as contingent 
when it is something 'the not-being of which can be thought' 
(B290). This, however, is inadequate to prove contingency. 
It appears that, at least in the experienced world, when 
somethilng is causdd it can be known to be contingent for 'We . 
cannot ... deny that the proposition, that everything 
contingent must ýave a cause, is patent to everyone from mere 
concepts' (B289f). On Kant's view, the proponent of the 
proof begs the question of the world's causal dependence. 
For 'we recognise contingency in and through the fact that 
something can exist only as the effect of a cause; and if, 
therefore, a thing is assumed to be contingent, it is an 
analytic proposition to say that it has a cause' (B291). On 
this account, we can hardly appeal to the contingency of the 
world to prove that the world is causally dependent; because 
we require to show that the world can exist 'only as the 
effect of a cause' before we can assert its contingency. 
While Kant does not use this argument explicitly, a 
somewhat similar argument is used by T. McPherson to refute 
the argument from contingency. The proponent of the proof, 
according to McPherson, argues that 'the way to see that God 
exists is first to consider the fact the world is finite 
where "finite" means "not able to account for its own 
existence"; when a man has seen the world is f inite he may 
come to see that there must be a God' (Mind,, Vol. 66 (1957), 
p. 37 9). This, in McPherson's view, is not an argument at 
all, but simply a disguised statement of the existence of 
God. 'The argument', he says, 'is made to run like this: 
look at the finiteness of the world; then take the next step 
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to seeing that there must be a God. This ... is no argument 
at all, for there is no step here; seeing the world as finite 
is not really anything different from seeing that God exists' 
(op. cit. p. 38 1 f). A similar view is taken by I. D. Braine 
(Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. (1972), 
p. 167f) . 
The crucial step in the argument, in McPherson's 
account, is taken when we accept that the world is "finite". 
But how, he asks, is it to be made? only by a change in a 
man's whole outlook. For McPherson 'the whole value of the 
Cosmological Argument lies not in its efficacy as a proof of 
the existence of God, but in its bringing out the point that 
the believer is just the man who sees the world to be 
"f inite" , or "sees the things of the world to be not capable 
of accounting for their own occurrence" (op. ci;. -. p. 382). Once 
a man has seen the world is f inite he is 'not merely on the 
first step of the journey to belief in God; he is a believer 
already' ( 
At this stage the proponent of the proof might well 
reply, in accordance with the Kantian dictum that we find all 
our examples of contingency in the changes undergone by the 
individual objects of our everyday experience, that the world 
is composed of contingent or dependent beings and as such is 
itself contingent. However, as Rowe points out, a collection 
of dependent beings is not itself necessarily a dependent 
being: '... the proponents of the argument never saw clearly 
that the collection of dependent beings is not itself a 
dependent being. They tended to confuse the question of why 
a collection of dependent beings has members (rather than not 
having any) with the altogether different question of why a 
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certain being exists' (Nous,, Vol. 5, p. 56). It is true that 
the existence of a certain dependent being could be derived 
from a sequence of dependent beings, yet all could be but 
limitations of some independent substance. Faced with this 
difficulty the proponent of the proof might reply with a 
dilemma. Either the underlying substance has, witýiin itself,. 
the sufficient reason for its existence or it has not. If it 
has not then the sufficient reason for its existence must be 
sought outside it in some necessarily existing thing. In 
either case we can rest satisfied only with necessary being. 
A thinker like Leibniz, for whom the material world was 
contingent, might demand of the sceptic why there should be 
a world at all. In both The Ultimate origination of Things 
and the Principles of Nature and Grace Leibniz himself puts 
the question 'why does something exist rather than nothing? ' 
The question, however, is itself controversial quite apart 
from McPherson's objection that it cannot be asked unless we 
already believe in the existence of God. The Leibnizian 
approach here has been attacked on the grounds that 
'nothing' is a purely relative term. Thus Hartshorne says 
that 'both atheists and theists have argued that "there might 
have been nothing" is either mere verbiage or a 
contradiction. The term "nothing" has a use only in a 
relative sense, nothing of some specified sort or for a given 
purpose. Apart from this relativity the word is meaningless, 
(Monist,, Vol. 54 (1970),, P. 187). 
I see no reason why we should accept Hartshorne's 
embargo on the absolute Leibnizian sense of the term 
'nothing'. We can envisage a physical theory of the running 
down of the universe and eventual evanescence of all energy 
0 ]ý- 
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that forecasts that the world must finally sink into 
nothingness. it might not, however, be essential for the 
proponent of the proof to dispute Hartshorne's point here. 
We may appeal to the principle of suf f icient reason, not to 
account for the existence of matter but to account for its 
nature, or even f6r its distribution. on the first point 
Leibniz writes: 'granting that things must exist, we must be 
able to give a reason why they_ should exist thus and not 
otherwise' (Principles of Nature and Grace 7). on the second 
point he argued against the Newtonian doctrine of absolute 
space that it lands us in contradiction since there would 
have to be a sufficient reason for the distribution of matter 
in space, and yet, as all points of absolute space must be 
similar,, God would have had no sufficient reason to place the 
world in one part of absolute space rather than another 
(Leibniz Clarke Correspondence L. III. 5). 
While the proponent of the proof would, no doubt, hold 
that there must be a sufficient reason for the various 
determining characteristics of the world, it must be 
admitted that,, in view of the cosmological argument's 
emphasis on existential dependence, it is the demand for a 
sufficient reason for the existence of the world that is 
fundamental. Even here, however, we may not need the premiss 
that there might have been nothing. Would it not be 
sufficient for the proponent of the cosmological proof here 
if he could establish that there might have been more (or 
less) matter in the world that in fact exists? Certainly 
Leibniz would insist that there must be a sufficient reason 
why the quantity of matter in the world, if finite, should be 
as it is and not otherwise. 
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Here, however, we encounter a difficulty which involves 
questions of meaning. What does it mean to say that there 
might have been more (or less) matter in the world? That 
there might have been, for example, on the atomic theory, 
only half the number of atoms that in fact exist in the world 
does not necessarily mean the world might have contained less. 
matter. We could equally well explain the smaller number of 
atoms of the grounds of there being the same quantity of 
matter subj ect to diff erent laws or ordered in adiff erent 
f ashion. 
At this point we could appeal to the semantics of 
possible worlds. For Kripke and others, who have revived it, 
the Leibnizian notion of possible worlds provides semantic 
content for modal statements. In terms of possible worlds, 
we can give meaning to the statement that there might have 
been less matter in the world than in fact exists, since 
there is a possible world containing only a certain subset of 
the atoms or elementary particles making up the actual world. 
This involves our being able to re-identify certain 
individual atoms in other possible worlds and it is worth 
noting that it is at this notion of 'trans-world identity' 
that some of the most serious criticisms of the semantics of 
possible worlds have been directed (Vide R. Chisholm's 
'Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions' Noust 
1967). Those who have used the apparatus of possible worlds, 
however, have generally treated this as a pseudo-problem. 
Another way of giving meaning to the statement that 
there might have been more (or less) matter in the world 
would be to invoke the theory of absolute space. If we hold 
that absolute space, as independent of matter, is the same in 
ill 
all possible worlds, then it is open to us to hold that the 
volume of matter could have been different in that it could 
have occupied more or less of the whole of absolute space. 
Against this, however, it may be urged that we are here 
confusing volume with quantum; and the suggestion is, of 
course,, entirely 'dependent on the theory of absol. ute space. . 
If we accept that these problems can be solved and that 
we can give meaning to the proposition that things might have 
been different in the sense required by the cosmological 
argument,, we must face another problem that was f irst 
outlined by Hume in the 
_Dialogues 
Concerning Natural 
Religion. McPherson, as we have seen, holds that only if we 
believe in a creator can we maintain that the world is 
contingent. Thus he appears at least to allow that if there 
is a God, then the world is contingent. Hume, however,, 
implies that even if there is a God, the world cannot be 
contingent unless it had a beginning in time. Thus he 
writes, 'How can anything that exists from eternity have a 
cause since that relation implies a priority in time and a 
beginning of existence' (op. cit. section IX). In the same 
vein Munitz writes: 'To say "X might not have been" implies 
that there was a time at which X came into existence, and 
that prior to the moment at which X began, other initial 
conditions or choices existed as possible alternatives' (The 
Mystery of Existence p. 154). In Munitz's view 'the element 
of conditionality present in the use of the phrase " might not 
have been" implies (1) what did happen is the consequence of 
some particular set of antecedent conditions; (2) the actual 
antecedent conditions belong to a range of alternative 
conditions compatible with either an explanatory law, or the 
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freedom of choice of some agent' (ibid. ). 
It might be thought that Kant's view of this matter 
would resemble Hume's. After all, according to Kant, we 
recognise contingency through causal dependence; and 
causality involves a temporal relationship. In the Kantian 
as in the Humean 'analysis of causation a cause is an event 
and is always prior to its ef f ect. Kant was. however, 
unwilling to rule out the possibility that the world depended 
on God. Other thinkers had argued that not all causes or 
effects need be events. Aristotle held that motion in the 
universe was eternal but was an effect which could be 
explained only by the action of a prime mover. Just as 
Aristotle held that God caused and sustained eternal motion 
in the world so some philosophers, notably Descartes, have 
held that God is not only the creator but the sustainer of 
the world, which is itself eternal. The objection to this 
view of God's causality is, as Kant points out, that it 
appears to be an internal co-ntradiction to say that God 
created the world from eternity. 'For then the world would 
have to be eternal like God; and yet it is supposed to be 
dependent on him' (Lectures on Philosophical Theology p. 144). 
It does seem contradictory to assert that there could be 
two eternal substances, one of which is the cause of the 
other. However, God's causality is supposed to be unique and 
this is recogni sed by Kant. He says that we learn from 
experience that things in the world can be the cause of 
something else but 'the causality by which God is supposed to 
be the author of the world must be of a wholly different 
kind. For it is impossible to think of God's causality, his 
faculty of actualizing things external to himself, as 
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anything different from his understanding. And it is just 
this causality of God's understanding, his actualisation of 
the objects of his representation, which is called will' 
(Lectures on Philosophical Theology p. 97). Further, Kant 
holds that 'in God only one infinite act can be thought, a 
single, lasting' power which created the whole world . 
instantaneously and which maintains it in eternity' 
(op. cit. p. 13 6). on the evidence of the Lectures it seems 
that Kant should allow that an eternal world could be 
dependent on God. For God_is eternal and he from all 
eternity has willed the best of all possible worlds. 
Whatever God wills comes to be. Whatever he wills eternally 
is the case from eternity. This may mean that the world is 
not contingent in the Kantian sense that it could have been 
different, if God is such that he cannot but will the best of 
all Possible worlds. But the world, on this interpretation, 
would be contingent, in the sense of dependent. 
Kant's own discussion of these issues is complicated by 
his view that the noumenal realm is non-temporal, and by his 
belief that even if reality were temporal the temporal series 
of events cannot be infinite. With regard to the second 
point the proponent of the cosmological argument may wish to 
assert that the world was created by God and that the world 
did indeed have a beginning of existence. But he may not 
wish to concede that to say the world might not have existed 
or that it might have been different entails, as Munitz 
suggests,, that there must have been a time when the world did 
not exist. 
Munitz's reference to antecedent conditions, however, 
may not be essential to the objection. He would presumably 
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hold that if the material world were eternal it could have 
been different, in the sense required by the cosmological 
argument, only if it were either dependent on God as 
McPherson argued or on the presence or absence of inhibiting 
factors within the material world itself. In the first case, 
things. could hav6 been different because God is free to 
choose what will exist; and in the second case, that things 
could have been different would no doubt be explained on the 
basis of some physical indeterminism. 
It appears, then, that even if he waives the objections 
regarding the Humean analysis of causation, the empiricist 
would maintain that we can hold the world could have been 
different only if we presuppose the existence of God or the 
purely physical dependence of some aspect of the world on 
conditions that are themselves indeterministic. The second 
alternative is of little assistance to the proponent of the 
proof; and he can hardly appeal to the first to establish his 
premiss without flagrantly begging the question. 
The proponent of the cosmological proof wishes to 
establish that the world could have been dif ferent, that it 
is 'contingent' or lacks Isel-f-suf f iciency'. only having 
established this can he proceed to the next stage of his 
argument,, which is to show that such a world requires to be 
grounded in necessary being or the self-sufficient. His 
critics, however,, reject his first move. How,, then, is the 
proponent of the proof to proceed? He wishes to establish 
that things could have been different, in order to justify 
his appeal to the principle of sufficient reason. He argues 
against the empiricist that the world, being contingent, is 
only one of a number of possible worlds. There must, 
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therefore, be a sufficient reason why this wo-rld shoulc exist 
rather than any other. This reason can, he believes, reside 
only in a necessary being which is the omnipotent source of 
the actual world. His critic, on the other hand, argues that 
it is only if we presuppose the existence of such an 
omnipotent being 'that we can hold there are other possible 
worlds. In this regard, then, the argument from contingency 
is quest ion-begg ing. 
To reject the argument from contingency is to reject the 
principle of sufficient reason as employed by Leibniz. Kant 
does, of course, specifically reject it as part of the 
metaphysician's apparatus of a priori principles. This may 
seem like the end of the matter for the Kantian. However, 
Kant himself, in his Beweisgrund essay, formulates another 
highly general principle that the proponent of the proof 
could well substitute for that of sufficient reason. This is 
his principle that the possible presupposes the actual. 
Kant's whole argument in the Beweisgrund proof is of 
considerable interest for the proponent of the argument from 
contingency and it will be worthwhile to assess relationship 
between the two proofs. 
Kant's thesis in the Beweisgrund is that nothing is 
possible unless it is thinkable, although it is not 
immediately obvious whether thinkability is here identified 
with possibility or whether it is merely a test of 
possibility. In any event, Kant argues that for the concept 
of a thing to be thinkable it must meet two conditions. In 
the first Place, it must not contain a contradiction for 
then it would be 'formally' impossible. In the second place, 
the realities must themselves be available or given to enable 
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us to form the concept since for Kant 'to think a possibility 
... is to form a concept whose "material" or content 
consists in certain realities (or their negations)' (Wood, 
op. cit. p. 66). If they were not so available the concept would 
be 'materially impossible'. Kant, in accordance with his 
dictum that the possible must be thinkable, holds that the 
possibility both of things and of concepts must be grounded 
in the actual. In the Lectures he says that 'we have no 
concept of real possibility except through existence, and in 
the case of every possibility which we think realiter we 
always presuppose some existence; if not the actuality of the 
thing itself, then at least an actuality in general 
containing the data for everything possible. Hence every 
possibility presupposes something actually given. For if 
everything were merely possible, then the possible itself 
would have no ground. Consequently this ground of 
possibility must itself be given not merely as possible, but 
also as actual' (op. cit. p. 68). 
What is presupposed,, then,, in our thinking of possible 
things, is the material or total reality that furnishes the 
material or data for our concepts of such possible things. 
This sum-total of reality Kant identified with the ens 
realissimum. Even after rejecting the Beweisgrund proof, 
Kant says that 'we are justified in assuming and presupposing 
an ens originarium which is at the same time an ens 
realissimum as a necessary transcendental hypothesis. For 
to cancel a being which contains the data for everything 
possible is to cancel all possibility. And therefore a most 
real original being is a necessary presupposition, on account 
of i ts relat ionsh ip to the poss ibi 1i ty of al 1 thi ng sl 
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(ibid. ). That the possibility of any thing presupposes, not 
merely the realities which compose it but the whole of 
reality or the ens realissimum, brings out the Kantian view 
that the concept of any individual thing must be completely 
determined, either positively or negatively, with respect to 
all possible predicates. The Beweisgrund proof is thus 
closely bound up with Kant's deduction of the Ideal of pure 
reason. 
Kant's association of possibility with thinkability may 
have been influenced by Leibniz who held that without God 
nothing would be possible. God actualises those 
possibilities or essences that are the objects of his 
understanding, and produces the best of all possible worlds. 
Kant himself cannot, of course, hold that there is a God and 
therefore a mind to which the criteria of thinkability may 
be referred, in an argument that in fact seeks to prove the 
existence of God. So it seems that his argument is not that 
possibility is to be identified in Leibnizian fashion with 
God's thinking, but that if something is possible then it 
must be eo ipso thinkable for a mind. Many would be 
sympathetic to Kant's view that thinkability is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of any thing, for it does seem 
true that if a concept is 'formally' impossible, such as the 
round square, then it is unthinkable. It certainly cannot be 
distinctly conceived. Kant, however, goes on to claim that 
thinkability is a sufficient condition of possibility because 
thinkability includes both the formal and material elements 
of possibility. 
Kant's view that the possible must be thinkable does not 
entail the conclusion that there can be no possibilities 
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without mind. The question is nevertheless sometimes raisedr 
by Wood for example, whether there would be possibilities in 
a world where there was no mind to contemplate them. Kant 
seems, in fact, to hold that for every possible thing there 
is a possible, completely determined concept whether or not 
that concept is e6tertained by a mind. In any cape he could. 
point out that on his argument the existence of any limited 
being implies the existence of the ens realissimum since 
every thing must be completely determined with respect to all 
possible predicates. The difficulty here is that the 
Beweisgrund proof is said to be a pure a priori demonstration 
of the existence of God whereas this appeals to the empirical 
fact that some limited being exists. 
Kant himself seemed to see the Beweisgrund proof as 
analogous to the ontological proof. Indeed, in the 
Beweisgrund, he calls it the ontological proof in 
contradistinction to the ontological proof proper which he 
refers to as the 'Cartesian proof'. In the Lectures on 
PhilOS02hical Theolo2y Kant says that 'in addition to the 
logical concept of the necessity of a thing (where something 
is said to be absolutely necessary if its nonexistence would 
be a contradiction, and consequently impossible) we have yet 
another rational concept of real necessity. This is where a 
thing is eoý 112so necessary if its nonexistence would cancel 
all possiblity' (op. cit. p. 68). There seems, however, to be 
here an assumption that the possible must exist in some 
absolute senser for we cannot dpmonstrate the necessity of 
the ens realissimum as the ground of all possibility if 
possibility Is itself dependent on contingent matter, for 
example. Howeverr how can we show that there are these 
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absolute possibilities? When Kant claims the impossibility 
of any state of affairs through which 'all possibility in 
general' is cancelled, Wood suggests he is trading on an 
am big ui ty. 'This claim is easy enough to accept if 'all 
possibility' means something like 'all possible states of 
affairsI. But, in the Kantian argument,, 'all possibility' 
must instead refer to something of the order of 'all possible 
things'. For the argument thus f ar has been that a 
completely empty world would be one in which all particular 
things would be impossible, because none of the realities 
needed to think them would be present as data for the 
corresponding thoughts. But even granting this argument, it 
looks as if one poss ible state of af fa irs m ight be that in 
which nothing exists (and thus, according to the argument, in 
which nothing is possible). The cancelling of all possible 
things does not obviously involve the cancelling of all 
possible alternative states of affairs unless it is shown 
that an empty (and thus, on the argument, a necessarily 
empty) world is not a possible state of affairs' 
(op. cit. p. 69f). 
Clearly, there must be some 'state of affairs' in Wood's 
general sense. It seems to be a necessary truth that 'either 
there is something material in existence or there is not'. 
So it follows that we cannot entertain a possibility in which 
all possible states of affairs are cancelled. But, as there 
appears to be no conceptual difficulty in the notion of a 
world in which nothing exists, how can Kant show that an 
empty world is not a possible state of affairs? Wood says 
that 'the actual existence of things suffices to show it 
impossible that there should be a necessarily empty world' 
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(op. cit. p. 7 0). But this is a 'cosmological' and not an 
'ontological, inference. We require the pre-niss that 
something exists before we can argue that there must be a 
ground or source of possibility. That there must be such a 
ground or source cannot be proved a priori,. 
For Kant, then, possible things presuppose the actual 
because otherwise their possibility would be unthinkable. It 
seems obvious enough that both things and our concepts of 
things must conform to the formal conditions of possibility. 
The connection between them has a material foundation as well 
because it is the matter of which things are composed that 
acts causally on our senses to produce the sense impressions 
from which our concepts are derived. This gives Kant's 
argument an empirical character. It is only through those 
concepts that we can 'think' possible things so that we can 
represent the possibility of a thing to ourselves only on 
condition that the matter exists to form it and, through 
experience, to form the concepts through which that 
possibility is represented. This, of course, is merely a 
circuitous way of saying that if some thing is possible then 
there must exist the realities that are sufficient to produce 
i t. Kant's reference to thinkability, however, emphasises 
his point that to "think" the concept of any thing we need to 
know what it is not as well as what it is. Thus we need the 
concepts of the realities that do not characterise the thing 
before we can determine i t wi th respect to those realities. 
It is only in this way that it can be completely determined. 
Many would accept as plausible some general form of 
Kant's principle that the possible presupposes the actual. 
The argument of the possibility proof , however, rests also on 
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the principle of complete determination, the application of 
which is said to lead us to the concept of the ens 
realissimum. Limited things are determined negatively with 
respect to some realities; but the very denial that those 
realities characterise a particular thing implies their 
existepce elsewhere since all concepts of negations are. 
derivative. 'No one can think a negation determinately, save 
by basing it upon the opposed affirmation. Those born blind 
cannot have the least notion of darkness, since they have 
none of light' (A575/B603). So Kant regards the concept of 
an ens realissimum as being at the same time the concept of 
an ens logice originarium, that is, of a logically original 
being whose concept cannot be derived from any other concept 
because all other concepts are derived from it' (Lectures 
p. 4 5). The ens realissimum then, like Spinoza's God, is 
conceived through itself and without it nothing can be 
conceived (Ethics I props. XIV and XV). 
There are many difficulties in Kant's argument. To 
begin with, the notion of complete determination is obscure. 
For Kant, as for Leibniz and Wolff, to be an individual is to 
be completely determined. one of each pair of contradictory 
predicates must apply to it. Even allowing this, however, it 
is difficult to see how the ens realissimum can be the source 
of all the predicates of individual things. The ens 
realissimum may be the source of all those predicates that 
express reality, but this seems insufficient to produce an 
individual. It seems that relational predicates are 
excluded. However,, cannot two individuals differ solo 
numero? If not, is Kant tacitly assuming the principle of 
the identity of indiscernibles? in any case it seems 
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possible that individuals should dif fer in form . %7ithout 
differing in their degrees or kinds of reality. Kant's 
assumption that an exhaustive list of non-relational 
predicates would be sufficient to identify an individual 
implies that he thought that each individual., like a 
Leibnizian monad, ýhould differ qualitively from eyery other. 
In the Critique he says that 'all manifoldness of things 
is only a correspondingly varied mode of limiting the concept 
of the highest reality which forms their common substratum, 
just as all figures are only possible as so many different 
modes of limiting infinite space' (A578/B606). This spatial 
analogy does not help since two congruent spatial figures can 
be distinguished only in terms of relations. 
Another problem is that to determine an individual 
completely we should need to know all realities. Kant admits 
that "the universal concept of reality" which human reason 
holds to be a precondition of the thorough determination of 
individual things 'cannot be divided a priori, because 
without experience we do not know any determinate kinds of 
reality which would be contained under that genus' 
(A577/B605). Wood says that it is here that the "traditional 
ontology" comes to our rescue. 'For this ontology tells us 
that the concept of reality is the concept of an intensive 
magnitude (and) if, in our attempt to conceive the thorough 
determination of objects a priori by pure reason we permit 
ourselves to conceive of reality as having such a maximum, 
then we will be able to see the way clear to a solution of 
our problem. For if we form the conception of a "sum" 
comprehending all possible reality within it, then we can 
represent a priori the division of the universal concept of 
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reality into different species by reý)resenting the division 
of this "sum" into mutually exclusive parts' (Wood , 
op-cit. p. 41). 
The "traditional ontology" to which Wood refers allows 
us to talk of degrees of reality. Thus, in the Third 
Meditation, Desbartes says that the degree of reality 
possessed by an efficient cause must be at least as great as 
that possessed by the effect; and Spinoza holds that the more 
reality a thing has, the more attributes it will have (Ethics 
I prop. IX). These ontological views do not, however, seem 
to carry us much further forward, since presumably, in any 
given individual, degrees of species of reality rather than a 
degree of reality in general, will be found; and they still 
imply that every individual has, like a Leibnizian monad, its 
own unique degree of reality. In any case, it remains to be 
explained how particular things lead us to the concept of the 
ens 
-realissimum. 
The fact that particular things have 
dif f erent degrees of reality does not entail that they are 
limitations of an ens realissimum; and it is still obscure 
how an exhaustive list of predicates limiting the concept of 
reality in general can uniquely identify an individual. 
What, then, is the significance of Kant's argument to 
his criticism of rational theology? In the Critique he 
denied objective validity to the possibility proof on the 
grounds that what it really proves is not 'the objective 
relation of an actual object to other things, but of an idea 
to concepts' (A579/B607). Kant holds that empirical 
possibility presupposes the ens realissimum because objects 
of the senses 'can be completely determined only when 
compared with all the predicates that are possible in the 
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field of appearance (so) the material for the possibility of 
all objects of the senses must be presupposed as given in one 
whole' (A581f/B609f). We are led into error, however, when 
we treat the proof as valid of things in themselves. 
Kant denies significance to the possibility proof on the 
grounds of his ide'alism. The proof is valid only of "objects 
of the senses" since modal concepts, including possibility, 
have no place in the noumenal world. In one place he 
suggests that 'the distinction of possible from actual 
things is one that is merely valid subjectively for human 
understanding' (Critique of_Teleological Judgement p. 56). 
Modal concepts express a relation of things to the mind that 
considers them. But, apart from the consideration that we 
cannot "think" noumenal reality, why should modal concepts 
not have a place in the noumenal world? After all, that 
world may be accessible to a non-human mind. Kant,. of 
course, holds that modal concepts can only be employed or 
"schematised" in temporal terms and that he has proved 
noumenal reality to be non-temporal. His argument here, 
however, is open to question on both counts. 
Our interest in the possibility proof comes from the 
fact that here Kant has himself provided a species of 
cosmological argument. The argument itself, however, can 
hardly be regarded as convincing. Certainly insofar as it 
has been considered by the commentators it has won little 
sympathy. Thus T. E. England objects that 'Kant passes in 
bewildering fashion from the proposition that all negations 
are limitations, implying a positive realityf to the 
assertion that all the manifoldness of things consists only 
of so many ways of limiting the concept of the highest 
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reality, which forms their common substratum' (Kant's 
Conception of God, p. 120). W. H. Walsh attacks the concept of 
the ens realissimum that Kant here employs holding that 'the 
very notion of such an entity is logically suspect, since it 
would not so much possess its predicates as consist of them' 
(Kant's Criticism bf Metaphysics, p. 219). 
Even if he rejects the Bewelsgrund proof, however, the 
proponent of the classical cosmological argument will study 
it with interest. He wishes to show that the existence of 
the world would be impossible if it were not grounded in 
necessary being. The existence of any contingent thing is 
possible only in relation to God. So here, as in the 
Beweisgrund, the possible implies the existence of the 
necessary. In the argument of the Beweisgrund, however, the 
existence of the ens realissimum is inferred not so much as 
an explanation of the existence of contingent things as an 
essential ground of their possibility, their own share of 
being or reality presupposing the sum-total of all reality. 
In spite of these differences the cosmological proof and the 
Beweisgrund proof seem to be closely related. For the 
proponent of the cosmological argument there are many 
'possible worlds' including, no doubt, the one in which 
nothing material exists. Even if we reject his appeal to the 
principle of sufficient reason, he may argue that things 
could have been different, that other possible worlds could 
have existed. If we grant him this, he can argue that these 
possibilities must have a source or ground; and that this 
source or ground must be a necessarily existing being of 
supreme reality or ens realissimum. In view of the close 
relationship between the two arguments it is surprising that 
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Kant did not treat t,, ýe cosmological proof with t'. -, e sympathy 
he clearly retained fcr the Beweisgrund proof. Behind both 
we can sense the principle ex nihilo nihil fit. In the 
classical cosmological proof the contingent world presupposes 
the necessary as its transcendent cause; and in the 
Beweisgrund proof 'possible things presuppose the existence of 
the ens realissimum as the source of their possibility. 
Kant's principle that the possible presupposes the 
actual may be less problematic than the principle of 
suf f ic ient reasoi-.. But to employ Kant's principle in the 
cosmological proof we need to show that there are other 
possible worlds without presupposing the existence of God. 
In Kant's argument any existent thing presupposes the ens 
realissimum as the ground of its complete determination. But 
if we reject this argument how can we show that there are 
other possible worlds? We have to show that there are these 
other possible worlds before we can appeal to the principle 
that the possible presupposes the actual. This is no use to 
us if the two are co-extensive. 
Are there, then, other possible worlds? Could things 
have been different in the sense required by the cosmological 
proof? Could, for example, there have been more or less 
matter than in fact exists or perhaps- nothing material at 
all? As a first move, the proponent of the proof might argue 
ad hominem that if there is no reason for the existence of 
the world then the existence of matter no more requires an 
explanation and is no more remarkable than the existence of 
nothing. In the same way , it might be argued that the 
external motion of one elementary particle round another no 
more requires an explanation than their being eternally at 
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rest relative to each other. If in that case we could argue 
that the moving particles could in fact have been relatively 
at rest rather than in relative motion, both being natural 
and nothing determining what is the case, could we not argue, 
on similar grounds, that there could have been nothing? The 
critic of the proo-f would, no doubt, argue that the two cases 
are not on a par, the one concerning the behaviour of matter, 
the other its existence or the framework to which all 
questions of possibility have reference. Nevertheless, it 
still seems to follow on the premisses of the critic of the 
proof that the existence of the actual world is one of a 
number of possible, mutually exclusive, states of affairs 
natural in that none of them would require explanation. 
The proponent of the proof, then, may argue ad hominem 
that, on his critic's premiss that matter exists without a 
cause, there could have been matter other than that which in 
fact exists, or indeed a world devoid of matter altogether. 
If this point be conceded to him he may then appeal to the 
Kantian principle that the possible presupposes the actual 
and thus these other possible states of affairs presuppose a 
source which can only be found in necessary being. Against 
this argument, his critic would presumably reply that these 
other states of affairs would indeed require a source and it 
is for this, very reason that they are impossible. 
Kant holds that the possible presupposes the actual. on 
Munitz's view, things could not have been different in the 
sense required by the cosmological proof unless we presuppose 
a source on which the material world depends. So this hardly 
seems an issue between them. The real issue is whether there 
are in fact other possible worlds or alternatives to the 
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actual world, The critic holds that the proponent of 
proof begs the question, since to say there are alternatives 
to the actual world is to presuppose a source of these 
possibilities. The proponent of the proof holds that on the 
critic's own argument there are alternatives to the actual 
world because that argument includes the premiss that there 
is in fact no source for what exists. The critic's denial 
that this is entailed by his premisses brings us to a 
distinction between what we may call internal and external 
possibilities. The proponent of the proof holds, in effect, 
that there are possibilities external to the material world 
whereas his critic holds that all possibilities are 
determined by that world. 
How can the proponent of the proof demonstrate that 
there are these 'external' possibilities? At this point it 
may be helpful to employ the idea of such possibilities being 
entertained by a mind. Let us, for the sake of argument, 
suppose an ontological proof valid, and as proving the 
existence of an omniscient being but not proving that any 
material world must be dependent upon him. Let us suppose 
that such a being exists but has no powers of creation. it 
does not follow that nothing material exists. For, on the 
premisses of the critic of the proof, the material world does 
not require a source. We can imagine such an omniscient 
being, like Leibniz's God, reviewing all possible worlds. In 
order to know which possible world was actual, since this 
could not be known a priori, we may regard him as employing 
some faculty analgous to perception. Such a being would 
surely regard the various possible worlds that could exist as 
real poss ib i1it ies. They cannot be merely logical 
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possibilities since one of them is actual. 
The omniscient being, in reviewing the possible worlds, 
would no doubt consider the world in which nothing material 
exists. Suppose it proved that there is in fact nothing 
material in existence. Would he then hold that the existence 
of matter was, after all, impossible? Presumably he would 
not since, on the critic's premisses, matter requires no 
source and nothing determines it to exist. That it exists or 
does not exist is a brute fact and thus both these states of 
affairs are possible. But if this is so then there are 
external possibilities as is required by the proponent of the 
proof . 
The mere possibility of the existence of matter demands 
a source or ground. This source or ground cannot be 
contingent for, as Kant points out, 'if everything were 
merely possible, then the possible itself would have no 
ground' (Lectures on Phi losop hical Theology, p. 68). For the 
omniscient mind to hold that the existence of matter was 
possible he would have to know there was a necessarily 
existing source from which it could derive. He could not 
know a priori if there were a contingent source for it; and 
in any case -a contingent source would not be suf ticient 
because its possibility would require to De grounded also. 
In the absence of a necessary ground we are led to an 
int inite regress. 
The omniscient mind, when reviewing possible worlds, 
accords them all the same status. According to the critic ot 
the proof only the actual world is possible. The 
impossibiiity of any alternative to the actual world is a 
I 
logical impossibility and is knowable a priori. To the 
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omniscient mind, however, unless all the 'formally' possible 
worlds are real possibilities then none is possible. As at 
least one is possible, i. e., the actual world, then all are 
possible. If there are these possible worlds then there must 
be a source or ground of their possibility. If the existence 
of such a source or ground is denied then the omniscient mind 
would hold that it was necessarily true that no matter 
existed. 
one problem for the type of critic whose views we have 
been considering is indeed that on his premisses an empty 
world would appear to be a necessary state of affairs . For 
the critic, the actual material world is contingent; and 
indeed the existence of any other material world would also 
be contingent. For no such possible world would there be a 
sufficient reason why it should exist. An empty world on the 
other hand, a world in which nothing whatever existed, would 
appear to be a necessary state of affairs on the critic's own 
premisses. That an empty world would be a necessarily empty 
world is a corollary of the cosmological proof, for if all 
contingent being is dependent on necessary being, then, if 
there were no necessary being, since it cannot be 
contingently true that there is no necessary being, there is 
necessarily no contingent being. 
This line of argument may be extended to produce an 
indirect form of cosmologi cal proof. The principle 
underlying this indirect proof is that the contradictory of a 
statement has the same modal status as the statement itself. 
Thus, where something can only necessarily be the case, given 
that it is not the case, it is necessarily not the case. 
Examples of the application of this principle are easy enough 
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to provide. If 5 were the cube root of 145, then it would 
be necessarily so. Given that it is not so, it is 
necessarily not so. If the area of a triangle were given by 
halving the square of its base, then it would necessarily be 
so given. Since this is not the case, it is necessarily not 
the case. If water is H2 0 then, according to Putnam and. 
other recent writers on essentialism, it is necessarily H20 
or H20 in all possible worlds. If it is not H20, then it is 
necessarily not H20. 
If we accept the general principle underlying these 
arguments, there appears to be no reason why we should not 
apply it to the world in general. On the views of both the 
proponent of the cosmological argument and the critic who 
holds that existential possibilities are no wider than the 
actual, an empty world, or a world in which there was nothing 
whatever, could exist only necessarily. Since it is not the 
case that nothing exists, there is necessarily not nothing. 
In other words, necessarily something exists. The fact that 
we require the premiss that it is not the case that nothing 
exists, i. e., that something exists, shows that this is a 
cosmological and not an ontological argument. 
This argument is, of course, insuf f icient to prove the 
existence of a necessary being. We cannot infer that some 
specific thing exists necessarily from the fact that 
necessari ly something exi sts. To argue thus would be to 
commit a quantifier shift fallacy. We shall, nevertheless, 
try to show that only necessary being can satisfy the demand 
that that something must exist. 
We may, perhaps, begin by pointing out that, for the 
proponent of the proof, to hold that something must exist is 
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to hold that there must be a suf f icient reason for its 
existence. To hold that contingent being could satisfy the 
demand that something must exist is to imply that its 
sufficient reason must lie outside that contingent being, 
presumably in some abstract logical principle. The 
sufficient reasoh for the existence of contingent being 
certainly cannot be found in any contingently existing thing 
without raising the problem of the infinite regress. Iti-, " 
however, very difficult to see how an abstract logical 
principle can provide the sufficient reason for the existence 
of things. It cannot be analYtic that something contingent 
should exist because, apart from the objections reviewed in 
our discussion of the ontological proof, analyticity would 
lead us to necessary rather than to contingent being. Unless 
the logical principle could ground matter other than that 
which in fact exists, the actual could only be regarded as 
necessary. If, however, it can ground other matter then it 
follows that there is no sufficient reason for the existing 
world. 
There are grounds other than those provided by the 
principle of sufficient reason on which the proponent of the 
proof may rest his argument here. It would be necessary that 
something contingent should exist only if there were a 
contradiction in the notion of an empty world. This is not 
the case for, as Kant pointed out, in such a situation 
'nothing is left that can be contradicted' (A594/B623). The 
impossibility Of an empty world can be inferred only from the 
notion of necessary being. 
It might be objected here that our argument cannot lead 
to necessary being because we begin with a contingent Dremiss 
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viz. that something exists. Russell argued Li tliis way 
against the cosmological proof which, he said, 'has a formal 
vice,, in that it starts from f inite existence as its datum, 
and admitting this to be contingent,, ... proceeds to infer an 
existent which is not contingent' (The Philosophy of Leibniz, 
P. 175). 
, 
The concl'usion of the proof certainly is contingent 
for it is only if something exists that we can assert the 
existence of necessary being. It is true, however, that 
although the necessity of the conclusion is only the 
necessity of entailment that conclusion is held to be true in 
all possible worlds. Nevertheless, the cosmological proof 
does not claim that it accounts for the necessity of the 
necessary being on which the world is said to depend. It 
starts from the contingent premiss that something exists and 
appeals to principles that are held to be necessary, e. g., 
that all contingent existence must be grounded. In any case, 
the formal vice of which Russell complains would apply only 
to those versions of the proof that seek to prove the 
existence of logically necessary being. It does not af fect 
the argument to an existent conceived as having 'real' 
necessity in the sense that we have discussed. 
If we accept, then, that something must exist, it seems 
to follow that there is necessary being. It cannot be 
necessary that something contingent exists. It is only on 
the grounds that something exists necessarily that we can 
argue that an empty world is not a possible state of affairs. 
It is perhaps worth noting that Sommers, when he attempts to 
show that something contingent must exist, relies on a form 
of the proof f rom possibility (v. Analysis, vol. 26, 
pp. 177 f f). This, however, merely takes us back to our 
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starting point. 
The critic of the proof, then, cannot allow that if 
there were no necessary being there would necessarily be 
nothing. He would no doubt argiie that if there were nothir-, 
then there could not indeed have been anything, or things 
could not have been different, but this would not be 
necessarily so, the impossibility in question deriving from 
the contingent fact that there are no antecedent conditions 
determining what should or should not be the case. But this 
is really to say that there would have to have been a source 
for contingent existence; and, as we have seen, if that 
source were contingent,, we are launched on an infinite 
regress. 
If it indeed follows from the critic's premisses that an 
empty world would exist necessarily we must demand of him why 
such a world does not exist. We cannot say of a necessary 
state of af fairs that it would obtain if something were the 
case. To show that it must obtain all we have to do is to 
show that it is logically possible. We cannot say that a 
necessary truth holds only in one possible world and yet 
def ine 'necessarily true' as 'true in all possible worlds'. 
The critic may say that the necessity with which we are here 
concerned, viz., that an em-ý)ty world is necessarily an 
empty world, is the necessity of entailment. He may argue 
that from the concept of an empty world we can infer the 
impossibility of anything whatsoever having existed, but 
hold that this does not exclude other possible worlds in 
which contingent existence is exemplified. Thus it would 
appear that the critic must, after all, admit that there are 
'external' possibilities or existential possibilities not 
135 
determined by the actual world. It may be tempti, ng for the 
critic to concede that the material world could have been 
different ab initio but to deny this any signif icance as it 
does not imply that in the world there are various 
existential possibilities as the proof requires. If, 
however, the critic does concede that the material world 
could have been different ab initio then he has conceded 
external possibilities. 
To sum up, we may say that Kant's criticism of the 
cosmological proof in the Critique may be offset by what he 
says in the Beweisgrund essay and elsewhere. His principal 
criticism of the argument from contingency in the Critique is 
that the contingency of the world cannot be proved. it is 
even doubtful whether we can legitimately apply the concept 
of contingency in a metaphysical context. For Kant, the 
contingent is something the not-being of which is possible. 
It is for this reason that the concept of contingency is 
bound up with the concept of causality. If something is 
caused to exist then we infer that it is contingent since had 
the cause not operated it would not have existed. We cannot, 
however, know that the world is contingent in this sense. 
In answer to Kant, the proponent of the argument from 
contingency may argue that by 'contingent' he means 
'dependent' rather than 'could have been different'. While 
most critics of the proof would find an appeal to the 
dependency of the world no more acceptable than, and indeed 
indistinguishable, from the argument from contingency Kant 
himself, on the evidence of the Beweisgrund essay and the 
Lectures on Philosophical Theology, holds that all that is 
possible is dependent on a source of possibility in general. 
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This source of all possibility he identifies with the ens 
realissimum. 
Attractive though Kant's argument is for the proponent 
of the cosmological argument it faces the problem that his 
critics tend to restrict the essential concepts employed in 
the proof to the' actual world. J. Laird,, for example, 
writes: 'Take the statement that the world is an effect. if 
so, it must have a cause or set of causes, but how could we 
show that it is an effect? Might it not be the theatre in 
which all causes and effects occur, but itself is neither 
cause nor effect? ' (Theism and Cosmology., p. 95). The same 
would no doubt be urged with regard to possibi lity and 
dependency, for it is this restriction of possibility to the 
actual world that constitutes the principal difficulty in 
constructing a version of the cosmological proof on Kantian 
principles. 
To try to show that there may be 'external' 
possibilities we have employed the Leibnizian notion of an 
omniscient mind contemplating possible worlds. On the 
premisses of the critic who holds that matter can exist 
without a source, it would appear that many worlds are 
possible including that in which nothing material existed. 
The omniscient mind could not know a priori whether there was 
matter or not. On the critic's argument that we have 
considered, however, it seems that if nothing material 
existed then the world would be necessarily devoid of matter; 
and that a world in which nothing whatsoever existed would be 
a necessary state of affairs. Wood denies that an empty 
world is eo ipso a necessarily empty world on the grounds 
that it involves 'an exclusion out of hand of the facie 
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possibility that the world might have been empty simply 
because nothing happened to exist in it' (op. cit. p. 68). This 
is, however, to concede too much to critics of the proof who, 
like Munitz, wish to exclude the notion of different possible 
worlds which would give purchase either to the principle of 
sufficient reasoh or to the Kantian principle that the 
possible presupposes the actual. 
The critic of the proof cannot say of an empty world 
that it could have contained matter or indeed that the actual 
world could have contained matter other than in fact exists, 
for there is, by hypothesis, no source for it and external 
possibilities are denied. He cannot say that in an empty 
world it would be a contingent matter that nothing existed; 
for it is only if there were a source for them that there 
would be such external possibilities. For such a critic, 
that which exists merely happens to exist; but that which 
does not exist necessarily does not exist. This distinction 
cannot be sustained. For the proponent of the proof, if the 
actual merely happens to exist then that which does not 
exist, given that it is possible, merely happens not to 
ex i st. Once such external possibilities are admitted the 
proponent of the proof can move from the ad hominem argument 
to the proof proper and invoke the Kantian principle that the 
possible presupposes the actual. Whatever we may think of 
the status of this principle it is one that is implicit in 
the arguments employed by some of the most intluential 
critics of the proof from contingency. 
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Chapter 7 
We now turn to the second route by which the proponent 
of the cosmological argument seeks to establish the first 
stage of the proof, that is, to the so-called 'first cause' 
argument. The origins of this type of argument can be traced 
back to Aristotle's argument to the Prime Mover. Arguments 
of this kind centre on the notion of a causal regress. In 
some versions, while the cosmological regress is allowed to 
be infinite, it is still held to be inadequate to account for 
the existence and nature of the world. In other versions, 
the. regress is rejected either because of some dif f iculty in 
the notion of an infinite series or because it is held that 
the type of regress in question cannot, by its very nature, 
be inf inite. Before considering Kant's contribution to the 
subject it will be useful to review the history of causal 
proof . 
Not all causal versions of the proof deal with 
regressive series of events. Aristotle's argument to the 
Prime Mover involves the rejection, not of an infinite series 
of events, but of an infinite series of simultaneous movers. 
It appears that this point escapes Kant, who remarks in the 
'Observation' on the thesis of the Third Antinomy that 'all 
the philosophers of antiquity with the sole exception of the 
Epicurean School, felt themselves obliged, when explaining 
cosmical movements, to assume a mover, that is, a 
freely acting cause, which first and of itself began this 
series of states' (A450/B478). 
Aristotle's argument here is now regarded as of purely 
historical interest, since it is founded on antiquated 
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astronomy and dynamics. He took the geocentric view, and 
assumed that the If irst heaven' or outer sphere of the 
universe, containing the fixed stars, is in motion around the 
earth. The If irst heaven' he believed to be eternal and to 
have been eternally in motion. How was this motion to be 
explained? Ac'cording to Aristotelian dynamics,, whatever is 
in motion is moved by something. We must, then,, postulate 
the existence of a mover to account for the motion of the 
heavens. 
Having established, to his own satisfaction, that there 
must be a mover to sustain the motion of the heavens, 
Ari. stotle goes on to reject a regress of movers. If 
something in motion is moved by a mover that is itself in 
motion then we have to postulate another mover to account for 
the movement of the original mover, and so on ad inf initum. 
Thus we are led to the conclusion that there must be a first 
and unmoved mover: 'since that which is moved and moves is 
intermediate there is something which moves without being 
moved, being eternal, substance and actuality' (Metaphysics 
1072 15). Because he rejects action at a distance, Aristotle 
held that the unmoved mover was situated in the outer heavens 
whose motion it sustains. Finally, the Prime Mover is 
identified with God. 
Aristotle's argument here strongly influenced Aquinas, 
whose First Way is also. an argument to an unmoved mover. 
Indeed the Five Ways of Aquinas, the first two of which are 
in effect causal versions of the cosmological proof, are all 
dependent on Aristotelian elements. 
The First Way, then, is in essentials the same as 
Aristotle's argument to a Prime Mover. Aquinas, like 
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Aristotle, appears to be concerned to exclude the possibility 
of an infinite series of simultaneous movers,, and,, like 
Aristotle, bases his argument on the proposition that 
everything in motion is moved by something else. He did not, 
however, reject the notion of an infinite series any more 
than did Aristotle. In the passage quoted above from the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle appears to rule out the possibility of 
an infinite series of movers on the ground that a regress 
that involves merely the transmission of motion from one 
thing to another is vicious. This point, on which Aquinas 
also relies, is dealt with more fully in the Physics (256a 
13ff). In Aquinas's version of this argument, he maintains 
that in an ordered series of moving and moved objects, where 
each is in turn moved by another, then 'if the first mover is 
removed or ceases from moving, none of the others will move 
or be moved: because the f irst is the cause of the movement 
of all the others ... But if there is an infinite series of 
movers and moved, there will be no first mover, but all will 
be as it were intermediate movers' (Quoted by Kenny, 
The Five Ways, p. 25f). 
Kenny and others have maintained that, in the first step 
of the argument, the reference to 'first mover' either means 
'earlier mover' or it begs the question. If, however, it 
does mean 'earlier' rather than 'that with no earlier mover' 
then the argument is invalid. Kenny quotes with approval 
Cajetan's criticism of this passage, in which it is argued 
that 'an intermediate cause as such needs only to be a middle 
causal link between an earlier cause and its effect; 
therefore an intermediate cause as such needs to be dependent 
not on af irst cause but on an earlier cause' (Quoted by 
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Kenny, OP-cit-P-25). While this criticism is persuasive, it 
does not deal with the question of whether a regress of 
movers such as Aristotle and Aquinas reject would indeed be 
vicious. 
In fact, the first stage of the First Way is vulnerable 
to criticism founded on Newtonian dynamics. The First Way 
and its Aristotelian original are grounded on the belief that 
whatever is in motion is moved by something; and, indeed, 
moved by something whose continuing activity is required to 
sustain that motion, since both Aristotle and Aquinas reject 
the impetus theory. As Kenny says, Newton's f irst law of 
motion wrecks the argument of the First Way. 'For at any 
given time, the rectilinear uniform motion of a body can be 
explained by the principle of inertia in terms of the body's 
own previous motion without appeal to any other agent. And 
there seems no a priori reason why this explanatory process 
should not go backwards for ever. Newton's law will not 
explain how motion began; but how do we know that motion had 
a beginning? Aristotle himself, after all, thought all 
motion was eternal. At the very least,, on Newton's 
principles, there would be no more difficulty about motion ab 
aeterno than about the immobility ab aeterno of an unmoved 
mover' (Kenny, op. cit. p. 28). 
These objections appear to be compelling, but Aquinas 
will not allow us to le. ave the matter there; for in the 
Second Way he provides a further version of the causal 
argument. Here, Aquinas argues that nothing that requires a 
cause of its existence can cause itself, for then it would 
have to exist before itself, which is impossible. Again, he 
rules out an infinite series of efficient causes. 'For in 
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every ordered series of efficient causes, the first member of 
the series causes the intermediate member or members, which 
in turn cause the final member. If You eliminate a cause you 
eliminate its effect, so there will not be final or 
intermediate members in the series unless there is af irst 
member. But if the series goes on forever, then there will 
be no first efficient cause; and so there will be no final 
effect and no intermediate efficient cause, which is 
obviously false. Therefore it is necessary to posit some 
first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name 
"God", (Quoted by Kenny,, op. cit. 34). 
Here, as in the First Way, Aquinas rules out an infinite 
regress of efficient causes. He does not, however, rule out 
the regress on the grounds that the very notion of an 
infinite regress is contradictory, and to clarify the matter 
he goes on to make an important distinction between the 
series per accidens and the series per se. He allows that a 
series of efficient causes 2er accidens, such as the series 
of begetters in generation, may be infinite. It is only when 
we are dealing with a series of efficient causes per se that 
the infinite regress is ruled out. In the series per se we 
have a series of causes essentially required for the 
production of the effect, as where we have a block shifted by 
a crowbar, which is in turn levered by a hand, and so on. 
The series per accidens may be infinite, 'so long as all the 
causes thus multiplied are grouped as one cause, and their 
multiplication is incidental to the causality at work. For 
instance a blacksmith may work with many hammers because one 
after another breaks in his hand, but that one particular 
hammer is used after another particular one is incidental. 
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Similarly that in begetting a child a man was himself 
begotten by another man; for he is father as man, not as son. 
In a genealogy of efficient causes all men have the same 
status of particular generator. Hence, for such a line to 
stretch back to infinity is not unthinkable' (St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Philosophical Texts, T. Gilby, p. 55f). 
Here, as in the First Way, Aquinas appears to be ruling 
out the possibility that an effect can be essentially 
dependent on an infi'nite series of causes,, so that to explain 
the effect it would be necessary to invoke the entire series. 
But it is not clear why Aquinas holds that there must be an 
order of simultaneous causes such as is required by his 
argument. According to Kenny, Aquinas thinks that the 
generation of a man depends on another, on an element, on the 
sun and so on to inf inity. So, in Kenny's view, 'the series 
of causes from which the seond way starts is a series whose 
existence is vouched for only by mediaeval astrology' 
(op. c it. p. 4 4). As Kenny says, in Aquinas' own examples, such 
as the block and the lever, we do have a series of active 
efficient causes 'whose causing is caused by a simultaneously 
acting further cause. But such series cease with the human 
agent who is using the tool' (op. cit. p. 45). 
If this interpretation is sound the Second Way is no 
more convincing than the first. The First Way fails because 
its scien, tific basis has been destroyed; the Second Way fails 
because no convincing example of a series per se of efficient 
causes has been given. Geach, however, in his sympathetic 
account holds that what is essential to the Five Ways 'is 
something tantamount to treating the world as a great big 
object' (Three Philosophers, p. 112). In the first two Ways, 
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Aquinas asserts that there are processes of change and that 
there are things which come to be. The argument, according 
to Geach, then proceeds as follows: 'If B is the cause of a 
process going on in A. or of A's coming to be, then it may 
be that this happens because of a process in B that is caused 
by a further 'thing C; and C in turn may act because of a 
process in C caused by D: and so on. But now let us lump 
together the chain of things B, Cr D ... and call it X. We 
may predicate of each one of the causes B, Cr Dr ... and also 
of X as a whole, that it causes a process in A (or the 
coming-to-be of A) in virtue of being itself in process of 
change. But what is it that maintains this process of change 
in X? Something that cannot itself be in process of change: 
for if it were, it would just be one of the things in process 
of change that causes the process in A (or the coming to be 
of A); i. e. , it would after all be just part of the 
changeable system of causes we call X, and not the cause of 
the process in X. Thus we are led to a changeless cause of 
the change and. coming-to-be in the world' (op. cit. p. lllf). 
Geach's account appears to misrepresent Aquinas' 
argument. The argument is not that the whole series itself 
requires a cause, but that the series per se is insufficient 
to account for the effect as each member of it is merely 
transmitting an effect for which th ere is within the series 
I 
no efficient cause. Geach may be right in his contention 
that there must nevertheless be a cause of the whole series. 
It is in fact irnPlied by Geach that Aquinas does not need to 
demonstrate that he is dealing with a causal series per se. 
But unless he can demonstrate that he is dealing with a 
causal series perse Aquinas has to face the objection that 
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we can regard the world as a closed system whose own 
resources are sufficient to account for the causal series 
per accidens. Geach' s demand that there must be a cause of 
the whole series of causes looks like a version of the 
argument from contingency whereas the argument from causality 
is supposed to'be an independent proof, 
This problem of keeping the proofs separate is evident 
in Leibniz's version. There are in fact other difficulties 
in Leibniz's statement of the causal proof, which is 
grounded, as we might expect, on the principle of sufficient 
reason. It runs as follows: I the suf f ic ient reason of 
exi, stence cannot be found either in any particular thing or 
in the whole aggregate and series of things. Let us suppose 
that a book of the elements of geometry exist! ad from all 
eternity and that in succession one copy of it was made from 
another, it is evident that although we can account for the 
present book by the book from which it was copied, 
nevertheless, going back through as many books as we like, we 
could never reach a complete reason for it, because we can 
always ask why such books have at all times existed ... What 
is true of books is also true of the dif f erent states of the 
world; for, in spite of certain laws of change, the 
succeeding state is, in some sort, a copy of that which 
precedes it. Therefore, to whatever earlier state you go 
back, you never find in. it the complete reason of things, 
that is to say, the reason why there exists any world and why 
this world rather than some others' (On the Ultimate 
Origination of T, Latta,, op. cit. p. 338). 
Leibniz's example of the book of the elements of 
geometry suggest that he is about to raise teleological 
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considerations. This does not, however, appear to be his 
point. The question he raises is why there should be a world 
at all and in what the sufficient reason for its existence 
can reside. There seems to be little difference between this 
argument and the argumentum a contingentia mundi. What is 
essential to causal versions of the proof is that, given that 
an aspect of the world demands a causal explanation, they 
should attempt to show that natural causality is ultimately 
inadequate. The argumentum a contingentia mundi, on the other 
hand, moves directly from the contingency of the world to 
necessary being. 
Leibniz's statement of the causal proof proper starts 
from a cosmological regress of causes, which it argues is not 
an adequate explanation of either the existence or the 
present state of the world. One problem for the proponent of 
the causal proof is that a particular series of events can 
often be explained by reference to some more comprehensive 
frame of reference. Leibniz avoids this problem by 
appealing, in his argument, to the series of states of the 
world as a whole. It is not, however,, obvious why Leibniz 
should think it necessary to embark on the regress to lead us 
to the sufficient reason for the existence of the world, 
Particular causes do not even begin to explain the existence 
of the world. Why, then, does Leibniz not simply employ the 
argument from contingency? It may be that he is seeking a 
sufficient reason for the world in its present state and that 
he requires a sufficient reason not merely for the existence 
of the world but for its present characteristics. Another 
possibility is that Leibniz wished to point out that, 
although each state of the world has all the necessary 
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conditions to produce the succeeding state of the world, the 
regressive series of events cannot provide us with a 
complete explanation of the present state of the world. if 
this is the point of the argument then it is the notion of 
the series per accidens that is under attack. 
We have already considered Aquinas's attempts to provide 
a causal proof founded on the rejection of the causal series 
per se. We have seen reason to reject Aquinas's argument. 
The question we have now to consider is whether the causal 
series per accidens can be shown to be ultimately inadequate. 
This question Kant deals with in the third and fourth 
ant. inomies. 
The four antinomies are reductiones ad absurdum of 
various fundamental theses of philosophical cosmology. Kant 
wishes to show that rational cosmology, when pursued on the 
presupposition of transcendental realism, i. e., that the 
world as it appears is real and independent of us, is 
confounded by the contradictions that inevitably arise. 
Thus, if we assume that the world as it appears to us is 
'transcendentally real' then we shall be able to prove that 
there must have been a free first cause of the world and that 
there must belong to the world an absolutely necessary being. 
But we shall also be able to prove that there can have been 
no such f irst cause and that there can be no such necessary 
be ing. This result, according to Kant, can only be avoided 
by treating the world as transcendentally ideal and is, in 
fact, regarded by him as providing an indirect proof of 
transcendental idealism. Kant nevertheless holds that valid 
proofs of the propositions that there was a free first cause 
of the world and that there belongs to the world an 
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absolutely necessary being can be given if we assume the 
transcendental reality of the world. We shall now examine 
his arguments. 
In the Thesis of the third antinomy, Kant seeks to prove 
that natural laws are inadequate to account for the 
'appearances 'of the world' and that we must 'admit another 
causality, that of freedom' if we are to account for these 
appearances. Kant starts his proof by saying that if there 
is no other causality than that according to the laws of 
nature then everything that takes place presupposes an 
anterior state, on which it inevitably follows according to a 
rule. We are thus committed to an infinite regress. But, 
Kant goes on, 'if ... everything takes place solely in 
accordance with laws of nature, there will always be only a 
relative never a first beginning, and consequently no 
completeness of the series, on the side of the causes that 
arise the one from the other. But the law of nature is just 
this, that nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently 
determined a priori' (A446/B474). 
There are, unfortunately, difficulties of interpretation 
here. According to Kemp Smith the point of the thesis is 
that the principle of causality calls for a sufficient cause 
for each event, and this is not to be found in derivative and 
conditioned causes. Unless the antecedent series of causes 
for an event can be traced back to a first cause, it can 
never be completed, and can never be suf f ic ient to account 
for the event in question. This was also Schopenhauer's 
interpretation,, and Kemp Smith quotes with approval 
Schopenhauer's refutation of the argument: 'state A is a 
sufficient cause of state B just so long as it has the 
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properties which are sufficient to guarantee that B will 
ensue. In this way my demand that it be a sufficient cause 
is entirely satisfied. It matters not how state A is arrived 
at' (World as Will and Idea, Vol. 1,, pp. 497f., quoted by Kemp 
Smith: Commentary, p. 493). Both Kemp Smith and Schopenhauer 
take Kant to be rejecting a causal series per accidens on the 
grounds that it gives no sufficient explanation of the event 
that forms its latest member. Bennett, howeverr feels that 
Kant's text does not support this interpretation. 
Bennett himself makes it clear that he has no 
alternative to Schopenhauer's interpretation of the third 
antinomy to Offer. He points out,. however, that Kant says 
not than an event requires a sufficient cause, but that it 
requires a cause that is sufficiently determined a priori. 
The key phrase, then, is not Isuf f icient cause' but 'cause 
(that is) sufficiently determined. Bennett says: 'I do do 
not know what that means, but it cannot mean the same as 
'sufficient cause' - for this latter points rather to the 
idea of an ef fect wh ich is suf f ici en tly de termined' 
(op. cit. p. 18 5). So Bennett concludes that Kant means the 
cause must be 'sufficiently determined' in advance or 
independently of the effect and that this also 'goes against 
the Schopenhauer reading, according to which the argument 
turns upon a point not about what the cause must be like 
independently of the effect, but on the contrary about how 
the cause must relate to the effect' (op. cit. p. 186). 
While Kant's argument may be unclear, there seems little 
doubt that he regards the proposition that everything takes 
place solely in accordance with laws of nature as 
con trad ic to ry. For laws of nature both demand that nothing 
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takes place without being 'sufficiently determined' and 
preclude the possibility that any event could be sufficiently 
determined. An event, it appears, can only be 'sufficiently 
determined' if the series of its conditions is complete. 
Presumably, then, if an event is to be accounted for by 
natural law its immediate cause must be the latest of a 
causal series which is complete in itself and does not 
involve an infinite regress. The conditioned thus points 
beyond the series of its conditions to the unconditioned. 
When Kant says that an event requires a cause which is 
sufficiently determined a priori he presumably means that the 
cause is itself completely conditioned or sufficiently 
accounted for by the causal series that precedes it. 
Some commentators say that the thesis of the third 
antinomy derives what force it has from the assumption of a 
beginning of the world. Thus Ewing argues that 'the thesis, 
as in the other antinomies, is based on the impossibility of 
a completed infinite for the argument is that any event 
presupposes for its occurrence the fulf ilment of all its 
causal conditions and the number of these is infinite' (A 
Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,, pp. 218f). 
Strawson takes a similar view. As Bennett points out, 
however, this is misleading: 'The thesis-argument does 
involve the thought of a world-beginning ... but only because 
it supposedly uncovers a -reason for thinking that the world 
must have begun, not because of any "assumption" that the 
world began' (op. cit. p. 186). Could we not argue that 
although the causal series per accidens is infinite there is 
a sufficient reason, i. e., God,, outside the series? Kant 
will not allow this. In his discussion of the issue in the 
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'Observation on the Thesis of the Fourth Antinomy he writes: 
we begin our proof cosmologically, resting it upon the 
series of appearances and the regress therein according to 
empirical laws of causality, we must not afterwards suddenly 
deviate from this mode of argument, passing over to something 
that is not a. member of the series' (A456/B484). 
For Kant, then, if we argue from the conditioned or 
causally dependent to the unconditioned we must regard the 
unconditioned as belonging to the series. As Kant says in 
the 'observation on the Thesis of the Fourth Antinomy'r where 
we are dealing with necessary being, 'the necessary being 
must ... be regarded as the highest member of the cosmical 
series' (A458/B486). (The argument for the thesis of the 
third antinomy does not, then, appear to involve a direct 
appeal to the principle of sufficient reason, as do 
Leibnizian versions of the cosmological argument). Kant says 
that 'the proposition that no causality is possible save in 
accordance with laws of nature, when taken in unlimited 
universality is ... self-contradictory; and this cannot, 
therefore, be regarded as the sole kind of causality' 
(A446/B474). Thus Kant claims to have discovered a 
dif f iculty in the notion of the causal series per accidens, 
in the notion of a causal series in which each member is 
accounted for by its precedessor, although the precise nature 
of the difficulty is not clear. We are left with the 
statement that no event can occur unless its causal 
conditions are complete. 
The fourth antinomy adds little to the material of the 
th i rd. Here the argument is to necessary being rather than 
to a first cause, but the two proofs are similar. Kant's 
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argument is that the sensible world contains a series of 
alterations, 'but every alteration stands under its 
condition, which precedes it in time and renders it 
necessary. Now every conditioned that is given presupposes, 
in respect of its existence, a complete series of conditions 
up to the unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. 
Alteration thus existing as a consequence of the absolutely 
necessary, the existence of something absolutely necessary 
must be granted' (A452/B480). As in the third antinomy, the 
point is thatthe conditioned points to the unconditioned as 
its ground. Unfortunately Kant again fails to explain why 
this should be so. Let us, however, re-examine the case for 
the theses of the dynamical antinomies. 
In the causal versions of the cosmological argument that 
we have reviewed, those that reject the regress involved in a 
causal series j2er se,, e. g., Aristotle's argument to the Prime 
Mover,, fail for lack of a convincing argument to show why we 
should embark on such a regress. Other causal versions of 
the proof depend, as does Leibniz's, on the principle of 
sufficient reason, consideration of which we shall set aside 
for the moment. In examining the dynamical antinomies we 
shall thus be considering the remaining form of the proof, 
which is dependent on the rejection of the causal series 
2er accidens. 
As we have seen, neither Aristotle nor Aquinas sees any 
difficulty in an infinite temporal regress of causes. 
Neither does Hume, who, as we have already noted, writes, 'in 
such a chain,, too,, or succession of objects, each part is 
caused by that which preceded it, and causes that which 
succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty? '. Geach too 
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takes this view: 'if a man had parents and they had parents 
and so on ad inf initum, wouldn't this regress be vicious? 
Not at all. If the meaning of the original answer "John was 
generated by his parents" depended on our ability to say who 
their parents were, then the supposition of a chain of 
ancestors going back ad infinitum would involve the absurdity 
that we could not understand the original answer without 
completing the whole infinite series of answers. But on the 
contrary the original answer is understandable without 
raising the question of grandparents' (Three PhilOsO2hers, 
P. 111) 0 
Notwithstanding this weight of authority there is a 
number of ways of attacking the view that the causal series 
per accidens is self-sufficient. In the first place, there 
is the principle of sufficient reason interpreted as 
demanding an unconditioned ground for the existence of the 
series; and this, it should be observed, does not rule out 
the infinity of such a series. Then, it is possible to 
attack the notion of an infinite series itself . as Kant does 
in the thesis of the first antinomy. Finally the causal 
regress per accidens may be rejected on the grounds that it 
cannot fulfil the explanatory function for which it is 
invoked, e. g., in Kant's statement in the third antinomy, 
where we read that: 'The proposition that no causality is 
possible save in accordan-ce with laws of nature, when taken 
in unlimited universality is ... self-contradictory'. 
In what way, however, is the explanatory force of the 
causal regress said to be limited? Schopenhauer holds that 
since state A is a sufficient cause of state B when it has 
the properties that are sufficient to guarantee that B will 
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ensue, Oit matters not how state A was arrived at'. In this 
view, then, each event in the causal series is in itself 
sufficient to account for its successor. The existence of an 
infinite causal series is explained when we accept that each 
member of the series has, in its predecessor, an adequate 
explanation. When each member of the series can thus be 
accounted for, Hume denies that the causal series as a whole 
requires an explanation: 'But the whole, you say, wants a 
cause ... Did I show you the particular causes of each 
individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I 
should think it very unreasonable should you afterwards ask 
me 
. 
what was the cause of the whole twenty' (Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Rel F IX). 
The challenge to the proponent of the causal proof is 
that he should make clear the nature of the dif f iculty that 
he considers limits the explanatory force of the regressive 
causal series. In Hume's dialogue, Cleanthes demands that 
the proponent of the proof, Demea, should state the 
dif f icultY; and no answer is returned. One writer suggests 
that the difficulty derives from the quasi-legalistic sense 
of 'cause', according to which a cause is 'responsible' for 
and not simply a concomitant of its effect (P. Brown 
'Infinite Causal Regression' Phil. Review 75,, p. 524). The 
difficulty, however, leaving aside the question of the 
principle of sufficient reason,, is that a causal series may 
be seen as accounting for the transmission and not for the 
existence of the properties for which an ultimate explanation 
is sought. Thus a causal series per accidens may be seen as 
self-perpetuating; but this does not account for its 
existence. 
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Whether such a regress provides an adequate explanation 
depends on what it is called upon to explain. Hume says that 
if we account for the existence of the members of a series we 
also account for the series itself, where 'the uniting of 
these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several 
distinct countries into one kingdom, or several distinct 
members into one body, is performed merely by an arbitrary 
act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of 
things' (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion IX). The 
proponent of the causal proof, however, would hold that 
although we may explain the existence of any individual 
member of the series by reference to its predecessor we 
cannot explain the existence of the series as a whole by 
reference to the regress of causes. 
Let us,, with Geach, take the series of begetters in 
generation as an example of a causal series per accidens, a 
series where each member generates its successor. It may be 
urged, in spite of Hume, tht we have failed to account for 
the existence of the series. For what the series involves 
essentially is the incorporating of a form in matter to 
produce successive members of the series. The form is 
transmitted from one member of the series to the next. But 
this merely accounts for the transmission and not for the 
existence of the form in question. Given the existence of 
the series we can account for the generation of new members 
in terms of the incorporation of form in pre-existing matter. 
But we cannot account for the existence of the form itself. 
If we are restricted for explanations to the series itself 
the existence of the form involved becomes something which 
cannot in principle be explained; and we are committed to an 
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infinite regress. However, the opponents of the causal proof 
would no longer argue that the causal regress, in cases of 
this kind, involves the transmission in an infinite series 
of an absolutely unaltered form. Leibniz's examPle of the 
series of books of the elements of geometry is no longer 
persuasive; and his statement that any state of the world is 
'in some sort, a copy of that which precedes it' is open to 
serious objections. As Hepburn remarks, in a slightly 
different context, since Leibniz, 'our thinking about nature 
has become progressively less mechanistic and anthropocentric 
and more deeply evolutionary. The task of the apologist 
has. become correspondingly more arduous' (Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 234). 
It appears, nevertheless, that Hume is wrong to dismiss 
the causal proof. Its rejection of the causal regress as an 
inadequate or incomplete account of the existence of the 
conditioned or causally dependent is sound. The causal 
regress would certainly be vicious if it were held that each 
member of the series were entirely dependent on its 
predecessor and nothing else, not even pre-existing matter, 
for its existence. Aquinas could, on Geach's interpretation, 
argue that such a series could itself be viewed as a 
dependent object that points beyond itself to an independent 
ground. This may be so, but the main point behind the causal 
proof may be more clearly. expressed. 
It is impossible, according to the proponent of the 
proof,, to explain the existence of an individual or property 
simply by appealing to a regress in which each member of the 
series derives from its predecessor and transmits to its 
successor existence or such properties as we may wish to 
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explain. We may here use an analogy. one object may lean on 
another which supports it; and that second object may lean 
against a third which is in turn supported by a fourth, and 
so on. But this regress cannot proceed ad infinitum. 
Somewhere in the series there must be support which is 
underivative. Similarly there must exist an independent 
source or explanation for the series of dependent things and 
for the existence of properties transmitted in a series per 
accidens. 
Perhaps the most persuasive version of the causal 
argument is the one that deals with the regress of causes 
involved in the generation of individuals that can be classed 
as members of a natural kind. If we are restricted to the 
series of causes we cannot account for the form exemplified 
by the members of the series. Indeed, if the series is held 
to be infinite, the form in question cannot have been 
causally produced because there can have been no time prior 
to its manifestation that would have allowed causal processes 
to operate. This type of proof is, however, as we have seen, 
no longer tenable in view of the evolutionary account of the 
existence of natural kinds. 
The proponent of the causal proof may, in view of these 
difficulties, appeal simply to the causal series per accidens 
arguing, as Kant does in the Third Antinomy, that the 
conditions required for -the occurrence of an event must be 
complete. He will then attempt to show that, if we are 
restricted to natural causes, the conditions for the 
occurrence of an event cannot be complete. This argument 
also fails. Here, too, as we try to trace the series 
backwards it loses itself in the general matrix of change in 
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the world. 
It is still open to the proponent of the proof to 
appeal, not to the particular series, but to the series of 
states of the world as a whole, as Leibniz does, and as Kant 
does in the Fourth Antinomy. The difficulty here is that the 
argument can hardly be distinguished from the argument from 
contingency. This is recognised by Kant who remarks, in the 
observation on the Fourth Antinomy, that 'In proving the 
existence of a necessary being I ought not, in this 
connection, to employ any but the cosmological argument' 
(A456/B48 4) . I- 
The difficulties that we have reviewed are formidable 
obstacles to the production of a convincing causal proof. 
Before we leave the subject we have, however, to consider the 
argument to a first cause founded on the rejection of an 




The argument to a creator from the premiss that the 
world must have had a beginning in time is not a common one 
in western philosophy but versions of such a cosmolog*ical 
proof have bee'n advanced, for example by St. Bonaventure. 
According to W. L. Craig this type of argument 'originated in 
the minds of [the] mediaeval Arabic theologians [Al-Kindi and 
Al-Ghazalil , who bequeathed it to the West' (Preface to The 
Kalam Cosmological Argument). That Kant himself was aware of 
the theological implications of there being a beginning of 
the. world appears from the Antinomy of Pure Reason, where he 
writes: 'In the determination of the cosmological ideas, we 
f ind on the side of dogmatism, that is, of the thesis a 
certain practical interest in which every well-disposed man, 
if he has understanding of what truly concerns him, heartily 
shares. That the world has a beginning, that my thinking 
self is of simple and therefore indestructible nature, that 
it is free in its voluntary actions and raised above the 
compulsion of nature, and finallY that all order in the 
things constituting the world is due to a primordial being, 
from which everything derives its unity and purposive 
connection, these are so many foundation stones of morals and 
religion' (A466/B494). 
Kant considers the arguments for and against the 
proposition that the world must have a beginning in time in 
the first antinomy. The antinomy was of great importance to 
Kant, who believed that it constituted an 'indirect Proof' 
of transcendental idealism. When we pursue rationalist 
cosmology on realist presuppositions we are inevitably 
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involved in contradictions. Reason is confounded because, 
while proofs can be provided demonstrating that the world had 
a beginning in time, that reality is composed of simple 
parts and that there is freedom and necessary being, equally 
convincing proofs of the contradictories of all these 
propositions can also be established. The only way to 
resolve these contradictions is to embrace transcendental 
idealism or the view that the world as it appears to us in 
space and time is ideal, space and time being merely forms of 
appearance. The first antinomy contains what is, in effect, 
Kant's only argument to show that space and time cannot 
characterise things in themselves, since on the arguments of 
the Aesthetic we simply have to leave this question 
unsettled. As Walsh says, to suppose that if space and time 
are forms of intuition then we are justified in calling a 
percept an appearance, 'assumes that we have independent 
knowledge of the situation, which on Kant's assumptions we do 
not I (Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 164). 
For the moment we are concerned less with the 
significance of the antinomy for Kant's transcendental 
idealism than with the arguments by which the contradictory 
propositions are said to be established. In the thesis of 
the first antinomy Kant, arguing on realist presuppositions, 
seeks to prove that the world has a beginning in time and is 
also limited in space. In the antithesis, in which again the 
reality of the space/time world is presupposed, he argues 
that it must be infinite in both space and time. 
The temporal half of the thesis of the antinomy is 
established by the following argument: if the world had no 
beginning in time then 'there has passed away in the world an 
9ow L-- 
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infinite series of successive states of things. Now the 
infinity of a series consists in the fact that it can never 
be completed through successive sYnthesis. It thus follows 
that it is impossible for an infinite world series to have 
passed away and that a beginning of the world is therefore a 
necessary condition of the world's existence' (B454). 
Some commentators have assumed that Kant's argument here 
depends on the supposed impossibility of inf inite 
collections. The difficulty, they believe, is solved when we 
show that these contradictions are illusory. Thus Russell 
dismisses the antinomy: 'Now, however, owing to the labours 
of the mathematicians, notably George Cantor, it has appeared 
that the impossibility of infinite collections was a mistake' 
(Problems of Philosophy, p. 147). It is not immediately 
clear, however, that Russell's point disposes of Kant's 
argument, which rules out not the possibility of infinite 
collections but the possibility of completing the successive 
synthesis that would be involved in the enumeration of the 
members of such a collection. 
In fact, many philosophers have accepted the existence 
of infinite collections while rejecting the notion of 
infinite number or the possibility of enumerating such 
collections. Aristotle maintained that the temporal series 
of events was without beginning and would be without end, yet 
he denied that there could be an infinite number for '... in 
the direction of largeness it is always possible to think of 
a larger number' (Physics 207 b. 10). Leibniz also denied the 
possibility of infinite number on grounds which he explained 
in a letter of 1698 to Bernouilli: I ... the number or sum of 
all numbers involves a contradiction (the whole would equal 
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the part). The same is true of an absolutely greatest number 
and of an absolutely smallest number (or smallest fraction)' 
(Leibniz Selectionsy Weiner p. 99). Leibniz, like Aristotle, 
did not feel that his rejection of infinite number entailed 
the conclusion that there could be no infinite collections. 
It seems certain he believed that there could be 
multiplicities that were infinite in the sense that they were 
beyond all number. (v. Reply to M. Foucher, Journal des 
Savans, ibid. ). 
While neither Aristotle nor Leibniz made any inference 
from the paradoxes implicit in the notion of infinite number 
to the temporal finitude of the world, St. Bonaventure argued 
in exactly this way. His argument uses the Aristotelian 
point that no number capable of being added to can be 
inf inite. 'In the first place, the eternity of the world 
contradicts the principle that it is impossible to add to the 
infinite; for if the world had no beginning, it has already 
experienced an infinite duration; now every day which passes 
adds a unit to the infinite number of days already gone; the 
eternity of the world supposes, therefore an infinite capable 
of being augmented' (The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, E. 
Gilson p. 190). It is also evident that,, if the world is 
eternal, it has passed through an infinite number of solar 
revolutions. But there are always twelve lunar revolutions 
to one solar I... so that the moon would have accomplished a 
number of revolutions in excess of the infinite [and] we end 
by supposing a number larger than the infinite, which is 
absurd' (ibid. ). 
It is now widely held that developments in modern 
mathematics have disposed of the alleged contradictions in 
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the concept of infinite number on which St. Bonaventure here 
rel ies. infinite numbers are said to differ from finite 
numbers in two fundamental ways. Infinite numbers are Inon- 
inductive' , whereas finite numbers are 'inductive'. The 
property of inductiveness Russell explains as being 
'hereditary' in a series. That is, if a property is 
hereditary and belongs to 100 (e. g. the property of being 
greater than 99) it will belong to all finite numbers greater 
than 100. These properties of numbers, which are proved by a 
step-by-step process from one number to another, fail when we 
come to infinite numbers, since the first infinite number has 
no -immediate predecessor, there being no greatest finite 
number. The property of non-inductiveness is held to dispose 
of Aristotle's objection to infinite number, and of St. 
Bonaventure's proof of the f initude of the world-series of 
past events, since the property of being increased by the 
addition of a finite number of units belongs to finite 
numbers only. 
Infinite numbers are said also to be 'reflexive'. 
class is said to be reflexive if it is 'equivalent' to one of 
its own proper sub-classes, that is, can be put in a one-to- 
one relationship with it. Thus, Lei nizis objection, that 
the contradictory nature of infinite number can be seen from 
the fact that the whole would be equal to the part, is dealt 
with by assimilating the. property of reflexiveness into the 
concept of infinite number. The same property of 
reflexiveness may be invoked to deal with St. Bonaventure's 
objection that if the world has existed for an infinite time, 
there would be twelve lunar revolutions to every one of the 
infinite number of solar revolutions. In this case it would 
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be argued that the series are 'equivalent' and that both are 
inf inite. 
Whatever our views may be on the theory of transfinite 
numbers advocated by Russell it is very doubtful that it can 
be employed to refute the argument of the thesis of the 
antinomy. Kant himself specifically rejects the view that 
since every number can be increased no number can be 
infinite, as being dependent on 'a defective concept of the 
infinity of a given magnitude' (B458). He does not say that 
an infinite quantum is contradictory in that it implies 
infinite number but that 'the successive synthesis of units 
rLaqvired for the enumeration of [such) a quantum can never be 
completed' (ibid. ). ýOn Russell's account of a non-inductive 
property, we begin the infinite numbers by postulating that 
the f irst such number has no predecessor. There is, 
accordingly, no way that we can count from finite to infinite 
numbers. 'And this is precisely what Kant is claiming when 
he says that you cannot start a series of f inite numbers and 
generate an infinite series' (M. S. Gram, Monist, Vol. 51, 
p. 514). Gram concludes that the theory of transfinite 
numbers cannot be used against the antinomy. I believe this 
is correct. It is not to infinite collections that Kant 
objects but to the generation of an infinite series by 
successive sYnthesis. 
It may be true that we cannot count from f inite to 
infinite numbers; and it may be true that an infinite 
collection cannot be generated 'by successive synthesis'. 
However,, as Kemp Smith argues, 'if it be really correct to 
define the infinite as that which can never be completed,. the 
conclusion to be drawn is that the temporal series is always 
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actually infinite, and that no point or event in it is nearer 
to or further from either its beginning or its end' 
(Commentary,, pp. 483f). 
Russell, in commenting on the antinomy, says Kant was 
wrong to assert that an infinite series can 'never' be 
completed by successive synthesis, since 'all he has ever 
conceivably a right to say is that it cannot be completed in 
a finite time. Thus what he really proves is, at most, that 
if the world had no beginning, it must have already existed 
for an infinite time' (Our Knowledge of the External World, 
p. 161). 
Russell, thent implies that an infinite series could be 
generated in an infinite time. Here, however, we have a 
further objection to consider, an objection also raised by 
St. Bonaventure in his rejection of the possibility that past 
time should be infinite. 'The third property of the infinite 
which is irreconcilable with the eternity of the world is 
that the infinite cannot be bridged; now if the universe had 
no beginning, an infinite number of celestial revolutions 
must have taken place, and therefore the present day could 
not have been reached' (Gilson, op. cit. ). 
He argues that 'we must necessarily be able to fix a day 
infinitely anterior to [the present) or else we cannot f ix 
any one; if no anterior day precedes the present day by an 
infinite duration then all the anterior days precede it by a 
finite duration and therefore the duration of the world had a 
beginning' (ibid. ). The same argument has been advanced by 
G. J. Whitrow. He writes that 'if the chain of events forming 
the past of (a given event] E is infinite there must have 
occurred events that are separated from E by an infinite 
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number of intermediate events. For,, if not, then any event 
in the past of E would be separated from E by only af in ite 
number of intermediate events. This would mean that the set 
of past events would, like the set of future events, 
constitute only a potential infinity, whereas it must 
constitute an' actual infinity' (The Voices of Time, J. T. 
Fraser ed. p. 568). 
These arguments hold, in effect, that the series of past 
events cannot be infinite because, in that case there would 
be events separated from the present by an infinite series of 
intermediate events and that series would have had to be 
completed or to be generated by successive synthesis in order 
for the present to have been reached. This does not rely on 
the proposition that there must have been an earliest event 
infinitely remote from us. It is here argued that within the 
series of past events there must have been, if the series be 
infinite, events separated from the present by an infinite 
series of intermediate events. So. on this argument,, Kant is 
correct. The series of past events cannot be infinite 
because, in that case, there would have been events 
inf ini tely remote f rom us in the past; and, as Kant argues, 
'the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it can 
never be completed through successive synthesis', that is, 
the present could never have been reached from an event 
infinitely remote in time.. We cannot evade the conclusion by 
employing Russell's argument that an infinite series could be 
generated in an infinite time because, as Russell himself 
accepted, there is no way of counting from finite to infinite 
numbers. 
Similar arguments have been used to show that the world 
167 
in space must be finite. Thus, P. M. Huby writes that 'any 
object in space, however far di stant, is a fi nite 
distance only from every other object. But between any 
object and any other there can be only a finite number of 
objects, and therefore, however vast the total number of 
objects may be, in will still be finite' (philosophy 1971, 
127). Bennett f irmly rejects this line of argument. 
'Granted that there are only finitely many bodies between any 
two bodies, there may be infinitely many bodies altogether; 
3ust as there are only finitely many natural numbers between 
any two natural numbers, even though there are infinitely 
many natural numbers altogether' (Kant's Dialectic p. 131). 
The same objection can be urged in respect of St. 
Bonaventure's argument regarding the temporal series, on the 
grounds that there may be an infinite number of past events 
even though there is only a finite number between any two in 
the series. 
The central point at issue then, is whether, on the 
premiss that past time is infinite, there must be events 
infinitely remote from us in time, and from which the present 
could never have been reached. In Bennett's argument, only a 
finite number of past events separates any given past event 
from the present although there may be an infinite number of 
past events altogether. This entails that every past event 
has af inite number of successors and yet, if the series be 
infinite, an infinite number of predecessors. If the series 
be infinite, then every event has predecessors; and, since 
every event has predecessors, there are predecessors that are 
common to every event and thus infinitely remote from the 
present. Since the set of past events can change only by 
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addition to its membership, it follows that members have 
belonged to the set for as long as the set itself has 
ex is ted. If the set has existed for an infinite time then 
there are members that have belonged to it for an infinite 
time. These events, being infinitely remote from us in time, 
are events from which the present could not be reached 
because, as Kant argues, an infinite series cannot be 
generated by 'successive synthesis'. 
The contradiction inherent in the notion of an infinite 
series of past events is that it entails the conclusion that 
some members of that series must always have been past. It 
will,, I think, be readily allowed that every past event,, if 
we except an absolutely f irst event, must have been 
successively future, present and past. An event that has 
always been past is simply an event that has never occurred 
and thus a contradiction in terms. In order to avoid the 
conclusion that this contradiction is entailed by the notion 
of an infinite past time,, it might be claimed that an 
infinite series of annual events could be put into a one-to- 
one relationship with the infinite series of natural members, 
If this is so we could say that the number correlated with 
any such event represents the number of years by which that 
event is separated from the present. So, although there have 
always been past events, no individual event has always been 
past, because, given any -event,, we can, by referring to the 
number correlated with it, determine when it was present, and 
when it was future. 
This objection fails. As we have already seen, for as 
long as there have been past events certain particular events 
have been past. If there have always been more than x past 
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events then there is a set of x events that has always been 
past. To make the matter clearer let us imagine an eternal 
hour-glass. From all eternity sand has been running from the 
upper to the lower globe. So, the lower globe has always 
contained grains of sand, indeed an infinite number. But for 
as long as it has contained grains it has contained certain 
individual grains. That is, the set of grains contained in 
the lower globe includes a sub-set that has always been 
there. We can see that this must be the case when we 
consider the case where all but a finite number of grains are 
removed f rom the lower globe. It would then contain fewer 
gra. ins than it ever had contained and thus we would have 
removed grains that had always been there. 
We can even regard the hour-glass in our example as 
representing the history of the world. The upper globe can 
represent the future whilst the lower globe represents the 
past. An event is represented by the falling of a grain of 
sand. Thus we see that there have always been past events, 
so some events have always been past, which is contrary to 
their definition. We do not, of course, need to regard the 
hour-glass example as a metaphor, since we have already seen 
that it can be used as an example of an actual infinite 
temporal process. 
Before going on to discuss what follows from the 
rejection of the infinity of the world-series of events, we 
ought to pause to consider Kant's proof that this series 
cannot be f inite -a proof tht he provides in the interests 
of his transcendental idealism. Kant's argument here, in the 
antithesis, is a reductio ad absurdum of the thesis: 'Since 
the beginning is an existence which is preceded by a time in 
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which the thing is not, there must have been a preceding time 
in which the world was not, i. e., an empty time. Now, no 
coming to be of a thing is possible in an empty time, because 
no part of such a time possesses, as compared with any other, 
a distinguishing condition of existence rather than of non- 
existence' (B455). As Broad comments, Kant here ' tacitly 
assumes LeibnizIs Principle of Sufficient Reason. Since 
there would be no sufficient reason why the world should not 
have begun at one rather than at another moment of time, it 
cannot have begun at any' (P. A. S., 1954/5, p. 7). 
The argument that Broad outlines here had in fact been 
use. d by Leibniz, in his correspondence with Clarke, against 
the Newtonian conception of absolute time. The argument, 
however, fails on a relational theory of time, as Leibniz 
showed. On the relational theory of time, I Itis manifest, 
that if any one should say that this same world, which has 
been actually created, might have been created sooner, 
without any other change; he would say nothing that is 
in tell ig ible. For there is no mark or difference whereby it 
would be possible to know that this world was created 
sooner' (Leibniz/Clarke Corres pondence L. V. 55). Kant, when 
he came to write the Critique, believed that space and time 
were ideal. But he believed, nevertheless, that on realist 
presuppositions 'these two non-entities, empty space outside 
the world and empty time. prior to it, have to be assumed if 
we are to assume a limit to the world in space and in time' 
(B4 61). Although Kant does not say why this is the case, he 
is presumably influenced by his belief that the apodeictic 
certainty of mathematics cannot be accounted for on the 
relational theory of space and time. He held also that the 
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puzzle of incongruent counterparts could be solved on the 
theory of absolute space but not on any theory that treats 
space as relational. 
It is doubtful whether Kant's claim that the necessity 
of mathematical propositions rules out the relational theory 
of space and time can be sustained. In any case, if we 
reject Kant's theory that space and time are forms of our 
intuition we can hardly fall back on the absolute theory to 
account for the apodeictic certainty of mathematics since we 
shall thereby have failed to explain the a priori. nature of 
such knowledge. In fact, since Kant's day non-Euclidean 
mathematics have been worked out and indeed the geometry of 
space itself is said to be non-Euclidean. So, as Russell 
expresses it, geometry appears as an empirical science 'in 
which the axioms are inferred from measurements, and are 
found to differ from Euclid's' (A History of Western 
Philosoj2hy p. 743). This, as an empirical science, is 
'synthetic but not a priori' (ibid. ). 
We can, I believe, accept the argument of the thesis and 
reject that of the antithesis as invalid. Kant holds that 
the argument of the thesis entails that the world must have 
come into existence 'since the beginning is an existence 
which is preceded by a time in which the thing is not' 
(A427/B455). This is not the case, however, since we may 
regard the beginning of the world as the beginning of change 
and thus of time itself. What, then, are the consequences 
for the cosmological proof? Once again, we have to reject 
any appeal to the princ iple of suf f ic ient reason, which we 
have for the moment set to one side. The critic of the proof 
will no doubt contend that an absolutely first event can only 
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have been an uncaused physical event with no theological 
implications. Thus Whitrow, acknowledging that on the 
relational theory the first moment of time may be defined as 
the first event that happened, gives as an example of such an 
event 'the spontaneous decay of an elementary particle in a 
static univers*el (The Natural Philosophy of Time, p. 33). if 
such possibilities are allowed, then it is very difficult to 
see how the argument to an absolutely first event could be 
used by the proponent of the cosmological argument. 
It is, of course, possible to attack Whitrow's argument. 
one way in which this could be done is by showing that an 
original spontaneous event is dynamically impossible, or at 
least inconsistent with contemporary physics. If such an 
argument were provided then the proponent of the proof could 
challenge his opponent to account for the origin of change 
within the world without recourse to a theological 
explanation. 
The occurrence of a first uncaused event would certainly 
have been ruled out by the mechanical theory of the world, in 
which the essential elements of the world are matter and 
motion neither of which can be created or destroyed by any 
physical process. According to the mechanical theory, 
matter, or the elementary units of mass, is absolutely inert 
and incapable of causing motion or any form of change in the 
world. All change, all. diversity of matter, depends on 
motion. Thus, Descartes writes: 'All the properties we 
distinctly perceive to belong to [matter] are reducible to 
its capacity of being divided and moved according to its 
parts; and accordingly it is capable of all those affections 
which we perceive can arise from the motion of its parts, 
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(The Principles of Philosophy, Pt. III XXIII). 
were held by Leibniz,, Wolf and Huygens. 
Similar views 
The classical 
physicists of the nineteenth century still held this view. 
Thus, Helmholtz on one occasion remarked: 'The object of 
the natural sciences is to find the motions upon which all 
other changes are based and their corresponding motive forces 
- to resolve themselves, therefore, into mechanics' (Quoted 
by J. B. Stallo, Concepts of Modern Physics p. 52). 
One problem for the mechanical theory was the notion of 
gravitational force. Newton himself appeared to deviate from 
the strict mechanical view in his theory of gravitation, 
which in its original form seems to allow action at a 
distance rather than a mechanical action by impact. In fact, 
however, he came to regard action at a distance as a manifest 
absurdity, and, in the lopticks', he did tentatively sketch 
out a mechanical explanation of gravitation. other such 
explanations were produced by the classical physicists, one 
notable example being that of Le Sage who suggested 
gravitational force was to be accounted for by the impact of 
streams of particles travelling at high velocity and in all 
directions, the particles being too minute to collide with 
each other. 
Contemporary science has completely rejected the kind of 
mechanical models of the world suggested by classical 
physics. In the mechanic. al theory, 'motion,, like mass,, is 
indestructible and unchangeable; it cannot vanish and 
reappear. Any change in its rate results from its 
distribution among a greater or less number of units of mass. 
And, motion and mass being mutually inconvertible, nothing 
but motion can be the cause of motion. There is, therefore, 
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no potential energy; all energy is rally kinetic' (Stallo, 
OP-C it. P. 9 5). In modern physics, by contrast, there is no 
absolute distinction between matter and energy. As Russell 
pointed out, if mass is only a form of energy 'there is no 
reason why matter should not be dissolved into other forms of 
energy' (Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, p. 309). 
In classical physics, then, there could be no f irst 
uncaused physical event because no change can be initiated 
among the inert elements of mass. Motion can come onlY f rom 
other motion; and there is no potential or stored energy 
which could give rise to change in a static world, all energy 
being ultimately kinetic. Contemporary physics, on the other 
hand,, regards mass as a form of energy that may be released 
to initiate change. That there should be an absolutely first 
event or a 'beginning' of the world does not, then, imply 
that this event was caused or produced by the act of will or 
a supernatural agent. In Whitrow's example, the first event, 
if such there be, could be the spontaneous decay of an 
elementary particle. 
There is, then, no insuperable difficulty for the modern 
physicist in the notion of an absolutely first event causing 
the breakdown of an equilibrium. Whether there could be an 
initial equilibrium in which there was absolutely no change, 
and therefore no time, is another matter. As S. E. Toulmin 
remarks, 'physicists today ... consider matter essentially 
active rather than passive' (Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
Vol. 5, p. 217). E. Whittaker,, in Spaceand Spirit, refers to 
the contemporary 'kinetic theory of matter'. If the 
elementary particles of matter be conceived as units of 
activity in constant relative motion then it seems reasonable 
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to assert that a world composed of such elements would be a 
world subject to temporal passage even if, at the macroscopic 
level, there were a changeless equilibrium. The possibility 
of an initial state of the world in which absolutely no 
change occurred is, then, a highly problematic one. 
Physicists have constructed cosmological models in which 
an initia super-dense state of matter is posited to account 
for the expansion of the known universe. While this may 
appear to lend empirical support to the view that there was a 
beginning to the cosmical series of events, the speculations 
regarding the nature of such a super-dense state of matter 
leave considerable doubts as to whether it could be regarded 
as an absolute beginning. G. Gamow, for example, points out 
that in this state matter would be subjected to extremely 
high temperatures, atoms and their nuclei being broken up 
into the elementary particles of which they are composed. 
Gamow himself feels that the super-dense state of matter if 
most likely to have been the result of a collapse that took 
place at an earlier era (v. The Creation of the Universe, 
pp. 28f f). If this leads us ultimately to the notion of a 
cyclical history of the world, in which there are successive 
contractions and expansions of matter, then it implies the 
infinity of the world series of events, the possibility of 
which we have rejected. 
According to H. Bondi, if the question of the beginning 
of the world is a proper one for physics at all then the 
physicist must view the initial state of the universe as 
having been 'a particularly simple state, the simplest, most 
harmonious and most permanent we can imagine. It contained 
within itself, though, the seeds of growth and evolution wlých 
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at some indefinite moment started off a chain of complicated 
processes which have by now changed this to our present 
universe' (. Cosmology, p. 9). The most satisfactory way of 
conceiving such an initial state of the universe is as an 
equilibrium of forces. J. McMurray has tried to rule out the 
possibility of such an initial changeless state. Thus, he 
writes: 'It might be [held] that such a world without change 
might ... be a world of energy, conceived as an equilibrium 
of forces, yielding as its result a whole that merely 
endured. But in that case all the forces present would 
exhaust themselves in maintaining equilibrium, and the whole 
would be without energy. Such an equilibrium of forces would 
provide no principle of persistence. If, on the other hand, 
the whole has an energy which is not merely the energy of its 
parts, then the energy of the whole is free energy and must 
therefore be effective energy, i. e.,, it must produce change' 
(P. A. S. Supp.,, Vol. 8, p. 147f). If McMurray's thesis could 
be proved, then it would be open to the proponent of the 
cosmological proof to argue that we must look to a 
supernatural cause to account for a beginning of change in 
the world: for an ini tially changeles, world would be one 
without energy. There arer however, difficulties in 
McMurray's argument. While it is true that free energy, 
energy surplus to that required to maintain 
equilibrium, would prevent the forming of an equilibrium, 
modern physics provides no grounds for his assertion that the 
forces involved in maintaining an equilibrium would exhaust 
themselves. It is, perhaps, worth noting that if energy were 
gradually exhausted in maintaining an equilibrium then the 
system as a whole would not be changeless. Further, if such 
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a system were eternal an infinite quanity of energy would 
have already been exhausted in maintaining equilibrium. 
Even if, however, we accept that there are no 
insuperable difficulties in physics in the notion of an 
initial changeless equilibrium there remains the problem of 
accounting for its existence. The equilibrium itself must 
have been unstable. In a stable equilibrium the system is so 
constituted that any move to disequilibrium is counteracted, 
as when a ball situated at the bottom of a steep sided vessel 
and moved up the side of the vessel returns to its original 
position. In an unstable equilibrium, on the other hand, any 
change to disequilibrium is irreversible within the system, 
as when a hanging weight is dislodged from its support. The 
idea the universe originally constituted a vast unstable 
equilibrium is a difficult one to accept. But there are yet 
more formidable difficulties to consider. 
Kenny has revived the scholastic's refutation of the 
thesis that causation implies temporal priority. It is 
claimed that an eternal foot could cause an everlasting print 
in everlasting sand. This seems fundamentally mistaken. To 
cause the print the foot would need to displace the grains of 
sand. If the disposition of the grains has from all eternity 
been such and such then it has not been caused, in any 
intelligible sense, by the presence of the foot. The foot 
might be regarded as maintaining the position of certain of 
the grains in that they would fall into the resultant 
depression were the foot removed; but this would not mean the 
depression itself was caused by the foot. 
The same considerations arise with regard to an 
equilibrium of forces, such as may be held to have 
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constituted the initial state of the world. We can imagine 
such a cosmical equilibrium where, for example, disruptive 
forces are balanced by gravitational forces. There is a 
tendency to regard such an equilibrium as perfectly natural 
since the one set of forces tends to disperse, the other to 
concentrate, the matter involvedo, equilibrium being reached 
when the masses are at certain critical distances from one 
another. Such a stable system, however, is explicable only 
where the forces involved have already operated on the masses 
thus producing the equilibrium. An original equilibrium in 
which all the forces present are perfectly balanced cannot 
have been produced by these forces, since their operation 
cannot have been temporally prior to the equilibrium itself. 
The stable initial state that appears to be implied by those 
physical theories of the evolution of the universe that hold 
that the universe had a beginning in time cannot, then, be 
accounted for by physical laws. It is thus open to the 
proponent of the cosmological proof to argue that either 
there was no initial equilibrium, matter having been created 
by God, or that the equilibrium was Produced by God, whose 
causality is not in time. 
It is, perhaps, worthwhile pointing out that any theory 
that held matter was both eternal and essentially atomic 
would be open to the same kind of objections as we have urged 
against an original equilibrium. The objection to the theory 
that matter has always existed as discrete fundamental 
particles that are identical in form is ind, ependent of the 
proof of the temporal finitude of the world. It is, however, 
a causal argument since it demands that a causal explanation 
of this identify of form should be provided. The most 
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convincing way to account for such an identity of form would, 
no doubt, be in terms of the operation of physical processes 
on some kind of prime matter. Natural causality, however, is 
ruled out because ex hypothesi there was no time prior to the 
existence of the fundamental particles during which natural 
causes could have operated. 
This argument is, of course, effective only against the 
theory that matter is essentially atomic. Recent cosmology 
tends to reject the view that the fundamental particles of 
matter have always existed although it has yet been unable to 
give any account of the state of matter from which such 
particles have derived. Whatever the initial state of 
matter, it must, on a purely physical account, have been 
quite different from its present state, which involves change 
at every level. The initial state of the world, on such an 
account, can only have been an uncaused equilibrium disturbed 
by some uncaused event. It is here that the rationalist 
theologian will concentrate his attack. 
Thus, in spite of Whitrow's argument that a spontaneous 
physical origin of change in the world is possible, the 
proposition that the world had a beginning in time does have 
implications for the cosmological proof. The most favoured 
current cosmological model is that in which the evolution of 
the universe is traced back to an explosion of the original 
'cosmic atom' or dense. accumulation of matter. He r e,, 
however, the physicists are somewhat at a loss. Bondi talks 
of the 'beginning' being 'a singular point on the border of 
the realm of physical science. Any question which reters to 
antecedents of the beginning or its nature can no longer be 
answered by physics, and is not a proper question for it' 
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(op. cit. p. 9). Whitrow writes that 'despite the powerful 
tools supplied to him by modern physics, the theoretical 
cosmologist unlike most of his scientific colleagues cannot 
easi1ycast0ffthe shackles of metaphysics' 
(The Structure and Evolution of the Universe, p. 195). The 
question for the proponent of the cosmological argument, 
however, is how he is to make use of the conclusion that the 
world had a beginning in time and how he can exploit the 
difficulties in which the physicist finds himself when 
confronted by the notion of an absolute beginning. This 




We must now consider what is in effect Kant's principal 
criticism of the cosmological argument, his criticism of the 
second stage of the proof, which seeks to identify the 
necessary being of the first stage with God. How is this 
identification to be made? Kant believes that reason, in 
searching for a concept adequate to necessary being, must 
have recourse to the ontological proof from pure concepts. 
The cosmological proof does involve an appeal to experience, 
the minimal experience that something exists. 'But (it] uses 
this experience only for a single step in the argument, 
namely to conclude the existence of a necessary being. What 
properties this being may have, the empirical premiss cannot 
tell us. Reason therefore abandons experience altogether, 
and endeavours to discover from mere concepts what properties 
an absolutely necessary being must have, that is, which among 
all possible things contains in itself the conditions 
essential to absolute necessity. Now these, it is supposed, 
are nowhere to be found save in the concept of an ens 
realissimum; and the conclusion is therefore drawn, that the 
ens 
_realissimum 
is the absolutely necessary being. But it is 
evident that we are here presupposing that the concept of the 
highest reality is completely adequate to the concept of 
absolute necessity of existence; that is, that the latter can 
be inferred from the former. Now this is the proposition 
maintained by the ontological proof' (A607/B635). 
As we have already seen, not all proponents of the proof 
have held the second stage to be essential to it. There is, 
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for example, no second stage in Aquinas' version of the 
proof. For Spinoza, who maintained that there is no absolute 
distinction between God and the world, the proof of God's 
existence is grounded on the definition of substance as that 
which exists necessarily. There is thus no question of a 
second stage of the proof in Sp inoza's account. From a 
philosopher like Leibniz, however, who argued that 'the 
sufficient reason of the existence of the universe cannot be 
found in the sequence of contingent things' we can demand an 
argument to establish that the necessary being on whom the 
world is said to depend is to be identified with God. In 
fact Leibniz does supply such an argument, although it is 
very different from the ontological proof that Kant suggests 
is essentially involved here. 
The Leibnizian second stage uses the scholastic doctrine 
that a cause must have at least as much reality or perfection 
as its effect. In fact, Leibniz states that the cause or 
ground of the world must have all the perfections found in 
the world in a supreme degree. 'This primary simple 
substance must include eminently the perfections contained in 
the derivative substances which are its effects. Thus it 
will have power, knowledge and will in perfection, that is to 
say, it will have supreme omnipotence, omniscience and 
goodness' (Principles of Nature and of Grace 9). At this 
point, then, Leibniz goes beyond the bare fact that something 
exists in order to establish his conclusion; but his 
inference may still be held to be 'cosmological', in that he 
is here concerned to account for certain general features of 
the world rather than to raise teleological considerations. 
It is,, however, doubtful, even if we accept the principle 
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that a cause must contain at least as much reality as its 
effect, that it would license Leibniz's inference to a being 
omnipotent, omniscient and supremely good, since all that 
would seem to be justified is the conclusion that, given that 
power, wisdom and goodness exist in the world, whatever 
produced the world must have these perfections or attributes 
to at least the same degree as in fact is manifested in the 
world, 
It is quite likely that Leibniz regards the principle 
that a cause must have at least as much reality as the 
effect as a special application of the principle of 
suf f ic ient reason. He might argue that, in completing the 
f irst stage of the proof, he has demonstrated not onlY the 
existence of a necessary being, having within itself the 
sufficient reason for its existence, but also the existence 
of a necessary being that is the suf f ic ient reason for the 
existence of the contingent things of the world. For the 
first stage of the proof starts from the premiss that the 
contingent world requires to be grounded in necessary being. 
Thus, the necessary being must be the ground of all the 
perfections found in the contingent world. In this way the 
second stage of the proof might be based, like the first, on 
the principle of sufficient reason. 
It is perhaps time to look at Leibnizls 'great 
principle',, to which he so often appeals in his metaphysics. 
It is the principle 'in virtue of which we hold that there 
can be no fact real or existing, no statement true,, unless 
there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not 
otherwise' (Monadology 32). while Leibniz was the first to 
formulate the principle it was implicit in the work of his 
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rationalist predecessors. It is fundamental in his system, 
in which, he says., it supplements the principle of 
con trad ict ion. The principle of contradiction guarantees 
truths of reason, the principle of sufficient reason 
guarantees truths of fact. 
Leibniz attaches great importance to the principle of 
sufficient reason in his statement of the cosmological 
argument. However, there appears to be a problem involved in 
the application of that principle to any theistic proof. 
Leibniz relies upon it to prove the first stage of the 
cosmological argument: 'the sufficient reason [of the 
existence of the world] must needs be outside of [the] 
sequence of contingent things and must be in a substance 
which is the cause of this sequence, or which is a necessary 
being, bearing in itself the reason of its own existence, 
otherwise we should not yet have a sufficient reason with 
which we would stop' (Principles of Nature and of Grace 8). 
We should observe, however, that the principle itself, unlike 
that of contradiction, is not a necessary truth. Whereas the 
principle of contradiction applies to all possible worlds, 
that of suf f icient reason applies only to the actual world, 
because God actualises the best of all possible worlds, all 
other worlds containing some gratuitous imperfections. His 
creation of this world is guaranteed only by his goodness, 
which brings about the best of all possible worlds. 'God 
makes this choice because being omnipotent, His choice is 
un1imitedr He may create any possible world; being 
omniscient, He contains all possible worlds in His 
understanding and perceives that which is the best; and, 
being perfect in goodness of Will, He chooses the best. Thus 
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the Divine Nature is ultimately the sufficient reason of all 
particular things, since it is the ground both of the essence 
and of the existence of the actual universe' (Latta, 
op. cit. p. 66). 
If the principle of sufficient reason is not a necessary 
truth it is difficult to see with what justification Leibniz 
can appeal to it in order to establish the f irst part of the 
proof. Kant,, in a letter to Eberhard, remarked that 
Leibniz's distinction between the truths guaranteed by the 
principle of contradiction and the truths guaranteed by the 
principle of sufficient reason was equivalent to his own 
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements (v. 
Latta, op. cit. pp. 208f). We thus have, in Leibnizls argument,, 
an attempt to derive a necesary conclusion f rom a prem iss 
that is essentially synthetic. It would appear possible that 
God could have created a world in which the principle of 
sufficient reason would have been false. In order to know 
that the principle can be universally applied, we need to 
know that the world is dependent, not merely on necessary 
being, but on a perfect, omnipotent and omniscient being. If 
this is so, then we may be led to suppose that there is some 
justification in Kant's criticism that the cosmological 
proof, in its second stage, has to fall back on the 
ontological proof. Leibniz himself seems to base the second 
stage of his proof on the principle that a cause must have at 
least as much reality or perfection as the ef f ect, this 
principle being an application of the principle of sufficient 
reason. The difficulty here is that he ought not to hold 
God's goodness to be the ultimate ground for the principle of 
sufficient reason when that principle is used to 
demonstrate 
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the existence of God. 
It would seem that the principle is justified on 
different grounds in different circumstances. How it may be 
justified prior to any proof of the existence of a perfectly 
good creator is a difficult question. The principle should 
perhaps be regarded as an expression of the rationalist's 
faith in the ultimate intelligibility of the world rather 
than as a self-evident truth. Kant notes that 'all attempts 
to prove the principle of sufficient reason have, by the 
universal admission of those concerned, been fruitless; and 
it was considered better,, since that principle could not be 
surrendered, boldly to appeal to the common sense of mankind 
- an expedient which always is a sign that the cause of 
reason is in desperate straits - rather than to attempt new 
dogmatic proofs' (A783/B811f). 
There are reasons to suppose that Kant believed the 
principle to be not merely of doubtful status but also 
fundamentally ambiguous. According to Al Azm the ambiguities 
in the principle of sufficient reason underlie the 
antinomies, which, he believes, Kant derived from the 
controversy between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke (v. 
The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies). it is 
true that one source of disagreement between the two men was 
their differing interpretations of the principle of 
sufficient reason, a principle both claimed to accept. 
Leibniz, who interpreted the principle strictly and as 
determining even God's will, wrote that it was wrong to say, 
as Clarke did, 'that God created things in what particular 
[absolute] space, and at what particular [absolute] time he 
pleased. For, all time and all spaces being in themselves 
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perfectly uniform and indiscernible from each other, one of 
them cannot please more than the other" (Leibniz/Clarke 
Correspondence, L. V. 60). Clarke replied that the principle 
'is of an equivocal signification; and may either be so 
understood as to mean necessity only, or so as to include 
likewise will and choice. That in general there is a 
sufficient reason why everything is, which is; is undoubtedly 
true and agreed on all hands. But the question is, whether, 
in some cases, when it be highly reasonable to act, yet 
different possible ways of acting may not possi"y be equally 
reasonable; and whether, in such cases, the bare will of God 
be not itself a suf f icient reason for acting in this or the 
other particular manner' (op. cit., C. V. 124/130). 
It is possible, then,, as Al Azm suggests, that the 
ambiguities in the principle of sufficient reason, as 
employed by the metaphysicians, led Kant to the view that in 
rational cosmology reason was bound to become involved in 
con trad ic ti on s. we have already seen the importance of the 
principle for the f irst antinomy. The arguments of the 
thesis seek to establish Clarke's Newtonian view that the 
world is limited in time and space. In the antithesis, by 
contrast,, this possibility is ruled out, on the strict 
Leibn'Lzian interpretation of the principle of sufficient 
reason. Walsh, who is sympathetic to the view that the 
principle underlies the antinomies, suggests that it is self- 
defeating because ' [it] can be seen as at once demanding and 
precluding that there be in the universe some tact, event or 
existent which is ultimate and self-explanatory. It demands 
such an item because it claims that whatever exists or occurs 
has a sufficient reason; the implication here is that the 
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chain of reasons can be brought to an end. But at the same 
time it precludes itf since it also insists that there must 
be some further reason for whatever is put forward as 
sufficient' (Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics p. 204). 
There is c. ertainly evidence that some such ambiguity as 
Walsh outlines lies behind the Leibniz/Clarke controversy. 
We have already noted Clarke's remark that the principle is 
of "equivocal signification". Clarke held that God could have 
created the world in any part of absolute space and at any 
moment of absolute time. Leibniz held that God could not have 
created the world at all in absolute time and space as there 
would have been no sufficient reason to incline his will. 
Clarke claims to accept the principle of sufficient reasonr 
but, as Leibniz points out, 'he adds that this sufficient 
reason is often the simple or mere will of God: as,, when it 
is asked why matter was not placed otherwise in space; the 
same situations of bodies among themselves being preserved. 
But this is plainly maintaining, that God wills something, 
without any sufficient reason for his will: against the 
axiom, or general rule of whatever happens. This is 'falling 
back into the loose indifference, which I have confuted at 
large and showed to be ... contrary to the wisdom of God, as 
if he could operate without acting by reason' (The Leibniz/ 
Clarke Correspondence L 111 7). 
The principle of sufficient reason, then, does underlie 
much of the controversy between Leibniz and Clarke. It does 
not, however, lie at the root of the antinomies. The 
antithesis of the First Antinomy is indeed based on the 
strict, Leibnizian, version of the principle. The thesis, 
however, is based on the principle of contradiction. It is 
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curious that the arguments of the Antinomy, which are 
supposed to be logically compelling, rest on principles of 
different logical status. The principle of sufficient reason 
is synthetic,, and, in Kant's view, false. It is thus 
difficult to see how the Antinomy can be used to discredit 
metaphysics unless the principle is regarded as essential to 
all metaphysical thought. It is much more dif f icult to see 
how the so-called "indirect proof" to establish the ideality 
of space and time can succeed. 
For Leibniz the principle of sufficient reason was 
fundamental. It enabled him to argue that the world must be 
groun ed in necessary being, and thus to complete the first 
stage of the proof. As we have seen, the principle may also 
be appealed to in the second stage, where the proponent of 
the proof will insist that the f irst stage establishes not 
merely the existence of a necessary being but the existence 
of a being sufficient to account for the existence of the 
contingent world in all its aspects. If, however, the 
principle is rejected, then the proponent of the proof must 
look elsewhere for the materials to construct it in both its 
stages. We have already reviewed ways in which this can be 
done to complete the first stage of the proof and must now 
consider how itcan be done in respect of the second stage. 
Kant's own account of the second stage, as we have seen, 
is that it is a version of the ontological proof. Reason, he 
says, at this stage in the proof 'abandons experience 
altogether, and endeavours, to discover from concepts what 
properties an absolutely necessary being must have, that is, 
which among all possible things contains in itself the 
conditions essential to absolute necessity. Now these, it is 
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supposed, are nowhere to be found save in the concept of an 
ens realissimum; and the conclusion is therefore drawn, that 
the ens, realissimum is the absolutely necessary being' 
(A606/B634f). It is this appeal to the ontological proof 
that,, for Kant, makes the f irst stage of the cosmological 
proof superfluous. However,. apart from the reasons we have 
discovered for doubting Kant's claim here, there seems to be 
no reason why the proponent of the proof should not appeal at 
this stage, not to the ontological proof, but to the proof 
from possibility. 
Kant himself, of course, refers to the proof from 
possibility as the ontological proof. This is misleading 
because, as we have seen, the proof from possibility does 
require a 'cosmological inference', i. e., an inference from 
the existence of the actual to thb existence of a ground for 
all possibility, since what is actual is a fortiori possible. 
The proof from possibility is well suited to provide the 
second stage of the proof. Once we establish the existence 
of the actual yet contingent world we may, with Leibniz, hold 
that this is one of a number (in Leibnizs view, an infinite 
number) of possible worlds. The ground of these 
possibilitie-s must then be sought in the necessary being 
whose exis-t-ence is rcgarded as having been estab'L.. -L shed by the 
first part of the proof, and which is regarded as the ground 
of the existence of the act. ual world. As the ground of all 
possibilities the necessary being is identified with God as 
iý, 
the ens realissimum. 
one problem for the proponent of tho --smological proof 
is that his first stage may be allowed and yet any 
theological implications denied on the grounds that some 
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'non-classical' version of the proof may be provided. Thus, 
Kant says,, once we introduce the concept of necessary being, 
'we are entirely free to hold that any limited beings 
whatsoever, notwithstanding their being limited, may also be 
unconditionally necessary, although we cannot infer their 
necessity from the universal concepts which we have of them' 
(A588/B616). Hume, too, cautions the theist against 
introducing the idea of necessity into debates about the 
existence of God, because we may then hold that necessity, 
not divine providence, is responsible for ordering the world. 
This point is made by Philo in the Dialogues, where he 
suggests that 'instead of admiring the order of natural 
beings, may it not happen that, could we penetrate into the 
intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was 
absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other 
dispositions? ' (op. cit. Part IX). 
In answer to Kant here we may point out the difficulties 
in comprehending how independent particulars could be 
necessary beings. Relations would presumably subsist between 
them, those relations themselves being necessary and external 
to the individuals but internal to the whole system, which 
would thus take on the monistic aspect of Spinozism. 
Further, if any finite individual be necessary then it would 
appear that the pattern of necessity that it incorporates 
must be repeated in an infinite number of other individuals. 
If there were a finite number only of such individuals then 
there must be some principle external to the individuals that 
accounts for this limitation. On this account, the 
individuals could not be regarded as absolutely necessary. 
The only way out of the difficulty would be to regard the 
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system as a whole as infinite, as Spinoza does (v. Ethics, 
Props. VII and VIII). Against this, however, we have already 
argued that there are reasons to suppose the world to be 
finite in space and time. 
It seems doubtful that any 'non-' classical' cosmological 
proof could be sustained. Nevertheless, critics of the proof 
are often quick to point out that the first stage of the 
proof falls short of providing grounds for asserting the 
existence of God. It is, however, open to the proponent of 
the proof to rely on more than one argument or on more than 
one version of the f irst stage of the proof. The various 
attempts to provide a first stage may be seen not as separate 
arguments., whose implications must be followed through 
without reference to one another, but as a group to which 
reference is made in the second stage of the proof. His 
refusal to regard the various versions of the first stage as 
a group allows the critic of the proof to make the most of 
the difficulties involved in making the move to the second 
stage of the proof. N 
The proponent of the proof, then, is not restricted to 
the simple premiss that something exists when he comes to 
construct his argument. He can, of course, use this premiss 
and conclude from it that something necessary exists. He may 
also,, as Kant suggests in the Lectures on Philosoph, ical 
Theology, use observed facts about the world to conclude that 
the necessary being is distinct from the world; and these 
arguments may be strengthened by reference to the refutation, 
outlined above, of the thesis that the world itself, or the 
particulars that compose it, may exist necessarily. 
Keeping before him the proof that the world is dependent 
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upon necessary being, the proponent of the proof may go on to 
argue that the world must have had a beginning in time, and 
that there must have been a unique uncaused event that at 
least initiated change within the world even if it were not 
a creation of the world. It is open to him to argue that 
such an uncaused event cannot have been a physical event and 
must be the free act of an agent, as Kant argues in the 
thesis of the third antinomy. To the objection that his 
premisses do not justify his identification of this agent 
with the necessary being, he may reasonably reply that what 
he proposes is the best hypothesis. 
The argument from causality, or the argument that there 
is no completeness in the conditions regarding the 
-I\ 
transmission of properties, is more dubious in view of the 
evolutionary account that may be given of the origin of such 
properties. However, while relinquishing this argument, the 
proponent of the proof may well turn to teleology. Kant 
argues that the physico-theological proof depends on the 
cosmological argument. 'The physico-theological argument can 
indeed lead us to the point of admiring the greatness,, 
wisdom, power, etc., of the Author of the world, but can take 
us no further. Accordingly, we can abandon the argument from 
empirical grounds of proof, and tall back upon the 
contingency which, in the first steps of the argument, we had 
inferred from the order and purposiveness of the world. With 
this contingency as our sole premiss, we then advance by 
means of transcendental concepts alone, to the existence of 
an absolute necessity of the f irst cause to the completely 
determinate or determinable concept of that necessary being, 
namely, to the concept of an all-embracing reality. Thus the 
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physico-theological proof, failing in its undertaking, has in 
the face of this difficulty suddenly fallen back upon the 
cosmological proof' (A629/B657). 
Kant's view appears to be that the physico-theological 
proof is limited, and these limitations lead the rational 
theologian to the cosmological proof. The 'order and 
purposiveness' of the world are themselves sufficient 
grounds, in his view, for asserting the contingency of the 
world. We require, however, the cosmological proof to move 
from the contingency of the world to the necessary being that 
is its ground. Kant, of course, rejects the cosmological 
proof as invalid. However, if Kant rejects the physico- 
theological proof because it depends on the cosmological 
proof, there appears no reason why the proponent of the 
cosmological proof, who is satisfied as to its validity, 
should not appeal to the physico-theological proof in the 
second stage of his argument. Kant, in fact, makes it appear 
that the cosmological proof as a whole is necessary to the 
physico-theological proof. We move, he says, from order and 
purposiveness to contingency; then from contingency to 
necessary being; and finally 'from the concept of the 
absolute necessity of the first cause to the completely 
determinate or determinable concept of-that necessary being, 
namely, to the concept of an all embracing reality. There 
seems, however, no reason why, if the two proofs are as 
closely related as Kant suggests, the physico-theological 
proof should not itself help to prove the materials for the 
second stage of the proof. If, from order and purposiveness, 
we may infer contingency, from which in turn we may infer 
necessary being, then that necessary being may be regarded as 
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the cause and source, not only of the contingent world, but 
of the order and purposiveness that it displays. While this 
may fall short of a proof of the omnipotence and omniscience 
of the necessary being, it does serve to endow it in some 
degree with the divine attributes, which the first stage 
proper of the proof Kant regards as impotent to do, 
At this point it may be instructive to consider what is 
probably the most comprehensive attempt to provide a second 
stage for the cosmological proof. This argument, which 
occurs in Samuel Clarke's, A Demonstration of the Being and 
Attributes of God proves to have the diversity of approach 
that we have advocated. Clarke, in the second stage of his 
proof,, set out to demonstrate that the necessary being, whose 
existence he claimed to have proved in the first part of the 
argument, had the essential attributes of God. These include 
eternity, infinity, omniscience, omnipotence and infinite 
goodness, characteristics whose existence Kant said could be 
established only by the moral proof. 
Of the attributes regarded as essential to our concept 
of God, eternity seems most clearly to characterise the 
necessary being of the f irst part of the proof. A 
necessarily existing thing must be eternal. Thus Clarke says 
that 'that being, therefore, which has no other cause of its 
existence but he absolute necessity of its own nature, must 
of necessity have existed from everlasting, without 
beginning, and must of necessity exist to everlasting without 
end' (op. cit. p. 42). 
Clarke holds that the infinity of the necessary being 
can also be inferred from its necessity. 'To be self- 
exi stent ... is to exist 
by an absolute necessity in the 
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nature of the thing itself. Now this necessity being 
absolute in itself, and not depending on any outward cause, 
it is evident that it must be every where, as well as always, 
unalterably the same. For a necessity which is not 
everywhere the, same, is plainly a consequential necessity 
only, depending upon some external cause, and not an absolute 
one in its nature ... Whatever, therefore exists by an 
absolute necessity in its own nature must needs be infinite 
as well as eternal' (op. cit. p. 44). 
This concept of spatial infinity is not adequate to the 
theistic concept of the infinity of God, according to which 
God is everywhere fully present. on this point Clarke gets 
into difficulties and acknowledges that 'the particular 
manner of his being infinite and everywhere present, in 
opposition to the manner of created things being present in 
such or such finite places; this is as impossible for our 
finite understandings, to comprehend or explain as it is for 
us to form an adequate idea of infinity' (op. cit. p. 46). 
The spatial infinity of the necessary being does follow 
'given Clarke's assumption that if a being exists it exists 
somewhere or everywhere' (Rowe The Cosmological Proof p. 233). 
We could, as Rowe says, question Clarke's assumption that 
everything exists in space and time. However, the question 
then is: how do we account for God's omnipresence with 
respect to those things that are spatial? Kant avoided these 
puzzles by his doctrine of the ideality of time and space. 
He objects to our making time and space 'conditions of all 
existence in general [since then) they must be conditions of 
the existence of God' (B71). Rather than resort to idealism 
we could interpret God's omnipresence with respect to finite 
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spatial things in terms of their being objects of his 
infinite knowledge and subject to his infinite power. 
When Clarke sets out to prove that the necessary being 
is omniscient, he abandons the a priori analytic method that 
he has used hi therto. So f ar, he believes that he has 
established that there is one necessarily existing and 
infinite being. He now argues that 'the self-existing being, 
whatever that be supposed to be, must of necessity (being the 
original of all things) contain in itself the sum and highest 
degree of all the perfections of all things. Now because 
that which is self-existent must therefore have all possible 
perfections (for this, though most certainly true in itself, 
yet cannot be so easily demonstrated a priori). But because 
it is impossible that any effect should have any perfection 
which was not in the cause. For if it had, then that 
perfection would be caused by nothing; which is a plain 
contradiction' (op. cit. pp. 51-2). 
This argument depends on a distinction between 
perfections, or positive features of the world, and 
imperfections, which are merely negations. God, as the 
source of all positive features of the world, has all 
perfections in a supreme degree. Intelligence is manifested 
in the world. It is a perfection. Therefore God possesses 
intelligence in a supreme degree. 
The argument is open to question. It is no longer 
rgarded as self-evident that a cause must contain all the 
positive features or ' perfections' that are produced in the 
effect. In particular, mind is often said to be the result 
of the fortuitous organisation of material parts. It 
is also 
dubious whether we could dismiss all features that cannot be 
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sensibly said to characterise God as 'negative'. Clarke 
classes figure and motion as imperfections or negations. 
They certainly could not exist unless the particulars that 
possessed them were finite and limited; but, in themselves, 
f igure and motion cannot be regarded simply as negations. 
It might have been better for Clarke, if he is going to 
argue a posteriori, to appeal, as we have already suggested, 
to teleology. We have seen that this does not lead us to the 
concept of an omniscient being, but neither does Clarke's 
argument. Clarke, in fact, argues that 'the supreme being 
because he is infinite must be everywhere present. And 
because he is an infinite mind or intelligence, therefore 
wherever he is, his knowledge is, which is inseparable from 
his being, and must therefore be infinite likewise' 
(op. cit. p. 109). As Rowe says, 'all that follows is that 
whatever degree of wisdom the self-existing being has is 
everywhere present' (op. cit. p. 248). 
When it comes to the question of power, Clarke is on 
firmer ground. The necessary being of the cosmological 
proof, unlike that of the ontological argument, cannot be 
other than the source of the world. It is from the existence 
of the world that the existence of the necessary being is 
inferred. The self-existing or necessary being must have 
power, since it produced the world. Clarke argues that the 
self-existing being must be,, not merely powerful, but 
omnipotent, since 'all the powers of all things are derived 
from him, and must therefore be perfectly subject and 
subordinate to him [so] nothing can make any difficulty or 
resistance to the execution of his will, 
but he must of 
necessity have absolute power to do everything 
he pleases, 
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with the perfectest ease, and in the perfectest manner, at 
once and in a moment, whenever he wills it, (op. cit. p. 73). 
All that this argument really proves is that the 
necessary or self-existent being has power that is unlimited 
by anything outside it. It does not prove that the power of 
the necessary being is absolutely unlimited, since it may be 
limited in itself. 
Clarke's argument, like the argument we suggested above, 
departs from the analytic method to which Kant assumes the 
proponent of the cosmological proof ought to adhere. There 
is, however, no reason, apart from that supplied by the 
interests of classification, why the theistic proofs should 
be regarded as totally separate. If, for example, we can 
infer the existence of a necessarily existing source of the 
world by employing the cosmological proof and the existence 
of a cosmic designer by employing the teleological proof, 
then it seems reasonable to identify the necessary being with 
the cosmic designer even though no formal demonstration of 
their identity can be given. 
Even if we are restricted to the cosmological proof 
proper, given that the first stage of the proof is valid, we 
can still infer that the necessa ry being is eternal, 
powerful and distinct from the world. It is true, however,, 
that to progr ess beyond this to a more satisfying or complete 
demonstration of the existence of God we require to go beyond 
the cosmological proof itself. 
Whatever may be said against Kant's disproof of the 
cosmological argument,, it remains true that he has attacked 
it at its weakest point. There may indeed be valid proofs of 
the existence of a necessary being or of a first cause. But 
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the problem of how such a necessary being or f irst cause may 
be identified with God is one that tends to direct the 
argument away from the fundamental simpl icity of the 
cosmolog ical argument proper and to raise other 
considerations bearing on the nature of the world, of 
teleology or even of scientific cosmology* 
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Chapter 10 
Kant's criticism of the cosmological proof has proved 
very influential but is, I believe, inconclusive. To reject 
his argument here, however, is not to answer the whole of his 
case against the proof; for, in his view, metaphysics is a 
pseudo-science and cannot yield knowledge. Any attempt to 
attain knowledge of super-sensible reality or of things as 
they are in themselves is bound to fail. If this be so then 
it may be argued that there is no need for detailed criticism 
of the argument, for the whole metaphysical enterprise is 
mi sg u ided. Wood has suggested that a criticism of the 
ontological proof founded straightforwardly on Kant's 
epistemology 'would have been far more compelling than the 
famous but badly under-argued one actually presented in the 
Critique' (op. cit. p. 123). If this be true of the ontological 
proof it may also be true of the cosmological proof. This 
suggestion we shall now examine. 
In the Critique, Kant seeks to prove that all necessary 
knowledge is necessary only relative to our cognition. The 
necessary propositions of mathematics are said to be 
connected with the fact that space and time are the forms of 
our sensuous intuition, through which objects are given to 
US. We can thus have a pr, iori knowledge of the form of 
experience in that, for exampler extended objects must 
conform to the Euclidean space in terms of which they are 
given to us. our non-mathematical necessary knowledge 
relates to the formal principles or categories under which 
the Isenuous manifold' is reduced to order by the 
understanding. Thus all appearances, 
because they have to 
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conform to the formal conditions of space and time in which 
they are intuited, must have 'extensive magnitude' and 
'intensive magnitude' or degree. The metaphysical doctrines 
of the permanance of substance and of universal causality are 
transmuted by Kant into principles necessary for our 
apprehension of a single time-stream and thus for experience 
itself. None of these principles relates to things as they 
are in themselves but rather to the conditions necessary for 
our experience of objects. 
Having surveyed the extent of our necessary knowledge, 
Kant turns, in the Postulates of Empirical Thought, to 
cons ider the categories of modality themselves: the possible, 
the actual and the necessary. '(1) That which agrees with 
the formal conditions of experience, that is, with conditions 
of intuition and of concepts, is possible. (2) That which is 
bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, 
with sensation, is actual. (3) That which in its connection 
with the actual is determined in accordance with universal 
conditions of experience is [that is, exists as] necessary' 
(A218/B265f). 
Here, Kant makes it explicit that the categories of 
modality concern, not possibility, actuality or necessity in 
any absolute sense, but only what is possible, actual or 
necessary relative to our cognition. Thus, he says that 'the 
principles of modality are nothing but explanations of the 
concepts of possibilityr actuality, and necessity, in their 
empirical employment; at the same time they restrict all 
categories to their merely empirical employment, and do not 
approve or allow their transcendental employment. For if 
they are not to have a purely logical significance, 
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analytically expressing the form of thought, but are to refer 
to the possibility, actuality, or necessity of things, they 
must concern possible experience and its synthetic unity, in 
which alone objects of knowledge can be given' (F219/B266f). 
On this ac-count, the categories of modality can have 
only empirical employment and can apply only to objects of 
the senses or phenomena. So there is simply no place in 
Kant's scheme for the concept of necessary being. As Walsh 
says, in commenting on the Postulates, 'the old metaphysical 
concept of necessity has here all but disappeared' 
(op. cit. p. 1 53). It is not, however, only necessity with 
which Kant is here concerned. We can have no concept of 
possibility either, other than that which is provided by the 
formal conditions of experience. So the possible, no less 
than the necessary, belongs only to the phenomenal world. 
Kant holds that the concept of possibility 'in its 
empirical employment' includes analytically all the 
conditions included in the Aesthetic and Analytic as 
necessary for our experience of things. The concept of 
actuality in its empirical employment he holds to be 'bound 
up with the material conditions of experience, that is with 
sensation'. It is, however, wrong to suggest, as Kant does, 
that these concepts admit of empirical employment only. on 
Kant' s account, we know that there are noumena. These must 
be actual and thus a fortiori possible. We may not indeed 
know in what their possibility consists. But it is not 
necessary to know the conditions that must be satisfied for 
this possibility to exist before we can hold that possibility 
and actuality characterise noumenal reality. 
It appears, then, that even on Kant's own premisses our 
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concepts of possibility and actuality cannot be restricted to 
the experienced world. Can the same be said of necessity? 
Kant argues that 'necessity concerns only the relations of 
appearances in conformity with the dynamical law of causality 
and the possibility grounded upon it of inferring a priori 
from a given existence (a cause) to another existence (the 
ef f ect) I (A227/B28 0). Thus, all necessity is hypothetical 
and we can 'know the necessity only of those effects in 
nature the causes of which are given to us, and the character 
of necessity in existence extends no further than the field 
of possible experience, and even in this field is not 
applicable to the existence of things as substances' (ibid. ). 
Thus, while Kant at least allows that possibility and 
actuality characterise things in the experienced or 
phenomenal world, this is not so with regard to necessity. 
In the phenomenal worldf necessity of existence is merely 
hypothetical. Given that one thing exists, another may be 
inferred as a necessary consequence. But it is absolute 
necessity of existence which the proponent of the 
cosmological proof requires. 
If necessity of existence has no place even in the 
phenomenal world, with what justification can it be 
imported 
into redlity or the noumenal world? If we do not derive the 
concept from experience it must presumably derive 
from our 
faculty of reason. 'The concept of necessity is only to be 
found in our reason, as a formal condition of thought; it 
does not allow of being hypostatised as a material condition 
of existence' (A620/B648). However, 
Kant believes that we 
do come to regard it as a 
'material condition of existence', 
because reason 'directs us to look upon all connection 
in the 
205 
world as if it originated f rom an all-suf f icient necessary 
cause% (A619/B647). 
Kant recognises that the fact we cannot, even in the 
phenomenal world, specify the conditions of necessity does 
not mean that necessity cannot characterise things in 
themselves. Thus, in the solution of the fourth antinomy he 
writes: 'All things in the world of sense may be contingent, 
and so have only an empirically conditioned existence, while 
yet there may be a non-empirical condition of the whole 
series; that is there may exist an unconditionally necessary 
being' (A560/B588). He goes on to point out that he has here 
'no intention of proving the unconditionally necessary 
existence of such a being, or even of establishing the 
possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the 
existence of appearances in the sensible world. Just as, on 
the one hand, we limit reason, lest in leaving the guiding- 
thread of the empirical conditions it should go straying into 
the transcendent, adopting grounds of explanation that are 
incapable of any representation in concreto, so, on the other 
hand, we limit the law of the purely empirical employment of 
the understanding, lest it should presume to decide as to the 
possibility of things in general, and should declare the 
intelligible to be im ossibler merely on the ground that it 
is not of any use in explaining appearances. Thus all that 
we have shown is that the thoroughgoing contingency of all 
natural things, and of their empirical conditions, 
is quite 
consistent with the optional assumption of a necessary, 
though purely intelligible, condition; and that as there 
is 
no real contradiction between the two assertions, 




Here,, Kant leaves open the possibility that the world 
may be grounded in necessary being, asserting that this can 
be neither proved nordisproved. We can, however, form no 
concept of such a being. 'The supposition which reason makes 
of a supreme be. ing, as the highest cause, is, therefore 
relative only; it is devised solely for the sake of 
systematic unity in the world of sense, and is a mere 
something in idea, of which, as it may be in itself, we have 
no concept. This explains why, in relation to what is given 
to the senses as existing, we require the idea of a 
primordial being necessary in itself, and yet can never form 
the slightest concept of it or of its absolute necessity' 
(A679/B707). 
Kant's assertion that, while there may be in fact a 
necessary being, we can form no concept of such a being, is 
the ground of his attack on thp second stage of the proof. 
Nevertheless, if,, despite his discussion of modality in the 
Postulates, Kant allows that the world may be grounded in 
necessary being then it would appear to be open to the 
proponent of the cosmological proof to argue that he has been 
conceded all that he requires to justify his pursuing the 
argument of the first stage of proof. We must, however, take 
account of the fact that Kant does derive materia. "I from the 
Analytic to construct a refutation of the arguments of the 
first stage of the proof. 
His principal criticism, herev concerns the eirployment 
by the proponent of 'the transcendental principle whereby 
from the contingent we infer a cause. This principle is 
applicable only in the. sensible world; outside 
ttiat world it 
9 
has no meaning whatsoever. For the mere 
intellectual concept 
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of the contingent cannot give rise to any synthetic 
proposition, such as that of causality. The principle of 
causality has no meaning and no criterion for its application 
save only in the sensible world. But in the cosmological 
proof it is precisely in order to enable us to advance beyond 
the sensible world that it is employed' (A609/B637). R. W. 
Hepburn writes of this passage that 'Kant [argues) that if we 
are talking of causality, then our discourse must remain 
within the sphere. in which alone the concept of cause has 
been given its meaning and role, that is to say, the relating 
of event to event in the spatio-temporal world of experience. 
If the concept is used outside that context which confers 
meaning upon it, we shall utter mystifying nonsense' 
(Encyclop aedia of Philosop hy Vol. 2, p. 235). 
one problem, here, is that while Kant does indeed 
restrict the scope of the concept of cause to the Ispatio- 
temporal world of experience' this is not for him the real 
world. The realm of the real or noumenal is beyond our 
experience and one to which the concept of causality simply 
has no application. If we reject Kant's proof of the 
unreality of space and time, and the consequent restriction 
of the categories to the purely phenomenal world of sense 
experience, then one ground for his refusal to allow the 
concept of causality application as is required by the 
proponent of the cosmological proof 
has gone. Kant himself 
holds that the necessity of the principle of causality shows 
that it applies to phenomena, because 
if the relata falling 
under the principle were things 
in themselves 'it would be 
altogether impossible to know anything of 
them synthetically 
2 priori. They are, howevere nothing 
but appearances; and 
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complete knowledge of them, in the furtherance of which the 
sole function of ýj priori principles must ultimately consist, 
is simply our possible experience of them' (Al8l/B223). 
If the principle of causality has application only in 
the phenomenal world, as a principle of the synthesis of 
appearances presupposed by experience, it can hardly be 
appealed to by the proponent of the proof who wishes to use 
the principle to carry him from the contingent world of 
experience to the super-sensible reality that is its source. 
Leaving aside the problems of the relationship Kant supposed 
to subsist between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, it is 
clear from the evidence of the fourth antinomy that, even if 
things in themselves were temporal and subject to the 
principle of causality, the cosmological argument could not 
be employed to Prove the dependence of the world on a God 
outside the world. He argues, in the thesis of the fourth 
antinomy, on the grounds of transcendental realism, that 
there must be an unconditioned or necessary being as the 
source of the series of alterations. But this source must 
belong to the series. This again looks like Hepburn's 
objection to the employment of the principle of causality to 
take us outside the sensible world. However, Kant's grounds 
for rejecting the possibility that the unconditioned source 
of the series should be outside the series are that the 
unconditioned cause must begin to act and thus must be in 
time. 'Accordingly the causality of the necessary cause of 
alterations, and therefore of the cause 
itself , must belong 
to time and so to appearance time being possible only as the 
form of appearance' (A454/B482). 
There are difficulties in interpreting Kant's point 
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here. We need not accept that the causality of the first 
cause must be in time if it is regarded as the source of a 
f inite series of alterations; for it is open to us to argue 
that the first cause is the source, not only of the series of 
alterations, but of time itself. If, however, we accept that 
the f irst cause must be in time, then we have to deal with 
Kant's doctrine that there are orders of being and that to be 
in time is to belong to the world of appearance rather than 
to reality. He holds that the synthetic a priori principles 
of time determination embodied in the Analogies are necessary 
for the empirical determination of time and thus for the 
existence of time itself. If, however, we reject this, there 
seems no reason why the first cause or unconditioned source 
of the world should not be temporal. Bennett, who finds the 
thesis of the fourth antinomy 'contrived and implausible', 
attributes Kant' s desire to show that the necessary being is 
in the world to no more important a motive than his wish to 
distinguish the fourth antinomy's thesis-argument from the 
cosmological argument in the theology chapter (Kant's 
Dialectic p. 243). 
Kant's grounds, then, for rejecting the appeal to 
causality in the first stage of the proof depend on his 
transcendental idealism, according to which time and space 
are ideal. Kant's arguments for the ideality of time are, we 
have argued, inadequate; many critics would nevertheless be 
sympathetic to his attempt to rule out the appeal to the 
principle of causality outside the experienced world. To 
this the proponent of the proof may reply that the rejection 
of the infinite series of events and 
the argument to a 
beginning of the world-series of events does require that 
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there must have been an uncaused event. This uncaused event 
must be either inexplicable in principle or it must involve 
the voluntary act of some agent. 
There is no doubt, however, that there remain 
considerable difficulties for the proponent of the proof 
here. It is, as R. W. Hepburn remarks, 'very hard, if not 
impossible, to see how the eternal and nontemporal God can 
act upon the temporal and noneternal world' (Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy Vol. 2, p. 253). For some thinkers, the notlon 
of the creation of the world by a nontemporal God is 
incoherent; for, in this case, we 'ascribe to God a timeless, 
and therefore impersonal pre-existence' (J. R. Lucas, 
Treatise on Time and Space. p. 309). In such an existence, 
Lucas argues, consciousness would be impossible. 
While these difficulties may be admitted, it must be 
remembered that Kant himself believed that God's existence 
was nontemporal. Time is, for Kant, merely the form of our 
inner sense and does not apply to things as they are in 
themselves. So, for Kant, God did not create the world in 
time. The realm of reality is non-temporal. In the Lectures 
on Philoso phical Theologyf Kant addresses the 'cosmological 
problem' of whether God created the world within time or from 
eternity. 'Now would it not be an internal contradiction to 
say that God created the world from eternity? For then the 
world would have to be eternal, like God; and yet it is also 
supposed to be dependent on him. Yet if eternity here means 
the same as infinite time, then I become guiltY of a 
regressus, in infinitum and fall into absurdity. But then can 
we think of the creation of the world only as within time? 
No, not this either. For when I say that the world 
had a 
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beginning, I am thereby asserting that there was a time 
before the origin of the world; because every beginning of 
something is the end of a time just past, and the f irst 
moment of a subsequent time. But if there was a time before 
the world existed, then it must have been an empty time. And 
this is once again an absurdity. And God himself must have 
been in time. 
'Now how can reason emerge from this conflict between 
its ideas? What is the cause of this dialectical illusion? 
It lies in the fact that I am regarding time, a mere form ot 
sensibility, a mere formal condition, and a phenomenon, as a 
determination of the mundi noumenon' (op. cit. p. 144). 
It might be thought that the central doctrines of the 
Critique render the problem of creation intractable. Kant, 
however, is far from holding that they rule out the divine 
creation of the world. The principles of the Analytic 
concerning the necessi ty of the permanent substratum or 
substance underlying all change and the necessity of the 
causal nexus are principles valid only in the phenomenal 
realm. In any case Kant believes that our empirical concept 
of causality is inadequate to comprehend the notion of 
creation. In the Lectures he says: 'We see very well that 
things in the world can be the cause of something else. Yet 
this quality does not refer to the things themselves; 
it 
refers rather only to their determinations: not to their 
substancer but only to their 
form. It follows that the 
causality by which God is supposed to 
be the author of the 
world must be of a wholly 
different kind. For it is 
impossible to think of God's causality, his faculty of 
actualising things external 
to himself , as anything 
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different from his understanding' (op-cit. p. 97). Kant goes 
on to deal briefly with the problem of a creation that is 
outside time, rcý, iarking that 'God's creation has to have been 
complete at once and instantaneously. For in God only ore 
infinite act can be thought, a simple lasting power which 
created the whole world instantaneously and which maintains 
it in eternity' (op. cit. p. 136). 
For Kantr thenr on the evidence of the Lectures, there 
is no insuperable difficulty in the notion of a creation or 
the world by a God who is outside time. Kant allows the 
doctrine of the creation and dependence of the world on God. 
Why, then, does he reject the cosmological proof? Hi s' 
principal arguments against the cosmological proof concern 
its supposed confusion of the phenomenal world with the 
noumenal. Thus, the proponent of the proof uses such 
principles as that from the contingent we may infer the 
existence of a cause; and that there must have been a 
beginning of the world and thus afi rst cause. These, he 
argues, are valid only of the phenomenal world and cannot be 
appealed to in order to establish the existence of a 
necessary being or f irst cause. If, however, we reject 
Kant's transcendental idealism, with its contrast between the 
phenomenal and the noumenal, his criticisms 
become much less 
persuasive. 
To reject Kantian idealism is not, of course, to restore 
to the principle Of causality or to the more general 
principle of sufficient reason 
the status of analytic 
propositions. As we have seen, 
however, it may be possible 
for the p. roponent of the proof to use 
the proposition that 
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necessary existent, without asserting the analyticity of the 
principle that from the -^ntingent we may infer a cause. He 
may proceed by appealing to the Kantian principle that the 
possible presupposes the actual; and thus that the existence 
of the world proves the existence of a ground of possibility 
in general. To reject Kantian idealism also leaves it open 
to the proponent of the proof to argue that the world had a 
beginning in time and that the unique uncaused event which 
was the beginning of the world must have theological 
impl ic at ions. These two strands may, of course, be followed 
together. 
Kant's criticism of the proof is, as we have seen,, 
principally directed against its second stage. Even here, 
however, there are Kantian elements from which the argument 
could be constructed. The possibility proof is, contrary to 
Kant's own description, essentially cosmological. From the 
existence of something in general we infer a ground of all 
possibility, something supremely actual. This supremely 
actual ground of all possibility Kant equates with the ens 
I real iss imum. Kant denies 'objective validity' to the 
possibility prooft in the Lectures, on the grounds that 
whereas the -only ground for the possibility of things in 
general that we can conceive is the ens realissimum, we 
cannot know that possibility has to be grounded 
in this way. 
As Wood points out,, 'if it is really true that the existence 
of a most real being is the only 
hypothesis by which we can 
account for the absolute possibility of 
things in general, 
then the existence of such possibilities must count as 
evidence confirming that 
hypothesis' (Kant4s Rational 
0 
Theology, p. 77). The question remains, of course, whether 
it 
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is legitimate to talk of 'evidence' and 'hypotheses' in this 
kind of metaphysical debate. 
Much of Kant's criticism of the cosmological proof, and 
indeed much of his criticism of the possibility proof, 
depends on his transcendental idealism. If we reject his 
transcendental idealism, as I believe we must, then it 
follows that many of his criticisms are undermined. It could 
be argued, however, that in rejecting Kantian idealism the 
theist raises more problems than he solves. Kant was 
certainly not antagonistic to theism. He thought that the 
problems of God's relationship with the world were best 
solved in terms of his transcendental idealism and indeed he 
seems to have thought that his theory of knowledge afforded 
protection to theism against philosophical speculation in 
that we are thereby enabled 'to deny knowledge in order to 
make room for faith' (BXXX). Once we reject his theory of 
knowledge the problems of God's relationship with the world 
must be faced anew. 
Perhaps the most intractable problems for the theist are 
those that are associated with the alleged dependence of the 
world on God. For some thinkersf God is merely the 
architect of the world. In this account, God acted on pre- 
existing matter. The difficulty for the theist here is that 
once we accept that matter is eternal and independent we may 
be tempted to ascribe the form of the world to natural law. 
Other philosophers have, like Spinoza, viewed the 
divine 
being as the immanent cause of the world, there 
being no 
absolute distinction between God and nature. 
For others 
again, God is the transcendent cause of 
the world. In this 
debate, there is little room for choice for the proponent of 
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the classical cosmological proof or argument f rom 
contingency. He must take the view that God is the 
transcendent creator of the world because his argument rests 
on the premiss that the world is finite and dependent. 
We have seen that Kant defended the notion of divine 
creation in the Lectures. But he defended this notion in 
terms of his idealism. If this is rejected then we must 
resolve what Kant calls the conflicts between the ideas of 
reason. These conflicts arise when we regard space and time 
as con itions of the existence of God and of the world 
instead of forms of our sensibility. 
In the. Lectures, Kant concentrates on the problems that 
arise for the theologian when the real world is regarded as 
temporal. We have suggested that God could be the source not 
only of the contingent world but also of time itself. This 
is not without its difficulties. It seems to imply that God 
was, at least prior to creation, unchanging. I do not think 
that this implies, as Lucas suggestsr that God's existence 
would be impersonal and without consciousness. It seems 
possible that God should be conscious and yet unchanging. 
Our consciousness involves change as our finite understanding 
ranges over the various objects that claim our attention. 
God's infinite understanding, by contrast, may comprehend 
any number of objects simultaneously. It does not seem to 
follow f rom the fact that God's understanding does not 
involve change essentially that he is incapable of action and 
therefore of creation. Once he created the world he would be 
in time, since he would be in some kind of relationship with 
his creation. 
The difficulties that arise for the rational theologian 
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when the world is regarded as spatial are also serious. if 
God himself is spatial then he presumably is to be regarded 
as the infinite immanent 'cause' of the world. The 
distinction between God and the world then becomes untenable 
and we are involved in Spinozism. This position has been 
undermined by the difficulties discovered in the notion of 
inf inity. If , however, God is regarded as the transcendent 
creator of the world it becomes difficult to comprehend how 
creation was effected. In Spinoza's view, God cannot be 
separate from his creation because different substances have 
nothing in common, and, 'of two things having nothing in 
common between them, one cannot be the cause of the other 
(Ethics I prop. III). To say that the notion of creation ex 
nihilo is beyond our f inite understanding is to invite the 
rejoinder that this is simply because it is unintelligible. 
Kant often refers to God as the ens realissimum. The 
world is said to be derived from the ens realissimum, i. e., 
it der iv es i ts share of real i ty f rom the sum tota 1ofa 11 
re ali ty. In the Critique we read that 'all manifoldness of 
things is only a correspondingly varied mode of limiting the 
concept of the highest reality which forms their common 
substratum' -ýA578/B606). There would appear, on this 
4- ' ute distinction Lbetween God aticl Lhe account, to be no abso-L 
world. For Kant, of course, the precise nature of the 
relationship of God to the world is veiled by transcendental 
idealism. 
The problems raised by the doctrine of creation become 
more acute once we re3ect idealism. 
If God is the immanent 
cause of material substance then 
it 
I 
may ! De argued that that 
substance cannot be finite. But 
the world is finite in Space 
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and time. on the other hand it is difficult to comprehend 
how a transcendent God could bring into being a substance 
having nothing in common with the divine essence. 
One way out of the difficulty in which the rational 
theologian finds himself may be provided by the monadism that 
informed much of the metaphysics of Kant's day. Creation can 
be understood as the bringing into being of monads that are 
simple, irreducible entities without the distinction in 
substance that separates God from the material world. The 
monads, may be conceived as unextended and yet as endowed with 
f orce. Some such notion lies behind the dynamism of 
Boscovich's Theoria Philosophiae Naturalis of 1763 where 
unextended point-atoms are centres of fields of force. 
Space, in these circumstances, may be regarded as 
ontologically dependent on the inter-reaction of the monads. 
God, since he is not in inter-reaction with the monads, may 
be regarded as non-spatial. 
In spite of the fact that it seems to provide a way out 
of the difficulties that beset the doctrine of creation, Kant 
rejects monadism. In the thesis of the Second Antinomy he 
argues that the discrete monadic nature Of matter can be 
demonstrated on the grounds that 'if all composition [of 
composite substances] be removed in thought, no composite 
part will remain' (A439/B467). In the antithesis of the 
antinomy, howeverr he argues that this monadology 
is 
inconsistent with the infinite divisibility of matter. 
According to Kant, the monadists have raised objections 
'against the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter' 
(A439/B467). He goes on to object that 'were we to give heed 
to themr then beside the mathematical point, which, while 
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simple, is not a part but only the limit of a space, we 
should have to conceive physical points as being likewise 
simple, and yet as having the distinguishing characteristic 
of being able, as parts of space, to fill space through their 
mere aggregation' (ibid. ). 
Kant sought, in this antinomy, to provide a further 
demonstration of the contradictions that arise when we regard 
the space/time world as real. The contradiction here is only 
apparent, however, since the concept of the extensionless 
monad is entirely compatible with the infinite divisibility 
of extended matter. 
We have argued that Kant's claim to have established 
transcendental idealism cannot be sustained, and that his 
criticisms of the cosmological argument are inconclusive. 
The arguments of the Critique do, however, present two 
hurdles that the proponent of the proof must clear. He can 
no longer place absolute reliance on synthetic a priori 
principles such as those of causality and sufficient reason. 
He must therefore widen the scope of the proof if it is to be 
convincing. Further, most versions of the proof complete 
only the first stage of the argument. Kant insists that the 
proponent of the proof provide an argument to 
identify the 
necessary being or first cause of the first stage with 
God. 
In insisting on this point Kant brings out the formidable 
difficulties involved in the second stage of the proof. 
In view of his severe criticisms it may seem paradoxical 
that Kant provides much material in the antinomies, 
in the 
possibili ty proof and elsewhere, 
that is useful to the 
proponent of the cosmological proof. 
What makes Kant's 
treatment of the proof particularly 
interesting is his 
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sympathy with i t and wi th the aims of the rati onal 
theologian. Kant wished to undermine rational theology only 
in order to make way for his moral theology. He appears at 
least to allow a certain persuasive force to the proof. The 
argument, he writes, 'continues to have a certain importance 
and to be endowed with an authority of which we cannot, 
simply on the ground of ... objective insufficiency, at once 
proceed to divest it' (A588f/B616f). How much 'persuasive 
force' we allow to the proof will depend on our metaphysical 
presuppositions. I believe, however, that the tendency to 
cosmological speculation, which Kant depicts, requires a 
stronger corrective than is provided by the epistemology of 
the Critique; and it is in his epistemology that he seeks to 
provide his real disproof of the possibility, not merely ot 
rational theology, but of metaphysics in general . 
